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One would rather warm a cold bench for one decade than write articles with emptiness. 
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This thesis explores the evolution of Chinese IP mechanisms during national 
development and transition to becoming a well-developed country. This subject is 
studied from the perspective of intellectual property (IP), with a special focus on the 
People’s Republic of China since 1949. 
 
Internationally, the Chinese State, as a late-developing country, has adopted various 
mechanisms to narrow its gap in income and in technological capability in relation to 
developed countries. Meanwhile, internally, China itself is going through a crucial stage 
of social transition, and switching its economic model from labour-intensive mode to 
high-tech and innovation-intensive mode. During China’s international ‘catch-up’ 
process, and its own social transition, the role of IP has constantly changed.  
 
This research on China’s IP covers a period of the late Qing Dynasty until early June 
2017, especially focusing on the period after 1949 and the modern Chinese IP system 
since its Reform and Opening-up Policy in 1979. The reviewed literature covers: (1) 
Chinese IP-related legislation and policies; (2) the domestic and international academic 
IP studies; (3) research reports from international organizations; (4) central reports from 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, other reports and speeches 
from the central government with a historical period start from 1933; and (5) IP-related 
annual reports and statistics from the State Intellectual Property Office and the various 
levels of the people’s court. 
 
This thesis combines the narrative approach of Chinese IP studies, law in context, and 
historical perspective, and specifically studies the question: ‘what is the IP system’s 
role in the catch-up process of China?’ The main research question is divided into sub 
questions: How does the development of the IP system and the national Science and 
Technology (S&T) integrate with each other (Chapter 2)? How is the IP system 
absorbed into Chinese society? The absorption of an IP system is explored via two 
aspects: one imperative aspect is the evolution of IP system from the perspective of 
enforcement (Chapter 3); and the other is how the IP system from the state level 
involved has impacted on the Chinese business players (Chapter 4). The manuscript 
concludes: Even though external pressures played an undeniable role during Chinese 
IP development, which can chase back to the 19th Century, China has been constantly 
advancing its IP system and its implementation mainly because of its internal and 
developmental needs since 1949 (Chapter 5). The outcome of this thesis summarises 
the three decades of Chinese modern IP development and its enforcement in the 
following way: an advanced legislation system that goes along with the international 
standards, an enforcement system with Chinese characteristics, and an administrative 
system for registration and examination focusing mainly on the domestic industries yet 
taking international practices as reference. China’s adjustments of the IP policies are 
ultimately determined by the overall objectives for catching up and building an 
innovative country. China updates its IP system strictly in line with its level of national 
S&T development. Based on the internal and international conditions, it is a selected 
development model from China’s side to emphasize IP reform and modernization. 
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1. Brief Description of the Contemporary Chinese Science and Technology System, 
and Intellectual Property System 
 
During the period of planned economy after the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949, inventions belonged to the state.1 Thus, privatization of the result of 
knowledge was illegal. 2  Neither individuals nor organizations could claim an 
ownership of intellectual invention, nor monopolize the creations.3 In the late 1970s, 
Deng Xiaoping’s proposition ‘science and technology is the number one productivity’4 
had properly established a social and legal identity for the creators as the ‘first wealth 
creator’ in China.5 In 1977, Deng addressed that China ‘shall acknowledge it fell 
behind the developed countries’, so that for China to achieve modernization, the key 
was to improve its science and technology. 6 Chinese society shall respect those who 
engage in mental works and recognize them as workers. 7  In the 1980s, the 
establishment of the modern intellectual property (IP) system has legalized the creators’ 
rights as private rights.8 Moreover, the introduction of IP denotes the start of the reform 
                                                
1 Art. 23, Regulation on Invention Reward 1963 
2 źǨǽɳ=Əƿȗ:ǛAƱäúǛȄ 2014 (C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th 
edn, Renmin University Press 2014)). 
3 Details see, such as, Regulation on Invention Reward 1963 
4 ʩċĠʩċĠŭʣȗ¥AƱǛȄ 1993, 274 ˕ Deng X, Selected Works of Deng 
Xiaoping, Vol.3, Renmin Press, 1993, p274.  
5 źǨǽɳ=Əƿȗ:ǛAƱäúǛȄ 2014 (C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th 
edn, Renmin University Press 2014)) 32. 
6 ʩċĠĊʳǽɳĊʳAŕ	ʩċĠŭʣ1975-1982AƱǛȄ 1983 X Deng, 
Respect Knowledge, Respect Talents, Selected Papers of Deng Xiaoping(1975-1982) (Renmin Press 
1983). 
7 ʩċĠĊʳǽɳĊʳAŕ	ʩċĠŭʣ1975-1982AƱǛȄ 1983 X Deng, 
Respect Knowledge, Respect Talents, Selected Papers of Deng Xiaoping(1975-1982) (Renmin Press 
1983). For development summarization of the first thirty decades after the establishment of People’s 
Republic of China since 1949, see X Deng, Implement the Policy of Readjustment, Ensure Stability and 
Unit (25 December 1980). 
8 S Zheng and others, Peking University Encyclopedia of Jurisprudence (Peking University Press 2001). 
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of Chinese property law.9 It is a milestone. It has offered a system grantee for liberate 
individuals, and can ‘represent the legislative orientation of civil law in China’.10 The 
Chinese IP system has held great strategic importance for Chinese social reform since 
2008, focused on improving social productive forces as a comprehensive national 
strength.11 The strategic importance of the IP system is reflected in four ways:12 (1) 
The IP system introduces the legal and political mechanisms to promote the capacity to 
create, utilize, protect, and administer intellectual property, so as to improve China’s 
capacity for independent innovation and to build China into an innovative country. (2) 
Implementing and improving the IP system helps to improve China’s socialist market 
economy, standardize the market order, and establish a creditworthy society. (3) The 
reform of knowledge and technology is a precondition for economic development. The 
Chinese IP system provides necessary systematic support for legal protections for 
intellectual results.13 The IP system has been established in order to boost and benefit 
the Chinese economic development. 14  The IP system can enhance the market 
competitiveness of Chinese enterprises and strengthen the core competitiveness of 
                                                
9 ʭŎł, ŎłĬɣĵ (ǽɳ=ƏǛȄ 2012) (C Zheng, Chengsi’s Enlightenments (Intellectual 
Property Press, 2012)). 
10 ‘ǽɳ=ƏĨFɗ4ŏÏƱ6ȒƿǲŰ¾’ źǨǽɳ=Əƿȗ:ǛAƱäúǛ
Ȅ 2014(C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th edn, Renmin University Press 2014)) 33. Prof. Liu’s 
statement may sounds questionable to some Western scholars, especially for these who define IP as a 
special discipline under civil law. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify that, Prof. Liu’s statement was 
made in the context of People’s Republic China’s Reform and Opening-up. This statement correctly 
underlines the fundamental and great significance of IP in China. The introduce of IP caused systematic 
changes inside China on its economy and property system. The establishment of IP represents the historic 
moment when market economy has started to replace the planned economy. Moreover, both the General 
Provisions of Chinese Civil Law (2017) and General Principles of Chinese Civil Law (1986) regulates 
IP right as a basic part of civil right. IP law in China is not considered as special law. Comparing to 
traditional civil law disciplines, such as inherence law or family law, the intensive legal reform has been 
carried out in property law. Therefore, Chinese IP can represent the legislative orientation of Chinese 
civil law. 
11 Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (2008). 
12 Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (2008). 
See such as, S Rein, The End of Copycat China: The Rise of Creativity, Innovation, and Individualism 
in Asia (John Wiley & Sons, Inc 2014) 
13 Âƴ!, ‘ȪǊůĞŁǽɳ=Əǲů˟®ď’ [2016] ƿú 31 (H Wu, ‘Innovation-
Driven And Development Of Intellectual Property Under The New Economic Norm’ [2016] Legal 
Science) 31. 
14 źǨǽɳ=Əƿȗ:ǛAƱäúǛȄ 2014(C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th edn, 
Renmin University Press 2014)) 29-33. 
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China. (4) IP helps China to further open-up to the outside world. 15  The 
indispensability of the IP system is a bridge for China to be involved in the international 
circle of modern business.16  
 
After the Reform and Opening-up Policy17 in 1979, China had a speedy development 
due to its attractive labour conditions, low wages, and open policies to foreign 
investments.18 Because of the internal social conditions and external international 
situation in China before 1979, China had no option but to develop the country based 
on a labour-intensive and low-technology model of economy after its opening-up.19 
Nowadays, summarized by Xi Jinping ‘China’s reform has entered into a deep water 
area after more than 30 years reform and opening-up. It can be said, the easy and 
everyone-is-satisfied type of reform has been completed, delicious meat is eaten, the 
rest are all tough issues.’20 According to Xi Jinping, the main ‘tough issues’ are, but 
not limited to: (1) the continued prominence of imbalanced, disharmonious, and 
unsustainable problems, which have been generated by development; (2) the innovative 
                                                
15 Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (2008). 
16 źǨǽɳ=Əƿȗ:ǛAƱäúǛȄ 2014(C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th edn, 
Renmin University Press 2014)) 29-33. 
17 Reform and Opening-up Policy refers to one of the two basic points of development, introduced by 
Mr. Deng Xiaoping. It is the fundamental line development of the Chinese Communist Party in the 
primary stage of socialism. This general policy of the socialist modernization drive was introduced by 
the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1978. 
‘Reform’ means the internal reform, which is to adhere to the socialist system under the premise of 
consciously adjust and reform. ‘Open’ means open to the outside world, which is to speed up the 
inevitable choice of China's modernization, in line with the characteristics of today's international 
environment and the development trend of the world. The Reform and Opening-up Policy is a long-term 
national policy. SeeêǃA, ȇú®ďɞǱȇɵsǌʘ2ǛȄ2007 (J Xi, The Encyclopedia 
of Scientific Development (Shanghai Lexicographic Publishing House 2007)). 
18 C Chen, Foreign Direct Investment in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011). 
19  K Shao, ‘History is a Key Decoder: Why China Aims at Re-Emerging as a Global Leader of 
Innovation’ [2013] 29 Law in Context 117. 
20 ‘%Ïŧ˔ȪʚãġęʝiǑƲ³GɼĄŹǲǳäƦÌǲŧ˔ęȪüŎ4í
¹ǲȻʰ¹Ţ4ǲʰŻˋËǲȁˢè’ %n%ç%āʮ, 1ʜĠń2ɫʳɛɬɷɽƋ (A
ƱǛȄ 2014) (Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the 
General Secretary Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014)) 41. For a detailed understanding and analyses of the 
Reform and Opening-up Policy in the last 30 years, see Publicity Department of the Communist Party of 
China, Important Speeches of the General Secretary Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014) 17. 
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capacity for technology is low; (3) industrial structure is irrational and the development 
mode is extensive; (4) both the development and income gap between urban and rural 
regions is wide; (5) social contradictions are significantly increased; (6) various 
problems exist in the areas which are closely connected to people’s vital interests: 
education, employment , medical care, housing, ecological environment, food and drug 
safety, safety in production, and judicial enforcement and judicial affairs, and social 
security; (7) some citizens have hard life; (8) problems of formalism, bureaucracy, 
hedonism and extravagance are prominent; and (9) grave challenges and daunting tasks 
remain in fighting corruption.21 China is in a crucial period of social transition, and the 
Chinese government has begun to comprehensively move to ‘deepen reform’22 and 
transfer its economy to a knowledge-based model.23 
 
The Chinese macro strategy, also known as ‘the grand strategy’, offers a broader and 
more comprehensive content for its micro strategies. In order to obtain political 
objectives, which include the assurance of external security and internal social 
development in peace and war, the dominant task of the 21st Century for the Chinese 
government is its economic and domestic development.24 This grand strategy can be 
divided into three parts: (1) a sustainable domestic development with sufficient 
indemnification; (2) a peaceful international environment; and (3) a military posture for 
reliable self-defence.25 All the national strategies at every micro level reflect this grand 
                                                
21 Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the General Secretary 
Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014) 40. 
22 %n%ç,%n%ço8j˓Ǒŧ˔Ɍğʳäˀ˚ǲ|, 2013 (The CPC Central Committee, 
Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Deepening the Reform of Several 
Major Issues (2013)). 
23 jÏAƱFɗäOȗ7ĎjÏAƱFɗäOȗƥOɪo8 2014ġÏƱȪǊÇȄO®ď
ɧŖɕņ} 2015 ġÏƱȪǊÇȄO®ďɧǲ|ɪ 2015 (People’s Congress, The Second 
Session of the Twelfth National People 's Congress Resolution on the Implementation of the National 
Economic and Social Development Plan in 2014 and the National Economic and Social Development 
Plan 2015 (2015)). For detailed academic studies, such as CA Varum, C Huang and JJBG Gouveia, 
China: Building an Innovative Economy (Chandos Publishing Limited 2007). 
24 B Zheng, China’s Peaceful Raise- Speeches of Zheng Bijian (1997-2005) (Brookings Institution Press 
2005). 
25 B Huldt and others, China Rising - Reactions, Assessments, and Strategic Consequences (The Swedish 
National Defense College 2008). 
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strategy. Since the Reform and Opening-up in 1979, China has developed considerably. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese government has keenly acknowledged the problems the 
country has as a developing country.26 ‘The country has a dual structure model of 
development’, according to Wu Yi, who was the Vice Premier of the State Council27: 
China is a country with a large population and weak economic foundation; it is also a 
country with big gap in natural and geographic conditions’ distribution. China has a 
vast difference between population and resource distribution, a considerable divergence 
of development between the urban and rural areas, and the development level is 
considerably different between the regions.28 According to an international synthesis 
report29 to the Office of Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs 
and the National Development and Reform Commission of China, the Chinese 
economy can be roughly divided into three groups based on the divergent individual 
income levels: (1) rural economy, which is based on the traditional agriculture with 
underemployment; (2) coastal economy, which is based on the export industries. It 
offers low wages. Although it has been leading the Chinese economy for the last two 
decades, it will slowly decline and disappear; and (3) knowledge-based economy, 
which is a productivity-driven and knowledge-based economic model that will lead the 
Chinese economy for the next decade, and support the transition of China to a high-
income country. Nonetheless, given the regional diversity in economic and 
development levels in China, macro strategy must be balanced to accommodate these 
                                                
26 Detailed illustrations see Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches 
of the General Secretary Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014). 
27 Ms. Wu Yi was the Vice Premier of the State Council during the period of 2003 to 2008. 
28 Y Wu, ‘China’s Development Road’ (2006), First China-US Strategic Economic Dialogue; see also 
MK Whyte, ‘Sub-Optimal Institutions but Superior Growth: The Puzzle of China’s Economic Boom’ in 
J Lin and L Wang (eds), China’s Economic Dynamics: A Beijing Consensus in the Making? (Routledge 
2014). 
29 E Lim and M Spence, Medium and Long Term Development and Transformation of the Chinese 
Economy. An International Perspective (Beijing Cairncross Economic Research Foundation 2011) 
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jcarpen0/Chinaluncheon/Synthesis%20Report%20Complete%20English.p
df> accessed 12 November 2013. 
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needs. The macro strategy should enhance a sustainable and healthy development of 
the Chinese economy.30 
 
China has experienced a period of rapid growth, similar to that observed in other 
developing countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. 
However, as already been shown in these developing countries, robust development 
cannot sustain indefinite growth. The Chinese government is keenly aware of the needs 
for transformation of its development pattern, and such intentions are well illustrated 
in its national science and technology (S&T) and IP strategies. Reflected through these 
strategies, instead of the previous sustained growth mode of raw materials and massive 
exports of low technical goods, China is switching its economic engine to innovation.31 
China is replacing its previous sustained growth mode to a sustainable one, which is 
the mode of a knowledge-based economy and domestic consumption.32 
 
The development challenges of China are unique. Firstly, comparing with countries 
such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Colombia that underwent similar periods of rapid 
economic growth, the level of urbanization in China is lower.33 Until 2013, the ratio of 
                                                
30 Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the General Secretary 
Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014) 57-75. 
31 Such as, Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Outline of the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy (2008); The Outlines on National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020) (2006); see also OECD, OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy- 
China (2008). 
32 Such as, Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Outline of the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy (2008); The Outlines on National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020) (2006); see also OECD, OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy- 
China (2008). Moreover, the State Council has issued its group regulation, the Outline of National 
Innovation - Driven Development Strategy in 2016, by which the importance of the national transition 
has been implemented at a strategic level inside the state administrative organs. The Outline of National 
Innovation - Driven Development Strategy (2016) is not a national law but a comprehensive provision 
for all the relevant administrative organs, which are under the supervision of the State Council. Thus, 
this strategy will not be discussed in detail within this manuscript. The Chinese title of this outline isÏ
ăů˟®ďőǮȥɛ(2016). 
33  JV Henderson, ‘Urbanization in China: Policy Issues and Options’ (2009) 
<www.s4.brown.edu/china2012/Papers/Final%20Report%20format1109summary.pdf> accessed 15 
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urbanization reached 53.7%.34 Chinese government is confronting various issues35 
caused by its urbanization process. Secondly, the homogeneity of the Chinese economy 
is low as well. 36  Existing studies have shown that: the disparities exist between 
different regions of China and also between its rural and urban areas.37This means that 
China contains a mixture of transformations of different types of development patterns 
after the Reform and Opening-up Policy.38 The undeveloped regions still have a need 
for a transition from capital and labour input-driven growth to a development model of 
productivity gain. For the developing regions or early-stage developed regions, the 
transition might then involve a changing emphasis—from industry to services. 
Meanwhile, many of the well-developed regions require a change from foreign 
demands to domestic spending.39 Despite ‘reducing the gap between the ambition of 
China’s plan and their uneven implementation’40, the Chinese central government 
                                                
April 2013. Statistic shows that ‘China’s annual rate of urban population growth, at 3-4% during 1990-
2004, was below the 5-6% rates typically experienced by other developing countries during their periods 
of rapid economic growth. Correspondingly, China’s level of urbanization in 2008 (45.7%) was below 
the 55% level typical for a country with China’s level of real income per capita.’ 
34 Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the General Secretary 
Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014) 72. 
35 Such as social security problems, resource insufficiencies, severe environment pollutions, capital 
deficits, population issues and issues of interests’ conflicts and so on. See Publicity Department of the 
Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the General Secretary Xi Jinping (Renmin Press, 
2014) 57-75. 
36 ʋAP, ‘%ʽƈ®ďɟ_ʶÏ˃Ȫˡǲˀ˚ ——ɢɽ%ÏȪǊ%ʽƈ®ďÇʔ×Ï˃
ɠɡǲłȵĬɪ	’ [2011] ȪǊúŁ 4-12 (R Zhao, ‘Long-term Development Plan: Drawing on 
the Experience of International Experience - Interpretation of China's Medium and Long-term Economic 
Development and Transformation: Reflections and Suggestions from an International Perspective’[2011] 
Dynamics of Economics) 4-12. 
37 E Lim and M Spence, Medium and Long Term Development and Transformation of the Chinese 
Economy an International Perspective (Beijing Cairncross Economic Research Foundation 2011) 
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jcarpen0/Chinaluncheon/Synthesis%20Report%20Complete%20English.p
df> accessed 12 November 2013. 
38 DL Yang, ‘Economic Transformation and State Rebuilding in China’ in BJ Naughton (ed), Holding 
China Together, Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era (Cambridge University Press 
2004). 
39 E Lim and M Spence, Medium and Long Term Development and Transformation of the Chinese 
Economy an International Perspective (Beijing Cairncross Economic Research Foundation 2011) 
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jcarpen0/Chinaluncheon/Synthesis%20Report%20Complete%20English.p
df> accessed 12 November 2013; see also China Development Research Foundation, China’s New 
Urbanization Strategy (Routledge 2013) 
40 E Lim and M Spence, Medium and Long Term Development and Transformation of the Chinese 
Economy an International Perspective (Beijing Cairncross Economic Research Foundation 2011) 
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confronts the unavoidable diversity from one region to another as a severe challenge. 
To break through the current economic development challenges, China is adopting a 
synchronous development model of promoting the industrialization, informatization, 
urbanization, and agricultural modernization.41 The delivery of policies is localized 
and decentralized, however, it would be questionable if the country’s legal system could 
correspond with the implementation of policies.  
 
In order to have a clear view on Chinese IP, one needs to look at the economic and S&T 
disciplines. After all, IP is not the very first agenda for the country’s development.42 
The IP system is generated by the property system from trades, as a result of industrial 
civilization.43 China is no different from other countries: if there is no S&T oriented 
industry in the country, then there is no base from which to discuss innovation-oriented 
IP.44 The national policy on S&T has developed from ‘March toward science’ (1956), 
‘Science and technology is the number one productivity’ (1978), and ‘Relying on 
science and education to rejuvenate the nation’ (1995), to ‘Constructing the National 
Innovation System’ (2006).45  China is strategically creating a national innovation 
system (NIS), which should be relatively well-established by 2020.46  
 
                                                
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jcarpen0/Chinaluncheon/Synthesis%20Report%20Complete%20English.p
df> accessed 12 November 2013. 
41 Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the General Secretary 
Xi Jinping (Renmin Press, 2014) 57-75. 
42 źǨǽɳ=Əƿȗ:ǛAƱäúǛȄ 2014 (C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th 
edn, Renmin University Press 2014)) 25. 
43 Âƴ! ,‘ǽɳ=ƏƋʊǲãȭĨɢɽ’ [2006] %Ïƿú  31 (H Wu, Interpretation of multi-
dimensional nature of intellectual property rights, [2006] China Legal Science) 31. 
44 ƐŸĻǽɳ=Əƿȗ7ǛȄOȇúˆǛȄ 2014(Li M, Intellectual Property Law (2nd 
edn, Social Sciences Academic Press 2014)). 
45 L Yang, ‘Implementation of China’s Rejuvenation through Knowledge’ in K Shao and X Feng (eds), 
Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2012); see also Z Song, 
‘From Marching Toward Science to Rejuvenating China by Relying on Science and Education: 
Comments on the Party’s Policy of Science and Technology since the Founding of New China’ 14 
Journal of Hulun Buir College 78 
46  J Hu, ‘Generally Complete the Construction of the National Innovation System with Chinese 
Characteristics by 2020’ China Daily (7 September 2012). 
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China’s current economic model is not for a long-term competition.47 The labour-
intensive and export driven industry model of China can not sufficiently compete with 
the existing high-tech and innovation-intensive industry model of developed countries. 
Meanwhile, China needs to stay up-to-date with the changes not only within China but 
also in the global environment, especially when the era of cheap capital around the 
world is coming to an end.48 China has turned its orientation to the emerging industries. 
By doing so, China is strategically avoiding the existing patent gardens of developed 
countries and arguably standing at the same starting line with many developed 
countries.49 A parallel construction of the IP system and NIS has been designed as part 
of a holistic plan of making China into a comprehensively well-off society by 2020. 
Moreover, the Chinese government keenly realizes its needs for an independent S&T 
strength for the country’s further development.50 IP and its strategies must support 
China’s overall development and contribute to its NIS.51  
 
China strongly commits to developing the country into a moderately prosperous 
society52 with a focus on innovation.53 The downstream effects of the development of 
the NIS and IP system are worth anticipating. Their impact will become increasingly 
                                                
47 E Lim and M Spence, Medium and Long Term Development and Transformation of the Chinese 
Economy an International Perspective (Beijing Cairncross Economic Research Foundation 2011) 
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jcarpen0/Chinaluncheon/Synthesis%20Report%20Complete%20English.p
df> accessed 12 November 2013. 
48 R Dobbs and others, ‘Farewell to Cheap Capital? The Implications of Long-Term Shifts in Global 
Investment and Saving’ (Mckinsey Global Institute 2010) <www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-
equity-and-principal-investors/our-insights/farewell-cheap-capital> accessed 11 December 2014. 
49 ʭŎł, ŎłĬɣĵ (ǽɳ=ƏǛȄ 2012) (C Zheng, Chengsi’s Enlightenments (Intellectual 
Property Press, 2012)). See also K Shao and X Feng, Innovation and Intellectual Property in China 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014), or Yu P, ‘The International Enclosure of China’s Innovation 
Space’, Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014) 
50 Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the General Secretary 
Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014) 67. 
51  The Outlines on National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology 
Development (2006-2020) 2006. See also Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, 
Important Speeches of the General Secretary Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014) 67. 
52 J Xi, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages Press 2014). 
53 X Fu, China’s Path to Innovation (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
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obvious and offer a solid base for the nation’s later economic reforms.54 The goal is to 
become a world S&T power until the mid-21st century.55 As Xi Jingping noted, ‘We 
are a big country, we shall have our own things in regards of the innovations in science 
and technology […] It takes forever and it is almost impossible to narrow the gap by 
simply following behind and imitating.’56 The systematic constructions are carried out 
not only in concern of the Chinese domestic conditions but also in the context of a 
changing global environment. The domestic conditions and international environment 
are separate, yet linking factors that shall not be separately discussed.57 However, the 
development of the country into a moderately prosperous society seemed to be a one-
sided wish from China as a developing country. In 1982, Deng Xiaoping stated that ‘It 
is not an easy thing to gain capital or technology from developed countries’.58 Above 
all, although the main perspective of this monograph is ‘catching-up’, its starting point 
is to take into account the ‘domestic conditions’ and ‘international pressures’ altogether 
as one general background.59 
 
In order to serve the construction of the NIS, China has significantly deepened its 
reform of the S&T system. The Chinese State Council issued the Outline for Medium 
and Long-term Program for Science and Technology Development 2006-2020 (2006-
                                                
54 Economic reform is the core of the current Chinese reform. During the ongoing comprehensive moves 
to deepen reforms, economic reform is the ‘principal axis’, it leads and spurs reforms in other fields. So 
that all the reforms can form into one force, rather than few fragmented and scattered forces. Detailed 
illustrations see Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the 
General Secretary Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014) 38-56. 
55  The Outlines on National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology 
Development (2006-2020) (2006). 
56 ‘ŏHŻ$äÏÑȇŘůɛƅɃĘǲ!ɚîƚ²ŻʏÑA½˓ƣMʪ+ČƳʞ
³ȿȯċėʎ’ %n%ç%āʮ, 1ʜĠń2ɫʳɛɬɷɽƋ (AƱǛȄ 2014) (Publicity 
Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the General Secretary Xi Jinping 
(Renmin Press 2014)) 67. 
57  T Wen, ‘The Relationship between China’s Strategic Changes and Its Industrialization and 
Capitalization’ in TY Cao (ed), The Chinese Model of Modern Development (Routledge 2005). 
58 X Deng, Our State’s Historic Experience on Economic Constructions (6 May 1982). 
59 One may argue that domestic conditions and external pressures are different perspectives. However, 
as a same logic as the Reform and Opening-up Policy in China, a strict and clear division of internal 
‘reform’ and external ‘opening-up’ in real life is hardly possible, and has a very limited academic 
necessity. 
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2020 Outline).60 Meanwhile, China is running a research and development system, 
consisting of major special S&T projects. Specific projects are identified in the 2006-
2020 outline together with the national S&T programme. These projects are: (1) basic 
research directed by the National Natural Science Foundation and National Basic 
Research Programme established in March 1997; and (2) applied research and 
programmes together with modelling products or key technologies.61  
 
The State Council published the Opinion on Deepening Institutional Reforms of Science 
and Technology and Fastening the Construction of National Innovation System62 in 
2012. This opinion has highlighted several actions involved in the construction of the 
NIS, such as: (1) making further improvements in the current policy, its design, and 
implementation capacity, in order to assist the market-oriented conditions for the 
innovative and creative industry; (2) strengthening academic-industrial linkages; (3) 
improving the funding system; and (4) enhancing the commercialization of intellectual 
property. These efforts are all macro mechanisms to: (1) improve the political 
environment for independent S&T; (2) assure the orientation of S&T to social 
development; and (3) improve the efficiency of the NIS, in offering and promoting 
advantages for independent innovation.63 
 
The NIS was strategically designed by the State Council of China. Its construction can 
be traced back to 1998, when China established the State Science and Education 
Leading Group, directed by the Prime Minister of China, in order to establish a proper 
                                                
60 Ïă%ʽƈȇúÇŘƌ®ďɟȥɛ2006-20202006	(The Outlines on National Medium- 
and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020) (2006)) 
<www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/gjkjgh/200811/t20081129_65774.htm>. 
61  Y Wang, ‘China’s National Innovation System and Innovation Policy’ (2012) 
<http://apctt.org/nis/sites/all/themes/nis/pdf/CSNWorkshop_Report_P2S2_Wang.pdf> accessed 7 May 
2013. 
62 Available at <www.most.gov.cn/eng/pressroom/201211/t20121119_98014.htm#>, accessed 15 May 
2014. 
63 Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the General Secretary 
Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014) 67. 
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NIS. This group consists of the Ministry of Science and Technology,64 the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and the Natural Science 
Foundation Commission. Apart from these members, the Ministry of Health and the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection were also directly involved in the construction of 
the NIS.65 In addition to the ministries at the central state level, China has an innovation 
system at the province level, because provinces in China each have their own Bureau 
of Science and Technology. Under this province level, China has a county level system 
for S&T administration. 
 
The institutional reforms in S&T are constructed so that the intellectual results can fall 
within an environment with IP protections.66 In short, by providing IP protections to 
technological development, China aims to provide motivation for technological 
innovation by: (1) creating a functioning institutional environment to conduct 
technological innovation; (2) encouraging the enterprises and individuals to be 
enthusiastically involved as main players; and (3) acknowledging the legitimate rights 
and interests for the innovations’ contributors.67  Thus, in the last 30 years China 
impressively constructed its IP system since its Reform and Opening-up Policy. 
 
Compared with US, the EU and EU member states’ IP law-making process, China 
completed its IP law-making and international regulatory compliance in a very short 
period. Chinese IP law has been designed together with other commercial law 
disciplines to serve China’s economic development. Chinese Trademark Law was 
                                                
64 Before 1998, it was the State Council of Science and Technology. In 1998, the State Council of 
Science and Technology was recomposed into the Ministry of Science and Technology. 
65 Y Wang, ‘China’s National Innovation System and Innovation Policy’ (Workshop Report 2012). 
66 X Feng, ‘Challenges to China’s Self-Driven Innovation’ in K Shao and X Feng (eds), Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014). 
67 X Feng, ‘Challenges to China’s Self-Driven Innovation’ in K Shao and X Feng (eds), Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014). 
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released in 1982, and has been amended three times in 1993, 2001, and 2013.68 The 
Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China was released in 1984, and has been 
amended three times in 1992, 2000 and 2008.69 Copy Right Law was passed in 1990 
and has two amendments, which are the 2001 and 2010 amendments.70 China signed 
all the important international IP treaties within the last 30 years.71  
 
The IP system is defined in the Outline of The National Intellectual Property Strategy 
(2008), which was in preparation since 2004. According to The Circular of the General 
Office of the State Council on Establishing the Leading Group for the Work concerning 
Formulating the Strategy for National Intellectual Property Right, 72  this steering 
group73 is directed by previous Vice Premier Wu Yi.74 The Outline is a series of 
policies which regulates China’s IP-related actions since 2008. It is the first incidence 
                                                
68 For detailed info on the evolution of Chinese Trademark Law, seeƐŸĻǽɳ=Əƿȗ7Ǜ
ȄOȇúˆǛȄ 2014 (M Li, Intellectual Property Law (2nd edn, Social Sciences Academic Press 
2014)). 
69 See the detailed evolution of Chinese Patent Law in Chapter 2. 
70 For detailed info on the evolution of Chinese Copyright Law, seeƐŸĻǽɳ=Əƿȗ7Ǜ
ȄOȇúˆǛȄ 2014 (M Li, Intellectual Property Law (2nd edn, Social Sciences Academic Press 
2014)). 
71 X Wen, ‘Planning Development Department of the State Intellectual Property Office: Improving 
Intellectual Property Protection, Establishing Innovative Countries’ [2007] 1 Patent Statistics Bulletin 
25-42. 
72 Ïˆk¦o8ŎȒÏăǽɳ=ƏőǮþĕU˘Ĉċȧǲʤǽ (Circular of the General 
Office of the State Council on Establishing the Leading Group for the Work concerning Formulating the 
Strategy for National Intellectual Property Right) 2005. 
73  The group includes the State Council, the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce  (SAIC), the Copyright Bureau, the Development and 
Reform Commission, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Public 
Security, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Personnel, the Ministry of Information Industry, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Health, the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the General Administration of Customs, the 
Administration of Taxation, the Administration of Quality Supervision, the Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ), the State Environment Protection Administration, the State Administration of Radio, Film and 
Television(SARFT), the State Forestry Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, the 
Legislative Affairs Office, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
and the Academy of Engineering.  
74 Z Zhang, ‘Roadmaps of China’s National Intellectual Property Strategy Outline’ in K Shao and X 
Feng (eds), Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014). 
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of IP strategically becoming a subject at the highest political level in China, which 
suggests that Chinese government has become more focused on IP than previously.75 
The 2008 Outline contains details of the guiding principles and strategic goals, and 
focuses on specific tasks together with a timeline for action.  
 
One of the aims of the 2008 Outline is to strengthen the IP judicial protection system. 
Moreover, the 2008 Outline confirmed the leading role of the Chinese court in 
protecting IP. The people’s courts of all levels play a role in protecting IP. 
 
The IP judicial practice in China is relatively new: the first IP tribunal was held in the 
Beijing High People’s Court in 1993. The Supreme People’s Court of China (SPC) 
established its IP tribunal in 1996. At present, China holds IP tribunals both at the 
central and local levels.  
 
China has 32 high people’s courts, 409 intermediate courts, and 3117 basic courts.76 
Every high people’s court has an IP tribunal. In Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, 
China also established distinct intermediate courts specialized for only civil and 
administrative IP cases.77 Up until January 2017, a total of 63 intermediate people’s 
courts host IP tribunals with jurisdiction on hearing the first instance of patent cases.78 
Some basic people’s courts may also have an IP tribunal if the region where the court 
is located is relatively developed regarding economy, society, and technology. Until 
                                                
75 S Luginbuehl, ‘China’s Patent Policy’ in S Luginbuehl and P Ganea (eds), Patent Law in Greater 
China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014). 
76 ƃˣAƱƿˆAƱƿˆțD	 (The Supreme People’s Court of China, ‘Introduction of the 
People’s Courts’) <www.court.gov.cn/jgsz/rmfyjj/> accessed 2 May 2014. 
77 jÏAƱFɗäOĞñÄOo8Ñ?ǌĤĔɰȒǽɳ=Əƿˆǲ|þ	2014 
(Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Decision on the Establishment of Intellectual 
Property Court in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou (31 August 2014)) 
<http://npc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0901/c14576-25581035.html> accessed 6 June 2015. 
78 For a detailed list see <http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/w6SGjkEPlckLlRiIcZG7Og> accessed 10 January 
2017. 
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June 2016, China has 158 basic people’s courts which have IP tribunals.79 The IP 
tribunals in Chinese courts protect IP rights, they are established due to the speciality 
of IP cases, and they protect IPRs in consideration of China’s own conditions.80 The 
SPC established six circuit courts from 2015 until 2016, which do not hear IP cases.81  
Four special IP tribunals in the intermediate people’s courts of Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuhan, 
and Chengdu were established in 2017.82 
 
Apart from protecting IP rights, China’s IP judicial practice has another role, which is 
fostering the knowledge-based economy in China.83 Both roles are carried out via (1) 
SPC issues judicial interpretations and judicial policies, and (2) IP tribunal of each court 
level clarifies the standards of the application of law to IP disputes.84  
 
The judicial interpretations of the IP-law-related issues are relatively new.85 In practice, 
these judicial interpretations of the SPC play a significant role in the Chinese IP judicial 
enforcement system and hold full legal force.86 The judicial interpretations are made 
                                                
79 For a detailed list see <http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/u7LzMXLO1pw1b3ajTIx_eg> accessed 15 June 
2016. 
80 X Kong and W Du, ‘Efforts and Tendencies in China’s Judicial Practice of Intellectual Property’ in 
K Shao and X Feng (eds), Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited 2014). 
81 Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the Trial of Cases by the 
Circuit Courts (2015). 
82 ƃˣƿo8¼Ŋ£?ĚɋĔĚƫƴĚŎʰĚ%ȣƿˆuɰʿĀƍƗĢʐØȝʗ
ʮǽɳ=ƏƠIǲŗà	ƿ 20172· (‘The Approval On Establishing Specific Tribunal in 
Intermediate Court of Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuhan and Chengdu and Cross-regional Jurisdiction on 
Intellectual Property Cases’ [2017] 2 ). 
83 ƐŸĻ,ǽɳ=Əƿˆů˟®ď,AƱƿˆŚ 2014ġ 9Ƅ 3ŵ Li M, Intellectual Property 
Court and Innovation-Driven Development, People  s Court News 
<http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/images/2014-09/03/05/2014090305_pdf.pdf> accessed 2 July 2015. 
84 X Kong, ‘Basic Issues of the Application of Intellectual Property Law: Judical Philsophy, Judical 
Policy and the Method of Adjudication’ [2013] Beijing: Law Press 1. 
85 For example, the systemized judicial interpretations on patent infringement cases is Interpretation of 
the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Patent 
Infringement Dispute Cases, it came into force in 2009. 
86 Art. 5 Provision of the Supreme People’s Court on the Judicial Interpretation Work. See, such as, ƹ
ĻÈ , ƃˣAƱƿˆƱ6ɴɯƿ¸ƿɢʱǥɢʢǧ , AƱƿˆǛȄ 2015 (D Shen, 
Understandings and Implementations on the SPC Judiciary Interpretations on The Chinese Civil 
Procedure Law (People’s Court Press, 2015)). 
 =A
in four forms ‘interpretation’, ‘provision’, ‘reply’, and ‘decision’.87 They are made in 
order to interpret on the specific issues concerning the application of law in trial work.88 
The SPC judicial policies on hearing IP cases cover a wide range of different issues and 
act as guidance to the local courts. This constitutes in detail: (1) judicial interpretations 
on the specific application of a certain law in the trial work or the application of law in 
the trial of the cases of a certain category or a certain kind of problems shall be made 
in the form of ‘interpretation’; (2) judicial interpretations on the formulation of the 
norms or opinions which are necessary for the trial work on the basis of legislation 
spirit shall be made in the form of ‘provision’. (3) judicial interpretations on the 
requests for instructions on the specific application of law in the trial work by the higher 
people’s courts or the Military Court of the PLA89 shall be made in the form of ‘Reply’; 
(4) the amendment or abolishment of judicial interpretations shall be made in the form 
of ‘decision’. 
 
The SPC also publishes modelling cases to reflect the IP judicial practices. The double 
roles of the Chinese judiciary indicate that, the Chinese judiciary is a receiver of macro 
policies as well as being a micro policy-maker itself. SPC interpretations mirror the 
Chinese judicial understandings of the relationships among ‘the innovation’, ‘the 
protection of individual rights’ and ‘the public interests’.  
 
After the Reform and Opening-up Policy,90 China has applied the conceptual design 
which followed the example of the developed countries. By issuing deliberate IPR 
legislation, the state grants the holders of the rights an exclusive monopoly for a limited 
period. Based on this ‘monopoly’, the right holder can control the commercial 
exploitation by: (i) gaining revenues, and (ii) excluding others from making, selling, or 
                                                
87 Art. 6 Provision of the Supreme People’s Court on the Judicial Interpretation Work. 
88 Art. 2 Provision of the Supreme People’s Court on the Judicial Interpretation Work. 
89 People’s Liberation Army of China 
90 The conceptual design of IP before 1979 is illustrated in Chapter 2. 
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using the monopolized object.91 Meanwhile, similar to many other countries, China 
acknowledges that the social benefit derived from the large-scale usage of knowledge-
based innovations shall outweigh the social cost. Thus, Chinese courts of all levels have 
been placed at a significant social position for balancing benefits between the 
knowledge creators and the various public interests in different regions.92 Although 
Chinese court pledges the enhancement of the IP judicial practices and the promotion 
of the innovation-based economy, it does not mean that Chinese court is offering a 
‘strong’ protection, but rather an ‘effective’ protection to IPRs as TRIPS has been 
regulated.93  
 
2. Research Sources 
 
2.1 Sources on S&T Policies and NIS 
 
The research focus of this monograph is not on ‘innovation’ per se, therefore, the 
research inherits from previous studies and adopts a general definition on ‘innovation’. 
Innovation refers to ‘the introduction or adoption of new products, new production 
processes, new ways of organization and management, new methods of marketing and 
new business models. A complete innovation chain includes both the creation and 
commercialization of new knowledge’.94 
                                                
91 WR Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights (Sweet and 
Maxwell 1999). 
92 X Kong and W Du, ‘Efforts and Tendencies in China’s Judicial Practice of Intellectual Property’ in 
K Shao and X Feng (eds), Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited 2014). 
93 ƐÀ, ‘źǨǽɳ=Ə\řƣĮˀ˚ƤȰÓ“ǺǥƜ”Įǲäɨɮ’ [2016] ƿƽÅƊ (H 
Li, ‘Liu Chuntian: There is a lack of great discussion of ‘criterion of truth’ for intellectual property 
protection mechanism’ [2016] Legal Weekly) <http://news.hexun.com/2016-06-23/184551233.html> 
accessed 23 June 2016. 
94 X Fu, China’s Path to Innovation (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
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It is apparent that S&T policies existed before the NIS, and academic research on 
Chinese S&T policies are clearly present in the literature. Chinese Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MOST) has very comprehensive records and descriptions on the S&T 
policies since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.95 These systematic 
studies of MOST cover the period since 1949. They contain the contents, aims, 
achievements, shortages, influences, and evolution of these S&T policies. This 
monograph includes the previous research results from MOST. These results from 
MOST are analysed in depth in Chapter 2.  
 
Another academic study on Chinese S&T policies for the period of 1978-2004 is 
presented by ‘China: Building an Innovative Economy’,96 which covers the overall 
innovation strategies, drivers, and outcomes, as well as the detailed reforms carried in 
the S&T systems. In 2014, a group of representative scholars jointly published 
‘Innovation and Intellectual Property in China’.97 It continues the academic research 
on those newly introduced up-to-date S&T strategies. These previous studies have 
offered a very solid base and knowledge on the Chinese S&T policies to this monograph, 
inspired this monograph to connect China’s IP issues with S&T, and research them 
altogether in depth. 
 
However, the existing research on Chinese S&T policies hardly cover the period before 
the People’s Republic of China. How S&T has transition during modern Chinese 
history98  is rarely systematically studied. Thus, the understanding of S&T policy 
                                                
95 Ministry of Science and Technology, ‘Science and Technology Development Plans in the History’ 
<www.most.gov.cn/kjgh/lskjgh/> accessed 28 July 2017. 
96  CA Varum, C Huang and JJBG Gouveia, China: Building an Innovative Economy (Chandos 
Publishing Limited 2007). 
97 K Shao and X Feng, Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 
2014). 
98 The modern Chinese history starts from the year of 1840, the year of the First Opium War 
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evolution of the People’s Republic of China is very limited and even seems to start 
from nowhere. 
 
Internationally speaking, neither the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, nor the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
nor the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
have provisions that regulate the S&T policies or NIS. Both are left to the discretion of 
each member state.  
 
The NIS has become the national strategic S&T policy since 2012 in China. The 
introduction of an NIS in China is not unique. Globally speaking, both developed 
countries and a considerable number of developing countries have introduced a NIS. 
The NIS was only introduced in China in the 21st Century, which is relatively late 
compared to other countries, such as the US, Germany, or Japan. There are many 
academic studies on the NIS,99 which can be roughly divided into three groups:100(1) 
                                                
99 Studies on NIS of developed countries, such as Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy, Evaluation of the Finnish National Innovation System - Full Report (Helsinki 
University Press 2009); See also H Capron and W Meeusen, The National Innovation System of Belgium 
(Springer-Verlag 2000). Studies on the US and EU national innovation systems, see such as TCR van 
Someren and S van Someren-Wang, Innovative China: Innovation Race Between East and West 
(Springer 2013). There are also NIS academic studies of developing countries, such as Brazil, Africa 
countries, India etc, such as M Mazzucato and C Penna, The Brazilian Innovation System: A Mission- 
Oriented Policy Proposal (CGEE 2016); B Oyelanren-Oyeyinka and D McCormick , Industrial Clusters 
and Innovation Systems in Africa: Institutions, Markets and Policy (United Nations University Press 
2007); and see also WC Wessner and JS Shivakumar, India’s Changing Innovation System: 
Achievements, Challenges and Opportunity for Cooperation (The National Academies Press 2007). A 
mixture of both developed and developing countries NIS can be found, such as B-Å Lundvall, I 
Patarapong and V Jan, Asia’s Innovation Systems in Transition (Edward Elgar 2006). 
100  Studies on NIS of different countries with various income-levels, such as, R Nelson, National 
Innovation Systems - A Comparative Analysis (Oxford University Press 1993), Nelson’s book doesn’t 
have a specific chapter on the NIS of mainland China, however, it has a chapter specifically introduced 
the NIS of Taiwan province. This book has no studies on Russia either. Although the lack of Russia and 
China can have impact on comparative studies inside this book and impact its research result, it doesn’t 
deny its significant academic contribution on its systematic comparative studies on 15 different countries. 
Its summarization and study results of common elements and differences among different NIS have a 
considerable level of referential significance for NIS studies. 
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NIS studies for large high-income countries, such as the US, Japan, Germany, France, 
or Britain.; (2) NIS studies for the smaller high-income countries, such as Finland, 
Belgium, Sweden, or Denmark.; and (3) NIS studies for lower-income countries, such 
as Indian, Brazil, Argentina, Israel, Asian and Africa countries. These existing NIS 
studies reflect that the different geographic, economic, and political circumstances, 
nature resources, farmland conditions, national security concerns, and priorities have 
decided the construction of one country’s NIS. 
 
In China, ‘The national innovation system is a government-led public system which 
gives full play to the basic role of the market in resource allocation while letting various 
innovation players forge close links and interact with one another’.101 Under the NIS, 
there are 5 sub-structures, which are envisaged as: (1) technology innovation system, 
which is the starting point of the NIS, comprising a combination of enterprises, 
universities, and research institutions in an enterprise-led system; (2) knowledge 
innovation system, which is a system designed for research institutions and universities 
with aims for promoting cooperation, resource sharing, and developing the general 
level of S&T; (3) defence-related science and technology innovation system, which is 
pictured as a promoter for combining the civilian type of innovations and the defence 
type of science and technology, and is also proposed to strengthen the development of 
dual-use technologies; (4) regional innovation systems, which have been constructed 
in consideration of the large-scaled Chinese territory and the visible regional 
differences inside the country, with individual characteristics and strengths that 
intensify the reform of the local science and technology systems and enhance the forces 
between the central and local levels; and (5) science and technology service agency 
                                                
101  The Outlines on National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology 
Development (2006-2020) (2006). 
 ><
system, which is designed as a system to simplify technology transfer activities.102 
Until 2015, China had already established 355 national technology transfer centres.103  
 
A large amount of research has now been carried out on the Chinese NIS, offering 
valuable perceptions to understand its current incarnation. Chinese scholars have 
carried out many studies and translated much academic literature on different state’s 
NIS to enlighten the Chinese understandings of NIS.104 Both Chinese and international 
scholars have a visible number of studies on the Chinese NIS. These current studies can 
be roughly divided into two groups: (1) studies on S&T policies and the new world 
relationship with China105 to enhance communication between the East and West; or 
(2) specific studies on the Chinese newly introduced NIS and its relevant factors to 
enlarge the understanding of the Chinese NIS. Such studies cover various aspects, such 
as policies, innovation capacities, capital issues, education rejuvenation of human 
                                                
102  Y Wang, ‘China’s National Innovation System and Innovation Policy’ (2012) 
<http://apctt.org/nis/sites/all/themes/nis/pdf/CSNWorkshop_Report_P2S2_Wang.pdf> accessed 7 May 
2013. 
103  See Outlines on National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology 
Development (2006-2020) (2006); Measures for the Administration of Demonstrative National 
Technology Transfer Agencies (2007); and Implementation of the National Technology Transfer 
Promotion Initiative (2008). 
104 See such as >(, Ĳɓ, ‘LZ"*#"*:VȬEʖOS’ [2003] "R6ɮÖ 
31 (H Li and W Zhang, ‘Comparative Studies on the World’s Main National and Regional National 
Innovation System’ [2003] China Technology Forum 31); ĳdʋŽǃ, ‘1""*6ƌ:VȬ]
Y=’ [2003] 1"OS 16 (Q Liu, and XJ Zhao, ‘ National Innovation System of Germany’ [2003] 
Germany Studies 16); >C˜d;"+, ‘OECD"*:VȬOS3,——Kɮ[8T’ 
[2004] R''OS (Z Li and GP Zeng, ‘Systematic Studies on OECD Countries’ National Innovation 
System and Its Meanings- From Theory to Policy’, [2004] Studies in Science of Science 206)e˄ǃ, "
*:VA?]Y=OS——WmM Pʶ (H^&'JQ 2010) (J Chen, 
Studies on the Construction of National Innovation System and Its Implementation - The Enlightenment 
From Finland (Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press 2010)); and see also K Motohashi, ‘Growing R&D 
Collaboration of Japanese Firms and Policy Implication for Reforming National Innovation System’ 
[2006] 24 Studies in Science of Science 482 <www.mo.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp/theme/nihonkigyouR&D.pdf> 
accessed 12 October 2016. 
105 Such as TCR van Someren and S van Someren-Wang, Innovative China: Innovation Race Between 
East and West (Springer 2013); See also M Zeng and P Williamson, Dragons at Your Door: How Chinese 
Cost Innovation Is Disrupting Global Competition (Harvard Business School Press 2007). 
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resources (talent plan), university and research institutions, multinational firms, and 
specific industrial studies.106  
 
Although there are numerous academic studies on the Chinese NIS, most of these 
studies focus on either a certain policy, a specific industry and certain innovation, a 
certain factor for innovation, or scrupulous development factors of innovation-based 
economy transition for China. Systematic studies on the NIS are rare.  
 
The advanced systematic studies of the Chinese NIS are conducted by the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The Chinese Ministry of 
Science and Technology formally requested the OECD to review China’s innovation 
policy and innovation system in 2004.107 Hence, following this request, the OECD 
published two reviews respectively in 2007 and in 2008 on the Chinese innovation 
policy and the NIS.108 In the context of China’s transition to a sustainable growth 
model, these two OECD reviews provide very extensive analyses of the breadth and 
                                                
106 Studies on the Chinese NIS, such X Fu, China’s Path to Innovation (Cambridge University Press 
2015). such as OECD, ‘OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy CHINA Synthesis Report’ (2007) 
<www.oecd.org/sti/inno/39177453.pdf> accessed 28 July 2017; OECD, OECD Reviews of Innovation 
Policy-China (2008); S Gu and B-Å Lundvall, ‘Policy Leaning as a Key Process in the Transformation 
of the Chinese Innovation System’ in S Gu and B-Å Lundvall (eds), Asia’s Innovation System in 
Transition (Edward Elgar 2006); J Zhang, The Development of High-Tech Enterprises in China’s 
Universities (Huazhong Science and Technology University Press 2003); K Zhang, ‘Rise of Chinese 
Multinational Firms’ [2009] 42 The Chinese Economy 81; H Yang and Y Cheng, ‘The Empirical 
Analysis of Evaluating the Implement Effect of Introduction Overseas High-Level Talents Policy’ [2013] 
16 Science & Technology Progress Policy; and Electronic Information Product Management Department 
Under the Ministry of Information Industry Economic System Reform, The Economic Operation 
Department under the Ministry of Information Industry and China Software Industry Association, ‘China 
Software Industry Development Study’ (2006); CB Broggi, Trade and Technology Networks in The 
Chinese Textile Industry - Opening Up Before the Reform (Palgrave Macmillan 2016); see also J Hu, 
‘Study on the New Relations between FDI Attraction and Technology Introduction’ (Tsinghua 
University 2004). 
107 OECD, OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy-China (2008). 
108  OECD, ‘OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy CHINA Synthesis Report’ (2007) 
<www.oecd.org/sti/inno/39177453.pdf> accessed 28 July 2017; And OECD, OECD Reviews of 
Innovation Policy-China (2008) 
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depth of the Chinese NIS system. The ‘OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy - CHINA 
Synthesis Report’ (2007)109 has been improved and included into the ‘OECD Reviews 
of Innovation Policy - China (2008)’. 
 
The over 590-pages-long ‘OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy – China (2008)’ has a 
very detailed systematic analysis of the Chinese S&T policies, especially for those after 
1979. The review carried out advanced statistic studies; managed first hand interviews 
and meetings with representatives from the government, research community, business 
sector, and other actors of the Chinese NIS; and presented case studies from Shanghai, 
Liaoning, and Sichuan on the regional innovation systems. This review focuses on the 
key-performers of R&D and innovation activities in China and explicitly points out the 
important role that science, technology, and innovation holds in the new Chinese 
‘innovation-driven’ develop model. Moreover, the OECD addresses the significance of 
fostering innovation for the current transition of China. The review offers insights on 
the pace of NIS development and analyses the main features of the Chinese NIS. The 
review analyses the role of Chinese policies and the governance of innovation. The 
OECD reviews 110  conclude that: China’s NIS is not fully developed and is still 
imperfectly integrated, with linkages between actors and sub-systems remaining weak. 
Thus, the OECD recommended in its report that:111 the Chinese government needs to 
improve the framework conditions for innovation. Meanwhile, the Chinese government 
should work to adjust, differentiate, and enhance dedicated policies to promote S&T 
and innovation activities. 
 
                                                
109  OECD, ‘OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy CHINA Synthesis Report’ (2007) 
<www.oecd.org/sti/inno/39177453.pdf> accessed 28 July 2017. 
110  OECD, ‘OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy CHINA Synthesis Report’ (2007) 
<www.oecd.org/sti/inno/39177453.pdf> accessed 28 July 2017. 
111  OECD, ‘OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy CHINA Synthesis Report’ (2007) 
<www.oecd.org/sti/inno/39177453.pdf> accessed 28 July 2017. 
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The OECD studies were expanded by Fu Xiaolan112 in 2015. Her studies draw on 
quantitative and qualitative research to form a bridge spanning the academic gap 
between the NIS, corporations from various leading industries, and the Chinese 
government. She pushed the current studies on the NIS to national and regional, as well 
as firms level. This study presents comprehensive descriptions as well as databases on 
the evolution of S&T strategies, processes, and drivers of innovation at different stages 
of development, and their impacts on China. Moreover, Fu also defines the Chinese 
NIS as an open innovation system. These up-to-date NIS studies have provided a solid 
base of sources to this monograph.  
 
However, these mentioned NIS studies only used the Chinese IP-related data to reflect 
the development of innovation capacities and technological upgrading. IP related data, 
especially patent applications, are used to evaluate R&D outputs and the development 
of the NIS. The foci of these mentioned NIS studies were on factors such as foreign 
direct investment, human resources on R&D, firms, public support for the 
commercialization of R&D results, and regional roles. Although the OECD reviews 
point out the needs of IPR enforcement, the IP system per se was not studied in either 
of these mentioned NIS related studies. The studies on relationships between the IP 
system and NIS, and the interconnections between the implementations of the NIS and 
the IP system remain underdeveloped. Our understanding of how the industry is 
absorbing both systems in practice is also very limited.  
 
                                                
112  Director of the Technology and Management Centre for Development (TMCD), Professor of 
Technology and International Development, Oxford University. 
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2.2 Sources of the IP System 
Although neither the IP-related international treaties regulate the NIS, the part II and 
part III of TRIPS has regulated requirements on general IP protections and their 
enforcement.113 
 
The Chinese IP system contains: (1) laws and regulations on IP, such as patent law, 
trademark law and copyright law, and related regulations and legislation concerning 
genetic resources, traditional knowledge, folk literatures and arts, and geographical 
indications, as well as IP-related provisions in laws and regulations concerning anti-
unfair competition, foreign trade, science and technology and national defence; (2) IP 
law enforcement and administration systems; and (3) IP governance, namely, IP in 
economic, cultural, and public policies.114 As a developing country, the patent-related 
policies play a fundamental role in China’s science and technology policies as well as 
its IP strategy. This fundamental role of patent policies was established in 2010 via the 
National Patent Development Strategy 2011-2020, which was issued by the State 
Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO).115  
 
Modern IP studies were only introduced to China since the Reform and Opening-up 
Policy. Thus, comparing to other countries, the milestone academic studies on Chinese 
IP are relatively easier to track, beginning with Zheng Chengsi (1944-2006) who 
introduced the modern IP system to China and actively joined the drafting of Chinese 
patent and trademark law. Zheng was one of the main founders of China’s copyright 
system.116 During the same period, Wu Handong and Liu Chuntian introduced and 
                                                
113  Part II and III of TRIPS, see also WTO, ‘Overview: The TRIPS Agreement’ 
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2b_e.htm#enforcement> accessed 15 April 2017. 
114 State Council of People’s Republic of China, ‘National Intellectual Property Strategy Outline’ (2008) 
<www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_1018942.htm> accessed 8 May 2013. 
115 jÏ6®ďőǮ2011-20202010	 (National Patent Development Strategy (2011-
2020) (2010)). 
116 ʭŎł, ŎłĬɣĵ (ǽɳ=ƏǛȄ 2012) (C Zheng, Chengsi’s Enlightenments (Intellectual 
Property Press 2012)). 
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developed the basic theoretical connection between Chinese IP law and Chinese civil 
law. 117  Wu’s theory on ‘intangible property’ 118  has significantly enlarged the 
understanding of the Chinese property system, and bridged the traditional property 
system to modern IP law.119 Following Zheng and Wu, and further developed by Liu 
Chuntian, and Li Mingde120, Chinese IP academics have solidly formulated their own 
understanding of IPRs as private rights121, and have continuously studied IP law from 
other countries, such as the US.122 
 
These four scholars are also the very first to address the strategic role of IP to China for 
the 21st Century.123 In the late 20th Century, Zheng pointed out that China’s IP studies 
shall be prepared for systematic studies so that China’s IP system can serve the Chinese 
‘innovation-based’ economy when it comes. 124  Wu points out that the 
                                                
117 źǨ, ‘ǽɳ=ƏU'ȗʆ=ƏŻƱƿúǲ$®ǣ’[2015] ǽɳ=Ə 3 (C Liu, 
Intellectual Property Right as First Property Right is A Discovery of Civil Law Studies) [2015] 
Intellectual Property 3). 
118 Âƴ!, ųĶʆ=ĨǾȋ (ƿĹǛȄ 2005) (H Wu, Studies on Intangible Property System 
(Law Press 2005)). 
119 H Wu, Intellectual Property Law (6th edn, Peking University Press 2014). 
120 The author participated in the major academic project ‘Legal Transplant for Innovation and Creativity? 
China and the Evolution of IP Norms’ funded by the Finnish Academy. This project was conducted with 
cooperation between the Finnish Academy and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, together with 
Prof. Niklas Bruun, Prof. Li Mingde, and other advanced Chinese and foreign IP scholars. The analytical 
and comparative study of Chinese and European IP law, the analyses of system reforms in China offered 
by this project, has visibly enlarged the author’s understanding of IP to the level of governance, that is: 
the adoption of a set of IP norms to China does not guarantee a functional IP system, it requires also 
intensive transformation of the perspectives and the implementing institutions. The project’s outcome 
‘Governance of Intellectual Property Rights in China and Europe’ has significantly enriched the author’s 
understandings on the Chinese IP system and formulated a concrete theoretical foundation to this 
monograph. This project raised the author’s curiosity to study the IP system with S&T policies and IP 
enforcement mechanism. 
121 C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th edn, Renmin University Press 2014). 
122 Prof. Li Mingde has carried out considerable amount of studies on US IP law. Such as M Li, US 
Intellectual Property Law (Law Press 2014); see alsoƐŸĻǽɳ=Əƿȗ7ǛȄOȇúˆ
ǛȄ 2014( M Li, Intellectual Property Law (2nd edn, China Social Sciences Academic Press 2014)). 
123 Such as ʭŎł, ǽɳ=Əƿ——ůȤǲɌğǾȋʳǗ (ƿĹǛȄ 2004) (C Zheng, 
Intellectual Property Law- Some Research Focuses for the Beginning of the New Century (Law Press 
2004)); see alsoÂƴ!, ‘Ï˃¯˔ä%Ï®ďäč%ǲǽɳ=ƏĨ’ [2009] ƿúǾȋ 3-17 
(H Wu, Intellectual Property System Under the Trend of International Changes and the Overall 
Development of China, [2009] Law Studies) 3-17. 
124 See C Zheng, ‘Review the Intellectual Property Research in the 20th Century’ [1999] Intellectual 
Property 3. 
 >B
internationalization of the Chinese IP system does not equal the convergence of global 
legal IP norms in the areas of protection of content, protection standards and levels of 
protection.125 In addition, Liu addressed that enhancing the judicial protection level of 
IP inside China does not equal a strong protection of IPRs.126 Moreover, Liu is one of 
the most representative scholars who was against adding criminal punishment to 
copyright infringements. 127  Liu’s academic understandings of Chinese IP has a 
considerable impact on the drafting of the Notice of the State Council on Issuing the 
Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (2008).128 
 
Together with other Chinese and foreign IP scholars, an enormous number of academic 
studies have been carried out on the Chinese IP system and its implementation. 
Meanwhile, apart from theoretical studies, the State Council, SPC, and SIPO has 
continuously published various types of reports that cover up-to-date data on IP filings, 
guidelines, judicial IP cases and annual reports with practical aspects. Many of these 
studies are used as important sources to this monograph. 
 
2.3 Other Important Resources on China Studies 
2.3.1 Chinese government’s understandings about China, the NIS, and IP system 
 
                                                
125 Such as Âƴ!, ‘şőƍʦ%Ïi 10 ġǲǽɳ=Ə6’ [2011] ǽɳ=Ə 13 (H Wu, 
‘Challenges and Opportunities: the 10 Years IP Career After China Joined WTO’ [2011] Intellectual 
Property) 13. 
126 Such asƐÀ, ‘źǨǽɳ=Ə\řƣĮˀ˚ƤȰÓ“ǺǥƜ”Įǲäɨɮ’ [2016] ƿƽ
ÅƊ (H Li, ‘Liu Chuntian: There is a lack of great discussion of ‘criterion of truth’ for intellectual 
property protection mechanism’ [2016] Legal Weekly) <http://news.hexun.com/2016-06-
23/184551233.html> accessed 23 June 2016. 
127 Due to the resistance of Prof. Liu and the scholars represented by him, the Copyright Law of China 
(1991) had no criminal punishment against copyright infringement. 
128  Renmin University, ‘Prof. Liu Chuntian’s Resume’ <www.law.ruc.edu.cn/sz/show.asp?No=92> 
accessed 12 June 2016. 
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During the research for this monograph, the researcher studied a significant number of 
speeches and documents from the central government and the central committee of the 
Communist Party of China, covering a period tracing back to the middle 20th Century. 
As the core policy maker and implementer, the Chinese government’s documents 
reflect its basic understandings about China.  
 
The Chinese government is committed to achieving socialist modernization as one of 
its ‘centenary goals’129. Today, Xi Jinping represents the core of the central collective 
Chinese leadership. The first generation began with Mao Tse-tung providing 
experience as well as the theoretical and material basis for the initiative of building 
socialism with Chinese characteristics.130 The second generation with Deng Xiaoping 
continued to build socialism with Chinese characteristics. The third generation with 
Jiang Zemin advanced socialism with Chinese characteristics into the 21st Century.131 
Followed by Hu Jintao and his team who adhered to and developed socialism with 
Chinese characteristics from a new historic starting point.132 Today, by carrying out 
                                                
129 Two centenary goals: to finish building a moderately prosperous society in all respects by the time 
the Communist Part of China celebrates its centenary in 2021; and to turn China into a modern socialist 
country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious by the time the 
People’s Republic of China celebrates its centenary in 2049. See J Hu, Report at the Eighteenth National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China (8 November 2012). 
130 For detailed explanation of ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’, see such as J Xi, ‘Disseminate 
and Implement the Guiding Principles of the 18th CPC National Congress (2012)’ in J Xi, The 
Governance of China (Foreign Languages Press 2014); And J Xi, ‘Uphold and Develop Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics (2013)’ in J Xi, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages Press 2014). 
131 J Xi, ‘Disseminate and Implement the Guiding Principles of the 18th CPC National Congress (2012)’ 
in in J Xi, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages Press 2014). 
132 J Xi, ‘Address to the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress (2013)’ in J Xi, The 
Governance of China (Foreign Languages Press 2014). 
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the Reform and Opening-up Policy, the Chinese leadership is comprehensively moving 
to ‘deepen reform’133 and ‘the Belt and Road’.134 
 
Central government documents have recorded development problems, solutions, and 
challenges from a central state and governmental perspective. Although this may 
endanger the author’s study as being too politically driven, it is academically accurate 
to insist on studying these documents. The OECD reviews or other international studies 
represent the western and external understandings of the Chinese S&T policies, the NIS 
and IP system. The documents and speeches from the Chinese central government 
represent the internal understandings of them. These documents are selected works and 
speeches of the national leaders of China, such as Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu 
Jintao, and Xi Jinping. As a matter of fact, with a narrative study of the Chinese IP 
system as this monograph is, it is impossible to ignore the Chinese government and its 
decisive role in Chinese IP development. 
 
China is currently in its primary stage of socialism, which is the paramount reality and 
the most important national condition in contemporary China.135 The ‘primary stage 
of socialism’ as a specific concept describes the national condition of China, which is 
defined as ‘a particular historical stage in the building of Chinese socialism. It refers to 
the historical stage in which China has gradually come out of under-development and 
will have by and large realized socialist modernization. It will take at least 100 years to 
                                                
133  Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues 
Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform (2013). Apart from Foreword and Conclusion, the 
decision contains 16 parts, which can be divided into three parts. The first section and the General 
Remarks elaborates on the significance, guiding thoughts and overall direction of continuing the reform 
comprehensively. The second section (parts 2-15) contains the main arraignment of main tasks important 
measures for continuing the reform in six aspects: economy (Part 2-7), politics (Part 8-10), culture (Part 
11), society (Part 12-13), ecology (Part 15) and national defense (part 15). The third section elaborates 
on organizational leadership. A detailed explanation from the Political Bureau of the CPC Central 
Committee, see J Xi, ‘Explanatory Notes to the “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform”’ (9 
November 2013). 
134 J Xi, ‘Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ 
(2017) <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/home/rolling/13299.htm> accessed 18 May 2017. 
135 J Xi, ‘Study, Disseminate and Implement the Guiding Principles of the 18th CPC National Congress 
(2012)’ in J Xi, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages Press 2014). 
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take shape from the completion of the socialist transformation of the private ownership 
of the means of production in the 1950s to the completion of socialist modernization.’136 
Reforms and developments from all aspects are carried out based on this national 
condition,137 including the IP system. 
 
The current Chinese overall reforms’ plan includes economic, political, cultural, social, 
and ecological constructions. China introduced its ‘three-step strategic plan’ for the 
country’s initial modernization. It was proposed by the 13th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China(CPC) in 1987. In detail, the three steps are ‘doubling the 
1987 Gross National Product(GNP) by the end of the 1980s and ensuring that the people 
would have adequate food and clothing as the first step; doubling the 1990 GNP by the 
end of the 20th century and ensuring the people a moderately prosperous life as the 
second step; and increasing the per capita GNP level to that of moderately developed 
countries, ensuring the people a relatively affluent life, and realizing modernization by 
and large by the middle of the 21st century as the third step.’ According to President Xi 
Jinping, China has entered a vital period, when new industrialization, application of 
information technology, urbanization, and agricultural modernization are 
simultaneously forging ahead, in parallel or interactively.138 China needs to enhance 
its independent innovation ability, the reform of the S&T system has been carried out 
at the same time as social and economic reform.  
 
The above-mentioned is the paramount national condition and plan for the Chinese NIS 
and IP system. 
                                                
136  The Thirteenth National Congress, Walk Along the Road of Socialism with the Chinese 
Characteristics (1987). 
137 J Xi, ‘Study, Disseminate and Implement the Guiding Principles of the 18th CPC National Congress 
(2012)’ in J Xi, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages Press 2014). 
138  J Xi, ‘Transition to Innovation-Driven Growth’ (Address to the 17th General Assembly of the 
members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the 12th General Assembly of the Members of the 
Chinese Academy of Engineering 9 June 2014) in J Xi, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages 
Press 2014). Xi pointed out in this report the needs of independent innovation to China ‘We cannot 
always decorate our tomorrows with others’ yesterdays. We cannot always rely on others’ scientific and 
technological achievements for our own progress. Moreover, we cannot always trail behind others. We 
have no choice but to innovate independently.’ 
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The Chinese government acknowledges that the nation falls behind developed countries 
in regard to S&T.139 There is a need to catch-up with the developed countries. On top 
of this, the current Chinese government addressed that China is in a crucial transitional 
period. Summarized by Xi Jinping in his speech on Chinese governance, ‘Transition to 
Innovation-driven Growth’,140 China has made remarkable achievements in social and 
economic development after the Reform and Opening-up Policy. The Chinese economy 
leapt to NO. 2 in the world. However, the Chinese economy is large but not strong, the 
economic development is fast but not of high quality. The current extensive 
development is not sustainable because the economic growth is mainly driven by factor 
inputs such as natural resources. Moreover, the modernization of China meant the 
current well-off population in the world will jump from 1 billion to more than double 
to 2.3 billion. The existing resources in the world would be far from enough for China. 
When the old path seems to be a dead end, the new road ‘lies in scientific and 
technological innovation, and in the accelerated transition from factor-driven and 
investment driven growth, to innovation-driven growth’.141 
 
Moreover, the central government of China points out that ‘A big size does not mean 
strong, a heavy weight is not equivalent to strong, sometimes it is puffiness’.142 The 
Chinese government keenly acknowledges the need to enhance the strength of its 
national S&T strength and independent innovation capacities. The 18th CPC National 
Congress put forward an important strategic plan for the implementation of an 
                                                
139 The Perspective Plan for Science and Technology Development From 1956-1967. See alsoʩċĠ
ĊʳǽɳĊʳAŕ	ʩċĠŭʣ1975-1982AƱǛȄ 1983 X Deng, Respect Knowledge, 
Respect Talents, Selected Papers of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982) (Renmin Press 1983). 
140  J Xi, ‘Transition to Innovation-Driven Growth’ (Address to the 17th General Assembly of the 
members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the 12th General Assembly of the Members of the 
Chinese Academy of Engineering 9 June 2014) in J Xi, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages 
Press 2014). 
141  J Xi, ‘Transition to Innovation-Driven Growth’ (Address to the 17th General Assembly of the 
members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the 12th General Assembly of the Members of the 
Chinese Academy of Engineering 9 June 2014) in J Xi, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages 
Press 2014). 
142 Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the General Secretary 
Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014) 65. 
 ?=
innovation-driven strategy, emphasizing that science and technological innovation 
must be in the core position.143 The Chinese government underlines the needs for 
improving the efficiency of the NIS.  
 
Guided by those central understandings of development, and based on S&T and 
economic conditions, the Chinese government emphasized the improvement of 
enforcement of IP protection to serve the efficiency of the NIS144  and economic 
transition.145 
 
2.3.2 The concept of ‘catch-up’ and other supportive literatures 
Accompanying the studies of the previous Chinese S&T policies and IP system, studies 
on the role of state, industry policies, and IP system are underway. These are discussed 
under the framework of ‘catch-up’.  
 
The research inherits a broad definition of what ‘catch-up’ is. It is a mixture of 
economic catch-up and technical catch-up, a process by which a single late-developing 
country narrows its gap in income and in technological capability vis-à-vis a leading 
country146 or a group of developed countries. Catch-up is a learning process adopted 
                                                
143  J Xi, ‘Transition to Innovation-Driven Growth’ (Address to the 17th General Assembly of the 
members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the 12th General Assembly of the Members of the 
Chinese Academy of Engineering 9 June 2014) in J Xi, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages 
Press 2014). 
144 Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the General Secretary 
Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014) 67. 
145 Such as J Xi, Speech on the Sixteenth Meeting of the Leading Group for Financial and Economic 
Affairs (2017), ‘Industrial property protection, especially intellectual property protection, is an important 
aspect of shaping a good business environment. We shall improve the relevant laws and regulations on 
the protection of intellectual property rights, improve the quality of intellectual property examination 
and its efficiency. We shall speed up the construction of new areas and formats of the intellectual property 
protection system. We shall increase the level of punishment on intellectual property infringement, so 
that infringers pay a heavy price. For both of the natural and legal persons, we shall motivate the right 
holders’ enthusiasm and initiative, to enhance their awareness of intellectual property rights to 
consciously use legal mechanisms to protect their rights according to law.’ 
146  In O Hiroyuku and others, Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-Up, an 
International Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2010), catch-up has been defined as the 
process which a late-developing country narrows its gap in income and in technological capability vis-
à-vis a leading country. This manuscript has expanded the definition from ‘a leading country’ to ‘a 
leading country or a group of developed countries’. This concept expansion is made based on the Chinese 
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by countries that are falling behind in technological and economic frontiers. ‘Catch-up 
is intended to highlight that historically, and today, countries that are lagging behind 
use practices employed in countries that are in the lead as models and performance 
standards’.147  
 
During the catch-up process, developing countries adopt practices from advanced 
economic countries as broad models. A main part of ‘catch-up’ is ‘technological 
learning’, which ‘encompassing the wide range of productive techniques for meeting 
development needs’.148 The term ‘technology’ used in ‘catch-up’ is a much wider 
concept than the ‘necessary engineering know-how’ considered by technicians.  
 
Catch-up is a complicated process and a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Catch-up 
contains not only the ‘know-how’, but also a ‘learning process’ that covers capabilities 
and activities of organization, coordination, and management.’ It is ‘a development 
process essentially involves learning about and trying to take on board practices that 
are in use in countries toward the frontier’.149 Catch-up requires: (1) the process of 
technological learning in the foreground, namely, improvement of indigenous 
technologies150; and (2) the background involves many different facets of a national’s 
                                                
practice. During Chair Mao’s era, China’s development goal was to ‘catch up and surpass Britain and 
the States’. Since the Reform and Opening-up Policy, the Chinese central government has learned from 
its previous experiences, including bitter lessons that Mr. Deng Xiaoping pointed out ‘one cannot 
succeed in development behind closed doors, China cannot develop itself in isolation from the world’. 
For a big country’s development, such as China, on the base of its own efforts, China needs capitals and 
technologies from different countries. China has been studying from a group of developed countries as 
its references for development but not only one. See such as, X Deng, ‘Our Ambitious Goals and 
Fundamental Policies’ in X Deng, Respect Knowledge, Respect Talents, Selected Papers of Deng 
Xiaoping (1975-1982) (Renmin Press 1983). 
147 O Hiroyuku and others, Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-Up, an International 
Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2010). 
148 O Hiroyuku and others, Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-Up, an International 
Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2010). 
149 O Hiroyuku and others, Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-Up, an International 
Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2010). 
150 The means of learning and absorbing advanced technologies are: (1) frequent cross-border flow of 
people; (2) access new knowledge via open sources, such as exhibitions, conferences, books, papers and 
patent documents; (3) import products and learn by imitation; or import machines and equipment and 
learn by using them; (4) via patent licenses; and (5) the spillovers from local affiliates of multinationals. 
See O Hiroyuku and others, Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-Up, an International 
Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2010). 
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institutional structures, namely, acquiring more efficient modern practices (most likely 
from abroad). These may include, for example: education and training systems, labour 
and capital markets, competition and regulatory policies, programs in support of 
infrastructure, resources, and environmental management, IP system and the ability of 
government.151 The learning process shall cover both the essential factors: physical 
technologies and social institutions.152 Because obtaining physical technologies alone 
cannot guarantee a country’s development or economic growth, the needs for 
development of social technologies are unavoidable.  
 
The catch-up process differs from one country to another. For example, China and India 
both imported software-related technologies, however, the catch-up process of these 
two countries’ software industries have been developed under very different models.153 
This is because indigenous conditions are often very different from one country to 
another. Therefore, studies of the catching-up process shall be specific to one 
country. 154  Moreover, even inside one country, mechanisms for catch-up can be 
different from one historical period to another. For example, China adopted very 
different catch-up mechanisms before and after 1979. Therefore, the studies of catch-
up process are carried out with a period-specific manner. 
 
                                                
151 O Hiroyuku and others, Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-Up, an International 
Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2010). 
152 The term ‘institutions’ used this thesis inherits the definition, which is to ‘denote structures and forces 
that mold and hold in place prevalent social technologies’. Nelson Richard applied an analytical approach 
to study the various meanings of ‘institution’ among economists and those who study technological 
advance. Nelson points out in his study that innovation driven economic growth needs to be understood 
as involving the co-evolution of physical and social technologies, and that the dynamics of institutional 
change should be seen in this light but not consider only the technology innovation as a key driving force. 
See RR Nelson, ‘What Enables Rapid Economic Progress What Are the Needed Institutions’ [2008] 
Research Policy 37. 
153 S Jui, Innovation in China: The Chinese Software Industry (Routledge 2010). 
154 ‘Convergence’ is a very similar concept as ‘catch-up’. However, convergence takes the world as its 
study object and emphasizes the global reduction of overall differences in productivity and income. See 
O Hiroyuku and others, Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-Up, an International 
Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2010). 
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Other significant and relevant research perspectives of industrialization, technical, and 
economic development policies in general have offered a broader understanding to this 
monograph. One outstanding relevant research is ‘Kicking Away the Ladder: 
Development Strategy in Historical Perspective’,155 which studies the catch-up process 
of many already developed countries as well as the newly industrialized economies. 
This comprehensive study has shown that the institutions and mechanisms which the 
developed countries have introduced to the current developing countries are not the 
fundamental inducement of their success but rather the result generated from these 
successes. The propaganda as ‘innovative and anti-imitation’ that the developed 
countries are having as there ‘state image’ is ahistorical. This advanced study from 
Chang has ensured the confidence to involve a historical perspective into this 
monograph.  
 
Moreover, the current studies on the role of IP to a country’s catch-up process are 
diverse at the theoretical level, some claim that tighter IP standards of TRIPS make 
catching-up more difficult, whilst others argue the contrary. In 2010, a group of 
researchers via Oxford Press published the book ‘Intellectual Property Rights, 
Development and Catch-up’.156 The book has presented an empirical and comparative 
study result on the investigation of the IP role in catch-up in country-specific and 
period-specific manners. This book has expanded the role of IP from theoretical debates 
to empirical research, and showed that the impact of IP during the catch-up process is 
real and multidimensional. Empirical research on the pathways of technological 
learning of different countries, and the influence of IP regimes on these pathways157 
                                                
155 H-J Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem 
Press 2002). 
156 O Hiroyuku and others, Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-Up, an International 
Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2010). 
157 O Hiroyuku and others, Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-Up, an International 
Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2010) has studied the catch-up process with a wide 
coverage of different countries: US, Nordic countries, Japan, Korea, Isreal, Argentina, Brazil, China, 
India and Thailand. 
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significantly expanded the current manuscript’s understanding of the role of IP regimes 
in the catch-up process. 
 
There are also studies on the aspect of structural changes in general in the sense of 
national governance, one of the representative studies on China is ‘Medium and Long 
Term Development and Transformation of the Chinese Economy - an International 
Perspective’ (2011). Even though it has no specific role in S&T policies, it has added a 
grand economic and general market understanding of China to this monograph. 
 
3. Research Questions  
China is carrying out its ‘catch-up’ to the frontiers, whilst going through a crucial period 
of social transition. Although the existing literature studied the national S&T policies, 
NIS, and IP system in depth, they were studied separately. The various central 
documents from the Chinese government have only generally addressed that the IP 
system shall serve the construction of the NIS. How these separate policies and systems 
elaborate together remains academically underdeveloped. According to Xi Jinping, 
China shall avoid fragmentation and isolation, and the resource allocation mechanism 
shall be systemized. 158  If there is only an IP system without domestic S&T 
development and independent innovation, China will have no real development but a 
‘passing-by’ case of foreign capitals.159 The Chinese government has switched its 
attention on the distribution process of wealth and income, rather than only on the 
foreign trade volume. Because, although China can have huge trade surplus from the 
statistics, without domestic S&T development and independent IPRs, the profit for 
                                                
158 J Xi, Explanatory Notes to the ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform’, in J Xi, The Governance 
of China (Foreign Languages Press 2014). 
159 ‘Li Deshui: Huge Surplus Essentially Is Only a Passing by God of Wealth’ First Financial Daily (26 
January 2006) <http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20060126/07122307823.shtml> accessed 18 September 
2015. 
 ?B
China is very limited.160 S&T development is an inevitable counter-balancing factor 
for China’s own development. Therefore, the author questions the IP system as a state 
mechanism: what is the IP system’s role in the catch-up process of China? This 
main research question has been divided into sub questions: (1) How does the 
development of the IP system and the national S&T integrate with each other?; and (2) 
How is the IP system is absorbed into Chinese society? The absorption of the IP system 
is explored via two aspects: one imperative aspect is the evolution of IP system from 
the perspective of enforcement; and the other is how has the IP system from the state 
level involved and impacted Chinese business players. The conclusions will combine 
the mentioned circumambient questions and discuss them with a general narrative 
method of Chinese IP studies.161 
 
This monograph studies the IP system with a focus on the patent regime. Because 
comparing with trademark, copyright, and other IP regimes, the patent regime is 
considered the most influential to technical catch-up.162 Moreover, from the state-level, 
various strategic guidelines and policies have shown that the Chinese government 
turned to concern patents as the most important among the various means of IP.163 
 
As a point of departure, this monograph thus analyses Chinese IP law and its 
enforcement from three separate yet related perspectives, they are: (1) the contextual 
                                                
160 ‘Li Deshui: Huge Surplus Essentially Is Only a Passing by God of Wealth’ First Financial Daily (26 
January 2006) <http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20060126/07122307823.shtml> accessed 18 September 
2015. 
161 The author agrees with Prof. Liu Chuntian that even though the methodology for researches and 
argumentation on Chinese IP has adopted both analytical method and narrative method, the narrative 
studies should be the dominant focus when it comes to its current incarnation Chinese IP studies. The 
author’s way of presenting this research result has been following Prof. Liu Chuntian’s narrative 
approach. Thus, this monograh focuses on the domestic and historical conditions of China and the nature 
of IP itself, rather than the international treaties and conventions oriented Chinese IP analytical studies. 
See C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th edn, Renmin University Press 2014). 
162 O Hiroyuku and others, Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-Up, an International 
Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2010); see also H-J Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: 
Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem Press 2002). 
163 Such as Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Outline of the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy (2008). 
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interactions among the national strategies on the S&T policies and the IP system; (2) 
the Chinese IP enforcement and its current statutory reform; and (3) from a practical 
aspect, taking the IT industry as an example and observing how the IP system is 
functioning for the domestic business. In detail, the second chapter reviews the fast 
development of the Chinese IP system and the S&T policies. It then elaborates the 
interconnection between the S&T policies and IP polices, and the mutualism between 
the IP system and S&T system. The third chapter illustrates the responses and ongoing 
adjustments of enforcement mechanism in the IP system. The fourth chapter uses the 
IT industry, especially Huawei, as an example for evaluating the reactions of Chinese 
leading business to the IP system and its implementation. The last chapter summarizes 
and lists the overall research results.164 
 
4. Methodology: A Combination of ‘Narrative Approach’, ‘Law in Context’, and 
‘Historical Perspective’ 
 
4.1 Adopting ‘Narrative Approach in Chinese IP Studies’ 
 
Research into modern Chinese IP commenced in 1979.165 An enormous amount of IP-
related research has been carried out. The important academic achievements on IP and 
the development phases in the 20th Century are well summarized by Zheng Chengsi, 
who is acknowledged as one of the academic founders for Chinese IP research. Zheng 
summarized the early IP academic studies in five phases. Respectively, the 1979- 
middle 1980s period; the 1991 period; the late 1995 period, and the late 20th Century 
                                                
164 X Wen, ‘Planning Development Department of the State Intellectual Property Office: Improving 
Intellectual Property Protection, Establishing Innovative Countries’ [2007] 1 Patent Statistics Bulletin 
25-42. 
165 C Zheng, ‘Review the Intellectual Property Research in the 20th Century’ [1999] Intellectual Property 
3. 
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period. After the late 20th Century, China’s IP studies matured and began to 
systematically prepare for the coming era of ‘innovation-based economy’.166 Chinese 
IP academia has developed a ‘narrative approach’ and ‘analytical approach’ on the 
Chinese IP studies.  
 
Represented by Zheng Chengsi, Wu Handong, Liu Chuntian, and Li Mingde, Chinese 
IP academia in general has adopted both analytical and narrative methods in its research 
methodology. However, the way of arguing and their emphases are different. ‘Narrative 
approach in Chinese IP studies’ is a study and argumentation method, by which a 
researcher mainly focuses on the Chinese own domestic, historical conditions together 
with the nature of IP itself.167 This approach takes the international IP system or IP-
related treaties or conventions as references.168  
 
‘Analytical method in Chinese IP studies’ focuses on the international treaties and 
conventions on IP and their impacts on Chinese IP, by which the argumentation and 
research normally starts with the Berne Convention, Paris Convention, and TRIPS. IP 
scholars who adopt analytical method as a core methodology normally hold a strong 
conviction that it is difficult to explain some principles in Chinese IP law without the 
international principles from these international IP-related conventions and treaties. 
                                                
166 See C Zheng, ‘Review the Intellectual Property Research in the 20th Century’ [1999] Intellectual 
Property 3. 
167 źǨ, ‘ǽɳ=ƏU'ȗʆ=ƏŻƱƿúǲ$®ǣ’[2015] ǽɳ=Ə 3 (C Liu, 
Intellectual Property Right as First Property Right is A Discovery of Civil Law Studies) [2015] 
Intellectual Property 3); See also H Wu, ‘To Rethink the Identity, Subject and Object of Intellectual 
Property By Comparatively Studying Property Ownership’ [2000] Legal Review; Âƴ!, ‘ǽɳů
ŷFǲǽɳ=Əƿ’ [2010] Űƿú 157 (H Wu, ‘Intellectual Property Law In the New Era of 
Knowledge Innovation’ [2010] Northern Legal Science 157). 
168 źǨǽɳ=Əƿȗ:ǛAƱäúǛȄ 2014(C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th 
edn, Renmin University Press 2014)); See also C Zheng, ‘The International System of Intellectual 
Property and the Law of Intellectual Property of China’ [1984] China Legal Science 166; C Zheng, 
‘Review the Intellectual Property Research in the 20th Century’ [1999] Intellectual Property 3.  
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This belief is due to the fact that some of the substantive contents of Chinese IP 
regulations are resourced from the important IP conventions, especially TRIPS.169 
 
4.2 Illustration of the Justifications on NOT Applying the Traditional Legal 
Doctrinal Approach  
 
This monograph targets non-Chinese entities as its potential audience but not aimed to 
the judges, nor from the judges’ perspective. Therefore, this monograph does not apply 
the traditional legal doctrinal approach.170 
 
Moreover, at the state level, China started its IP law making in 1982. At present, China 
has all the necessary statutes, the protection scopes and the implementations follow the 
international standards and rules of TRIPS.171  China’s introduction of modern IP 
legislation fulfils the basic standards set out in the Berne and Paris Conventions, as well 
as in the TRIPS.172 Currently, China is carrying out intensive legal reform and the 
Chinese IP strategy until 2020 is ‘establishing a comprehensive IP system’, ‘promoting 
creation and utilization of IP’, ‘enhancing IP protection’, ‘preventing abuse of IP rights’, 
and ‘fostering a culture for IP rights’.173 Therefore, it is questionable if the reform at 
the state level is touching the social reality or it is just a wishful law and political 
                                                
169 Such as C Zheng, ‘WTO and Intellectual Property Law of China’ [2001] Academic Journal of 
Yunnan University 29. 
170 Even though some doctrinal scholars tried to free the ‘judge’ role model of doctrinal method, to a 
certain degree that the continental European view still refers to the doctrinal methodology to offer 
interpretative suggestions on legal norms from the perspective of judges. 
171 A Wechsler, ‘Intellectual Property Law in the People’s Republic of China: A Powerful Tool for 
Innovation and Development’ [2011] China-EU Law Journal, Online Version. 
172 S Luginbuehl, ‘China’s Patent Policy’ in S Luginbuehl and Peter Ganea (eds), Patent Law in Greater 
China (Edward Elgar 2014) 3-24. 
173 State Council of People’s Republic of China. National Intellectual Property Strategy Outline (5 June 
2008) <www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_1018942.htm> accessed 28 July 2017. 
 @<
thinking of vertical reformation.174 From the state level, the ‘instrumental use of the 
law’ is very intensive. Hence, with an intensive state intervention as Chinese IP is 
experiencing at the moment, talking about the current Chinese IP in an apolitical way 
is questionable.175 
 
IP in China functions in multiple ways, in short, it serves those who want to use law to 
change the society and also to those who want to preserve the status.176 And the focus 
and privilege of such mentioned instrumental usage switches from one to another, and 
is obviously reflected in the development of Chinese IP after 1979.177 In order to see 
through the instrumental applications of the IP system, and study the ‘core values’ of 
IP in the coherent Chinese law system, this study then has to apply methodologies that 
go beyond the traditional legal doctrinal approach. 
 
4.3 Illustration of the Justifications on Applying ‘Law In Context’, ‘Comparative 
Factor’ and ‘Historical Perspective’ as Methodology 
 
This monograph is highly inspired by William Twining’s methodology ‘Law in 
Context’. Some may claim that there is a lack of fundamental support at the 
philosophical level and the application of a European methodology is under the risk of 
being improper for the interpretation of the Chinese IP situation.  
 
                                                
174 MYK Woo and ME Gallagher, Chinese Justice - Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China 
(Cambridge University Press 2011). 
175 This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
176 Âƴ!, ‘ǽɳ=ƏƋʊǲãȭĨɢɽ’ [2006] %Ïƿú 31 (H Wu, ‘Interpretation of multi-
dimensional Nature of Intellectual Property Rights’ [2006] China Legal Science) 31; See alsoźǨ
ǽɳ=Əƿȗ:ǛAƱäúǛȄ 2014(C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th edn, Renmin 
University Press 2014)). 
177  ʭŎł , ǽɳ=Əƿ——ůȤǲɌğǾȋʳǗ  (ƿĹǛȄ  2004) (C Zheng,  
Intellectual Property Law- Some Research Focuses for the Beginning of the New Century (Law Press 
2004)). 
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Indeed, applying a European methodology to explain legal phenomena generated from 
a Far East society is debatable. However, as a common result of evaluation, there is no 
perfect method which covers all Western and Chinese perspectives. The emphasis of 
applying ‘law in context’ for this research is: whether the applied method is sufficient 
to solve the research questions. 
 
Twining’s thoughts provide a useful insight to the author’s research: ‘to academic 
lawyers, law is a part of the humanities and social sciences; to the profession, it is in 
large part a business in service (mostly) to (big) business’.178 Twining’s papers are 
different from the legal doctrine, because he has consistently enlarged the scope of the 
legal discipline from ‘exposition’ or ‘interpretation’ of legal rules to the study of law in 
its social context and he makes contact with neighbouring disciplines,179 in short, ‘ law 
in context’ or ‘rules are an important, indeed a central feature of law, but for almost any 
purpose – for understanding, for practice, and for reform – the study of rules alone is 
not enough; law must be studied in the context of social processes generally.’180 
 
The ‘Law in Context’ methodology deals with law and legal practice, and it links legal 
philosophy and sociology of law together with statutes. It is a very useful notion and 
method for this monograph. However, it is still necessary to ask, ‘what are the 
justifications for applying law in context to the Chinese situation’?  
 
Firstly, comparing to the relatively self-developed process of Western law and theories, 
the contemporary Chinese law and theories are always under the impact of Western 
thoughts, especially Chinese IP studies. Most Chinese IP scholars can read one foreign 
                                                
178 DG Réaume, ‘Book Review on William Twining’s Blackstone’s Tower and Law in Context’ [1999] 
661 University of Toronto Law Journal 49.  
179  Such as some of Twining’s latest books, Globalization and Legal Scholarship (2011), General 
Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (2009), etc. 
180 W Twining, Law in Context: Enlarging a Discipline (Clarendon Press 1997) 33; J Griffiths, ‘Book 
Review on W. Twining, Law in Context: Enlarging a Discipline’ (1998) 4 European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal law and Criminal Justice 145. 
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language or are closely working with scholars who read foreign languages.181 However, 
while applying Twining’s ‘Law in Context’, it is necessary to make some clarifications 
in advance, as pointed out by a leading Chinese legal philosopher, Prof. Shu 
Guoying:182 (1) The research subject ‘Chinese Law’, as a whole, is not historically 
developed in the same way as Western law.183 Due to modern technology,184 the 
process of ‘creating’ a legal knowledge is very often replaced by ‘copying’ a legal 
knowledge. Although there is a fast generation and distribution of an enormous amount 
of publications, this knowledge is not systematized. Therefore, the system of legal 
knowledge has neither a solid base nor stable structure. The development processes and 
generation of the Chinese legal knowledge may, unfortunately, lack order. It is neither 
a mature nor well-managed system. 185  (2) The good and bad concepts, both the 
imported and self-generated, exist in tandem. Even though it may seem as a diversity 
of legal thoughts, it is necessary to keep in mind that assimilation of legal knowledge 
due to interests alone should be avoided.186 (3) Academia cannot currently sufficiently 
support practitioners or legislators.187 (4) The use of methodology of any kind should 
                                                
181  C Zheng, ‘Review the Intellectual Property Research in the 20th Century’ [1999] Intellectual 
Property 3. 
182 ɇÏǕ, ƿÊúȒÓŰƿ, ?äúǛȄ, 2010. (G Shu, Legal Philosophy: Stand and 
Method (Peking University Press 2010)). 
183 ɇÏǕÑ§µ ƙ%ȍɕǲ%ÏƿǥúƿÊúȒÓŰƿ, ?äúǛȄ, 2010 
(G Shu, ‘Chinese jurisprudence in the jungle of history’ in G Shu, Legal Philosophy: Stand and Method 
(Peking University Press 2010)). 
184  Prof. Shu especially discusses the change of ‘creating knowledge’ after the implementation of 
computer science and Internet. 
185 Prof. Shu metaphorizes the lack of systemization as ‘immature kid putting together wooden blocks’. 
SeeɇÏǕ, ‘EŰƿɮǹśʂƿúǥɮǲ®ď’ ƿÊúȒÓŰƿ, 41–64. ?äúǛȄ, 
2010. (G Shu, ‘Observing the Development of Legal Philosophy Through Methodology’ in G Shu, Legal 
Philosophy: Stand and Method (Peking University Press 2010) 41-64). Moreover, inɇÏǕ,Ñ§µ
 ƙ%ȍɕǲ%ÏƿǥúƿÊúȒÓŰƿ, ?äúǛȄ, 2010 (G Shu, ‘Chinese 
jurisprudence in the jungle of history’ in G Shu, Legal Philosophy: Stand and Method (Peking University 
Press 2010)) Prof. Shu particularly studied the development of academia of legal jurisprudence and legal 
philosophy since 1949. 
186 Prof. Shu holds the opinion that: the fast copying of knowledge inevitably leads to misidentify good 
and bad knowledge. The massive copying of knowledge infiltrates into the process of creating knowledge 
that has generated bubbles and worship of publications inside the academia. Prof. Shu claims in his 
studies that the current Chinese system of legal knowledge is lack of solid foundation and structure. The 
weakly assembled system of ‘copied knowledge’ is a form of great leap. Moreover, knowledge creation 
is no longer a pure ‘intellectual activity’, it is subject to the temptation of material and power, and 
ultimately become a maidservant. ɇÏǕ, ƿÊúȒÓŰƿ,?äúǛȄ, 2010. (G Shu, 
Legal Philosophy: Stand and Method (Peking University Press 2010)). 
187  Prof. Shu summarizes the lack of intellectual support for practitioners and legislators is 
fundamentally because Chinese legal theories in many cases lack attention on the secular life and society 
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not be pushed to the extreme; and (5) even though the weaknesses of current Chinese 
law and its jurisprudence has exposed it to strong criticism from other disciplines, it 
does not necessarily mean the legislation itself is not well made. 
 
Many ‘Law in Context’ examples can be found in the existing Chinese IP studies. One 
can easily determine that, even though at the state level, China is trying very hard to 
make a positive promotion of Chinese IP, this effort was often challenged and objected 
by other contexts and disciplines, such as political, moral, social, and economic factors. 
The defence made from the Chinese side is also from these contextual factors but not 
based on legal statutes or jurisprudence. For example, questions about the lack of IP 
are raised under the context of cultural historicism, which is the Chinese legal tradition. 
By addressing an old Chinese proverb ‘to steal a book is an elegant offence’, William 
Alford illustrated the lack of tradition of IP in the traditional ideology of China.188 The 
same questions are also interpreted under the context of the Eastern-way of learning 
under the Confucian tradition, such as stated in the work of Nils Montan ‘in the 
Confucian societies, imitation and reproduction of ideas, art, and scholarship are 
considered tokens of honor and respect. […] within this cultural context, the protection 
of intellectual property rights is not a concept that fits easily into a Confucian society, 
where copying is often an integral part of the learning process’.189As a defence, Shao 
Ke stated in his article on the history of Chinese copyright and the traditional opinions 
about innovation, 190  which were proved from other aspects by different scholars 
                                                
of China. Legal theories and legal practice cannot formulate a benign symbiosis system. Legal theories 
cannot offer sufficiently intellectual support for the creation of legal solution, basic principle, or make 
reasonable and convincing arguments for legal decisions. In some cases, legal theories are even absent 
from legal practices. See detailed discussion inɇÏǕ, ƿÊúȒÓŰƿ, 58-60. ?äúǛ
Ȅ, 2010. (G Shu, Legal Philosophy: Stand and Method (Peking University Press 2010)) 58-60. 
188 WP Alford, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization 
(Standford University Press 1995). Prof. Alford studied why intellectual property law, and in particular 
copyright, has never taken hold in China. 
189  NV Monton, ‘Trademark Anticounterfieting in Asia and the Pacific Rim’ [2001] International 
Trademark Association 21. 
190 ʬȇ, ‘ȏ2Ȝc——îSƘ%ÏǛƏµ«QȬůɞ’, ǽɳ=Əġ, 39–56. ?ä
úǛȄ, 2011 (K Shao, ‘To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense? – How to Anatomize the History of 
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that,191 the notion of private property and the involvement of economy, historically 
speaking, strongly existed during the ancient Chinese history. Moreover, during the 
Qing Dynasty, the Qing government tried to develop a patent system, which was 
recorded both in the Chinese as well as Western archives.192 During the reign of 
Emperor Guangxu (1871-1908) of the Qing Dynasty, China passed a patent law (1898) 
that granted patent protection, via proclamations and administrative measures to 
Chinese as well as Western citizens and companies.193 Although this patent law hardly 
implemented, a report of the US patent office in 1909 proved that the Chinese 
government handled IP infringement cases by Chinese subjects very well by using 
‘excellent dispositions in this matter’.194 Counterfeiting and piracy has nothing to do 
with culture but could be a natural consequence of market equilibrium due to the 
imbalance between demand and supply, which can happen in any country but not only 
in China. Less developed countries are normally technology followers of developed 
countries, and unavoidably have to pass a primary stage of development. Such a 
primary stage of development, supported by historical facts, are usually packed with 
imitations but not innovations.195 
 
                                                
Chinese Copyright and the Traditional Opinions about Innovations’ [2011] Intellectual Property Rights 
Annual Journal 39). 
191 Such as GCK Cheung, Intellectual Property Rights in China: Policy of Piracy, Trade and Protection. 
Routledge Contemporary China Series (Routledge 2009) 21. 
192 WP Alford, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization 
(Standford University Press 1995). 
193 ĲĠǽɳ=Əƿɺɮ?äúǛȄ1994. (P Zhang, Intellectual Property Law Analyses 
(Beijing University Press 1994)). 
194 AW Pontius, Protection Extended to Patents, Designs, Framed-Marks and Copyrights in China, 
Japan and Korea (Government Printing Office 1909). ‘As regards the protection of American patents, 
designs, trademarks, and copyright against infringement in China by Chinese subjects, no formal 
regulations for their registration and protection against Chinese infringement in any given part of the 
Emprie can meanwhile be secured through representations to the respective local authorities made 
through the American consular offices, a fact which evidences the Chinese Government’s present 
excellent disposition in this matter. The protection thus afforded is by means of proclamations and 
administrative measures.’ 
195 H-J Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem 
Press 2002). 
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Secondly, it is impossible to imagine Western law without the input of scholars’ 
writings where there is an absence of governmental authority. Comparing to the 
Chinese law-making procedure, the particular situation is very different. When China 
started its Reform and Opening-up in 1979, the country’s population was poorly 
educated, which led to a generally poor human resource to its political, legal, 
institutional, economic, and educational reforms.196 Furthermore, the lawmakers in 
many cases were law developers. Chinese law is unimaginable without the input of 
scholarly research, where in many cases scholars directly worked for the governmental 
authorities. Due to the needs of social reform in China, the Chinese legislators have 
unavoidably inserted particular social messages. Therefore, it is necessary to include 
‘context’ to understand Chinese IP.  
 
Furthermore, it is necessary to insert context to understand a transplanted system in its 
accepting state. Legal transplant is the most popularly used mechanism for legal 
changes, and Chinese IP is no exception.197 It is easier to transplant an already existing 
and sophisticated system than create a new autochthonous law. It is a natural reaction 
and a universal phenomenon, when a less modern or less developed system has been 
contacted from a sophisticated modern system.198 However, it is necessary to clarify 
that the research result of this monograph is not trying to develop any general theory of 
legal development. The research result does not apply to the developing countries that 
may or may not share similarities with Chinese societies. 
 
While considering IP legal rules and its structure on one hand, and the Chinese social 
conditions on another, the author acknowledges Frederick Maitland’s statement that 
                                                
196  K Shao, History Is a Key Decoder: Why China Aims at Re-Emerging as a Global Leader of 
Innovation, vol 1 (Law in Context 2013). 
197 A detailed study of IP transplant of China, see N Lee, N Bruun and M Li (eds), Governance of 
Intellectual Property rights in China and Europe (Elgar Intellectual Property and Global Development 
2016). 
198 A Watson, Comparative Law: Law, Reality and Society (3rd edn, Vandeplas Publishing 2010). 
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‘the forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves’.199 Or in 
short, ‘the dead ones are still impacting us from their graves’. This delicate concept 
warrants the question: For the Chinese IP system, are those the dead ones from the West, 
or the dead ones of the East? Therefore, a historical perspective has been inserted to 
this monograph.  
 
Before proceeding to the detailed chapters, the author would like to spotlight a very 
abstract yet necessary picture about China. Some may immediately question if the 
following part is relevant to the research questions. The author leaves this answer to 
her audiences’ discretion. The reasons for including the following part are as follows: 
China has been searching for its own destiny since the middle of the 19th Century. To 
some extent, the intensive import of Western law was a visible reflection to the lack of 
‘self-consciousness’ of China.200 To understand and evaluate the Chinese IP system, a 
significant amount of research has focused either on discussing substantive law or its 
protection level of enforcement. However, during this crucial transition period, it is 
necessary to comprehend the relationship between IP law and the society in which the 
IP system operates. This monograph is not claiming it understands the relationship 
between Chinese law and its society; it only tries to underline ‘law’ in a broad way 
within China’s own history of catch-up. The following part describes a general 
atmosphere of the large stage for Chinese law and what it contains, of which IP is an 
irreplaceable part. 
 
4.4 Features of the Methodological approach 
 
                                                
199 F. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (1909) 
<http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/maitland-formsofaction.asp> accessed 15 October 2016. 
200  K Shao, History Is a Key Decoder: Why China Aims at Re-Emerging as a Global Leader of 
Innovation, vol 1 (Law in Context 2013). 
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The fundamentally guiding opinion of this monograph is that: the causes behind a 
certain legal phenomenon can be various and complicated, which very often go beyond 
the legislations and are closely linked with other contexts. Therefore, instead of 
focusing on studies on legislation or cases, the author has explored Chinese IP in this 
monograph with a grand historical perspective within the contexts of social 
development on S&T, judicial reform, and intensive-IP-dependent industrial practices. 
 
The narrative and contextual approach is discussing the Chinese IP system at the state 
level. With the contextual approach, the study is focused on the interests and values, 
promoted by the national government, reflecting the structural changes and 
modernization of the society, as well as industrial development and innovations. The 
comparative aspect adopted in this monograph is mainly used to illustrate the legal 
situation in other cultures to locate a reference object which can illustrate the level of 
development of China and Chinese IP. 
 
This historical study focuses on the development of the key concepts and principles of 
the IP system in the past and during the transition with the intention of deepening 
understanding of the development of the law when meeting the challenges of a modern 
industrialised society and the global market. The author makes no clear distinction 
between the international and national conditions of IP law.  
 
Above all, the author summarizes the feature of applied methodologies in this 
monograph as ‘researching the Chinese IP catch-up with a Möbius Strip perspective’, 
which means: Chinese IP is treated as one of the running athletes on the road of 
development consisted by different contexts. Historical perspective twists the road of 
development into a Möbius Strip, although international and domestic conditions can 
be divided, they are only one component of catch-up. 
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5. A Visible Social Transformation - A Changing Attitude toward Confucianism 
in the Process of the Rule of Law in Modern China 
 
The following part of this chapter makes no attempt to formulate a precise theory of 
historical, societal, or political study on the Chinese legal system. This monograph is 
not written to illustrate the relationship between Chinese law and its society. This part 
shows a general attitude fluctuation on law inside the Chinese society. Despite the 
ideologies and peel off the historical guise, the relationship between the society and the 
legal changes reveals how law responded to Chinese societal concerns. The massive 
borrowings in the Chinese legal system have indicated a growth of a society, and 
                                                
201 Sourced from Baidu baike, https://baike.baidu.com/pic/ɑƯ.Ůĝ
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715976a2bc45c10385343b50d, accessed on 18 December, 2017. Special thanks go to Mr. Zhang Ningfeng, 
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offered a helpful key to understand how China looked for an appropriate system, and 
its rejection and approval of a foreign law. The following part formulates a basis to 
follow my later arguments on the Chinese IP system. Indeed, the whole IP system is 
just a part within the chain of the legal, regulatory, and policy aspects essential for a 
developing country to benefit from innovation, thus promoting a country’s 
development. 
 
The Chinese indigenous definition of society is mainly concerned with the 
implementation of rites, a system of theories that had been developed under 
Confucianism. Compared with the modern concept of Law, the implementation of 
Confucianism played a significant role in social management in a similar way as law. 
Following the definition of the scope of law and methodologies of legal anthropology, 
Confucianism could be treated as an indigenous legal system that differs from Western 
law. Because the Western notion of ‘law’ was an alien concept when it was introduced 
to Chinese society.  
 
The modernization of China began with blots. The First Opium War between China 
and Britain transformed China into a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country. Hence, 
1840 is defined as the first year of modern China. At the same time, the social 
circumstances after 1840 cruelly knocked Chinese intellectuals and induced the 
oscillation of Confucianism-centred governance.  
 
Since 1840, Confucianism has been fluctuating. Following a hurricane in the awareness 
of law, attitudes toward Confucianism synchronously changed. This section discusses 
the change in social attitudes in the process of the rule of law in China since 1840.  
 
From the First Opium War to the present, the modern history of China could be roughly 
divided into the following three parts according to the cognitive change in law: 
 
1840-1911: The end of the Chinese imperial era 
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1911-1949: The Republic of China, Japanese invasion and the Chinese civil war 
1949-present: The People’s Republic of China 
 
5.1 18401911: An Era of Many ‘First Times’ 
The decades from 1840 to 1911 were the last years of the Chinese imperial era. The 
treaties approved and executed by the Qing government, which were all unequal, could 
be treated as the first generation of the ‘modern law’ of China. It was the first time that 
Confucianism caused doubt among the Chinese people. 
 
1840-1874: The Ignorant Stage 
The first confrontation occurred in the Taiping Rebellion during 1851 to 1864. The 
leader of this movement, Hong Xiuquan, claimed himself as the younger brother of 
Jesus Christ. The rebellion is defined as an early heroic revolution and gallant 
movement from the peasant class.202 Moreover, from a micro-historical perspective, 
this is also the first time that a western concept was transplanted into China and 
challenged the indigenous rules. The Taiping Kingdom, which was established by Hong 
Xiuquan, set up rules to replace Confucianism and spread the idea of ‘property in 
common and equality.’ A patent law of some kind was proposed during this rebellion 
around 1859.203 
 
Taiping troops were constantly burning down Confucian temples during the 
governance of the Taiping Kingdom. However, the Taiping Kingdom soon transformed 
itself into the imperial governance. During this period, the central position of 
Confucianism was still a core concept for governance. 
                                                
202 The Qing government stopped the rebellion by armed force. Zeng Guofan and his army scotched this 
rebellion cruelly due to fact that Hong Xiuquan disrespected the authority of Confucian. However, Sun 
Yansten seemed holding another attitude and spoke highly of this rebellion since the rebellion imported 
and implemented a western concept the first time into China and managed to build up an independent 
governance. Sun Yansten even called himself Hong Xiuquan II.  
203 WP Alford, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization 
(Stanford University Press 1995). 
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The notion of law was not seriously considered inside China until 1860, and the 
implementation and enforcement were hardly mentioned. The incineration of the 
Yuanmingyuan Palace in 1860 taught the Qing government a hard lesson. Nowadays, 
main stream Chinese historians criticize this incineration as an invasion, which was 
caused by the Second Opium War and aimed at broadening the privileges and potential 
market inside China. 
 
However, one point is worth mentioning. Before the British and French troops captured 
Beijing in 1860, Emperor Xianfeng denied the pre-approved Treaty of Tianjin (1858) 
in June 1859. The Emperor should have met the ministers from Britain and France and 
officially exchanged the treaties. However, the Qing government not only refused to 
meet the ministers, but even attacked the British and French teams. Most of the Chinese 
historical books hold the idea that the attack of British and French troops on Beijing in 
1860 was part of their invasion plan. However, in 1861, Zeng Guofan204 commented 
as follows: ‘In the ninth year of Emperor Xianfeng,205 foreigners came to exchange the 
treaties. Lord Senggelinqin206 lured them into traps, attacked them and sunk their boats, 
and the whole of China cheered. However, the next year, foreigners came back again, 
attacked and occupied Beijing, and almost ruined the whole China. Senggelinqin should 
commit suicide to atone his guilt’.207 
  
Looking back through history, even though all the treaties were unequal, the historical 
experience should be borne in mind. China entered the modern world in an extremely 
immature way. Meanwhile, the reluctance toward being internationalized and 
modernized was obvious at that time. 
                                                
204 Zeng Guofan(18111872)was an eminent Chinese official, military general, and devout Confucian 
scholar of the late Qing Dynasty in China. He was one of the most important figures who restored the 
stability of Qing Dynasty after Taiping Rebellion. The stability he set up are known as ‘Tongzhi 
Restoration’. 
205 The year of 1859. 
206 The general who attacked the British and French teams in 1859. 
207 Original comment in Chinese: É&/ġǄAƓŠ»Ȣd@ǠdƟƙƸɻȷƺrɈ
åȈĿǙȷˉġéAàɄ?Ƽˇ#ådƟƙƸħɃƎGʀå 
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1874-1911: The Arousal Stage 
Based on a shipwreck that occurred in Taiwan, the Japanese government started a 
military confrontation with China in 1874. Afterwards, the two countries signed the 
Beijing Treaty on Specific Issues of Taiwan.208 In Taiwan’s history books, this treaty 
has been treated as the starting point when the ‘brothers from same culture and same 
root’ moved their relationship to an intensely hostile direction. By executing this treaty, 
the Qing government did not stop the expanding desire of Japan, but indirectly 
encouraged its rapacity. Hence, the first Sino-Japanese War, through which the 
Japanese aimed at the control of Korea, did not really occur suddenly. China not only 
lost the control of Korea after this war, but also its regional dominance in Asia. Loss of 
this war is also treated as a huge humiliation in the modern history of China. 
 
The fact that China was defeated by Japan in 1894 strongly affected the central position 
of Confucianism. In the process of taking law into consideration, Confucianism was 
reinterpreted in 1898, and this raised the first social reform inside China, which covered 
education, culture, science, technology, political and legal matters. However, this 
reform failed, and because it lasted only for 104 days, it is known as the ‘Hundred Days’ 
Reform’.209 
 
However, this is the first time that ‘law’ came into consideration nationally and was 
used to support the national transformation. An IP protection code ‘Reward Regulation 
for Vitalizing Technologies and Crafts’ was passed in 1898, governing the importation 
of advanced technologies and inventions.210 
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Ȣ	 
209 Ōō¯ƿ 
210 ĲĠǽɳ=Əƿɺɮ?äúǛȄ1994. (P Zhang, Intellectual Property Law Analyses 
(Beijing University Press 1994)). 
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Kang Youwei211 stated in his Notes for the Conveyance of Rites, 212 in which he 
interpreted that in order to reach ‘the Age of Great Harmony,’213 one country should 
belong to its people. The concept of ‘people and public’ was brought to attention for 
the first time within the domestic knowledge system. Moreover, by analysing 
Confucian’s concepts on ‘The Age of Great Harmony’ and ‘The Well-off Society’,214 
                                                
211  Kang Youwei(1858-1927), Chinese scholar and reformer, aimed to establish a constitutional 
monarchy in China. The leader in the Hundred Days’ Reform.  
212 ȃʛǁ	 
213 åä¼ The Age of Great Harmony 
 äʧ-ɕ0åǘk 
 When the great way prevails, the world is equally shared by all. 
 ʨʅɅȿ 
 The talent and virtue are elected. 
 ɦ]^Ǽ 
 Mutual confidence was emphasized and brotherhood was cultivated. 
 ũAǟɜrɜǟóró 
 Therefore, people regard all parents as their own, and treat all children as their own. 
 ðȴƅŔȠÞƅŔǧģƅŔʼ 
 The elders can live in happiness, the adults are employed by their talent, the youths can grow 
and educate.  
 ˤĆùǟīǯȶǳƅŔ˝ 
 Widows and widowers, orphans, childless, ills and invalids are all well taken care of. 
 ǬƅëƅƬ 
 Men and women all have an appropriate role in the society and family. 
 ʃŇrƢűÒ0ĽɔűĘ 
 Nature resources were fully used for the benefit of all, and not appropriated for selfish ends. 
 Ňrűʒ0ĽǘĘ 
 People contribute their ability to society and not for the private gain. 
 ŻũɤʾȷɆǵȑ3ʄȷU 
 Thus evil scheming is repressed, and crimes fail to arise. 
 ũâœȷʾŻɥä¼ 
 So the doors do not have to be shut. This is called ‘the Age of Great Harmony’. 
214 ċĪȄO The Well-off Society  
 CäʧŴˈå'ă 
 Now the great way has been superseded, the world belongs to single family 
 º@r@ºóróʉ'ę 
 Each one only regards own parents as parents, own sons and daughters as children and take all 
things as private gain 
 äA«G'ȃ, 
 Powers become hereditable and are justified as ritual system 
 ØʯƻƶG'Î, 
 Castles and moats are made as strong territorial protection 
 ȃ,G'Ȥ, 
 Rites and virtues are used as law 
 Gƨ¿ɂGȕǚó 
 These are used to determine monarch relationship, to found filiation 
 GǼfıGÇæï 
 To safeguard the brotherhood and to unit couples together 
 GɰĨGȒǨʲ 
 So that various systems are established, and land has been divided 
 GʈǽG'ę 
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he pointed out that ‘the Well-off Society’ had to be a necessary stage for entering ‘the 
Age of Great Harmony’. However, this interpretation caused a major conflict inside 
China, and Kang Youwei was criticized as a westerners’ slave215 by some Chinese 
officials at that time.  
 
Around 1900, the Boxer Rebellion occurred. The movement of Yihe Tuan, otherwise 
known as the Boxers, was organized by ordinary Chinese citizens and strongly against 
everything associated with the West. Not only Christian Churches but also ordinary 
believers, both Chinese and foreigners, suffered during this violent and mass rebellion. 
The rules established by the Boxers were very indigenous thoughts with the guidance 
of Confucianism. There were clearly stated rules such as not being greedy for money 
nor for intercourse, respecting parents, and being loyal to the government. Moreover, 
the name ‘Yi’ means loyalty and ‘He’ means harmony, which are the two most basic 
Confucian thoughts. The forms of this movement also indicated the extreme execution 
of Confucian values: (1) Traditions should be respected. Therefore, those who were 
treated as non-traditional were punished. Although there was no Chinese official data 
existing on the number of victims during this rebellion, official papers from that age 
recorded the extreme form of the movement, in which ordinary Chinese citizens who 
had western goods or only a western appearance suffered or were even killed in the 
street. (2) Family and decedents should be respected. Hence, those who caused damage 
to one’s family and disruption of the peace for decedents were executed as the most 
horrible punishment one could imagine. Chinese Christians, including their family 
members, were cruelly killed. Large numbers of Christian tombs were destroyed. In the 
                                                
 So that courageous intellectuals gained respects, each individual contributes his own career.  
 ũɾǧŻUȷqǩƩʌ 
 So that machinations are raised and wars are caused. 
 ȆƷŭƫŎǠÅkǩƩrʣ0.Ʃl¿óȶƉƅʁ8ȃȶ0 
 Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, Cheng, Zhou are the outstanding individuals, who had prudently 
implemented rites and virtues. 
 Gǻr,Gȵr]ǻƅʚBɬɩȂƱƅĞîƅǩƩȶÑÙȶ©NG
'ƭŻɿċĪ  
 Interpreting the meanings, use them as standards to examine people. Exposing faults, establish 
the model of comity. Sufficiently disclose the rites and virtues. Dismiss the one who abuses 
powers and people treat group as such as a scourge. Such society is called as well-off.  
215 Ǆì 
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later Boxer Protocol, known as the Xinchou Treaty of 1901, compensations were 
required for the destroyed tombs. The retrospective effect as a basic political form of 
power in indigenous thoughts was also implemented during this rebellion. The 
movement developed into an extreme way that the tombs of westerners who arrived 
China years ago, who were famous for peace and harmony, were destroyed, including 
the tombs of Matteo Ricci216 and Johann Adam.217 Although this rebellion claimed to 
get rid of western culture and goods, according to an unofficial data, 99% of the victims 
were ordinary Chinese citizens. Sixty-six years later, a similar movement occurred. 
Homothetic forms and claims were executed, but this was then strongly against 
Confucianism. 
 
In order to quell the extreme movement, the allied troops of eight countries intervened 
in China in 1901. In Chinese history, this intervention is known as the Invasion of Eight 
Countries’ Allied Troops. The Xinchou Treaty of 1901 (Boxer Protocol) was approved 
as another international law. Following this treaty, in the commercial treaty of 1903218, 
the US already expressly required China to issue patents to US citizens holding patents 
on the same terms as patents issued to Chinese citizens, although at that time China had 
neither patent law nor offices.219 The Boxer Protocol established even more unfair 
obligations on the Chinese side. The citizens rose up to seek new governance and the 
Qing dynasty ended in 1911.  
 
The first impression of modern law was unfortunately not very positive from the 
Chinese point of view. Both executing such laws, and not, led China to wars and social 
disasters. From a historical perspective, this could be one of the non-stated reasons why 
Chinese citizens nowadays always hold a skeptical attitude toward laws in general. 
                                                
216 ǡȐ 
217 ƷɌƇ 
218 See Article X, Treaty Between the United States and China for the Extension of the Commercial 
Relations Between Them (1903), available at <www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/209> accessed 14 
July 2017. 
219 WP Alford, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization 
(Stanford University Press 1995). 
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5.2 1911-1949: Chaos 
 
1911- 1921 Confucianism vs. Law 
The governance of Qing ended with the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, and the Republic 
of China was founded in 1912. In August of that year, the first national party of China, 
Kuomintang (KMT) was formed. The establishment of KMT opened a new page in 
Chinese history when the political organization was transferred from the form of gang 
revolution to the revolution of political parties.220 However, the main founder, Song 
Jiaoren221 of KMT, was assassinated under the order of Yuan Shikai222 in 1913. 
 
During this period, both Confucianism and Law achieved a new level. Yuan ShiKai 
aimed at reviving the Chinese monarchy; hence, the theory of Confucianism was widely 
disseminated. On the other hand, the Republic of China and its founders were eager to 
build up a nation with orders based on law. After the assassination of Song Jiaoren, the 
independence of the judiciary reached a new peak, which had never happened in earlier 
history. The Shanghai Public Prosecutors’ Office even summoned the Prime Minister, 
Zhao Bingjun. Although inside the KMT, according to the disclosed record, ‘we should 
follow Song Jiaoren’s behest, use law but not armed force to solve the problem’, the 
disagreement did not stop Sun Yansten from using armed force to overthrow Yuan’s 
governance. Sun Yansten223 raised the second revolution, also known as the National 
Protection War in 1915, which failed after only two months. Yuan Shikai died in 1916; 
                                                
220 Z Luxun, The Modern Chinese History that Has not Been Taught in Taiwan (Keio Cultural Enterprise 
Co. Ltd. 2011) 99. 
221 Song Jaoren (1882-1913), the first Chinese who aimed at establishing cabinet inside China. He is a 
political republican revolutionary and a main founder of the Republic of China as well as the KMT.  
222 Yuan Shikai(1858-1916), general and politician in the late Qing Dynasty, the second president of the 
Republic of China.  
223  Sun Yansten(1866-1925), Chinese revolutionary and the first president of the Public of China. 
Forerunner of democratic revolution and father of the nation.  
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after which time China lacked a central authority like Yuan and soon entered the 
Warlord Era. 
 
The spread of the thoughts of Confucianism or the ideas of law did not solve any real 
social problem or improve the Chinese citizen’s living conditions, but was implemented 
as political claims to strengthen governance. Although Sun Yansten addressed the 
importance of law many times, even in his Three Principles of People (nationalism, 
democracy, and the people’s livelihood), his individual power was above the law. An 
insinuative fact was that, after the Second Revolution, Yuan Shikai disbanded the KMT 
based on ‘the crime of treason’ according to law. This showed that both Confucianism 
and Law in China was used in a ‘baroque’ approach. Law, which had the same role as 
Confucianism inside China, was more likely used as a governmental rule and claims 
for political support rather than a widely accepted social norm. The supreme authority 
of law did not reach the same level as it has in western society. During this period, a 
patent law ‘Interim Reward Regulations for Technologies and Crafts’ was passed in 
1912, but failed to play a significant role during this historical period. 
 
However, the core position of Confucianism no longer existed. Half a century ago, 
when the Taiping Kingdom was destroying Confucian temples and books, intellectuals 
such as Zeng Guofan sent out an armed force to punish the disrespect of Confucian. 
Half a century later, when Yuan Shikai tried to revive the central position of 
Confucianism, intellectuals strongly disagreed with him. Although the future of the 
Republic of China was not clear at that time, democracy and the norm that one country 
belongs to its people was already rooted into the society. The restoration of the 
monarchy did not bring back the central position of Confucianism, but raised the New 
Culture Movement. Many revolutionaries disseminated the norms of law and science, 
exploring new notions based on them, in order to reveal a new China to Chinese citizens. 
They strongly criticized Confucianism, reformed the vernacular, and raised the modern 
awareness of rights, such as women’s rights, freedom of speech, and other rights 
sourced from the norm of law. Three years later, combined with the unfair treatments 
 AD
and the spineless government reaction after the First World War, the New Culture 
Movement turned into the May Fourth Movement. The main slogan was ‘Anti-Japanese, 
Anti-feudal, and Anti-imperialist’. The anti-feudal and anti-imperialist referred to the 
Confucian thoughts, the civilizations, and the kingdoms that Confucianism served.  
 
Following the New Culture Movement, China came to be regarded as a nation, 
equivalent to the other nations in the world in the view of the Chinese.224 Moreover, 
Confucianism is no longer the unique authority. The authoritative power of 
Confucianism has been significantly weakened in the view of Chinese people, including 
its good values and concepts. The more than 2000-year-old indigenous concept and its 
supreme position was challenged, criticized, and abandoned within only 60 years. 
 
1921-1949: What Shall Be the Central Authority? (I) 
In 1921, the main leader of the New Culture Movement, Chen Duxiu, established the 
CPC. Mao Tse-tung, known as Chairman Mao, was among the representatives in the 
first national meeting of the CPC. Sun Yansten advocated the policy of ‘Ally with 
Russians and unite with the CPC’225 in the First National People’s Congress in 1924. 
This policy aimed to support and back up the coming Northern Expedition, in order to 
overthrow the governance of warlords in northern China. 
 
However, after the death of Sun Yansten in 1925, the KMT and CPC separated into two 
groups that strongly opposed each other. The KMT represents the benefits of the 
                                                
224 Ancient Chinese folk culture did not consider China as a ‘country/nation’ as what we define in the 
modern civilization, but as the central of the world, or ‘the celestial empire’. The New Culture Movement 
changed the state identification of China and addressed that: China is as same as the other countries, it is 
one of the countries within the international society. Historically speaking, modern concepts such as 
‘nation’ and ‘citizen’ were introduced to China during the Hundred Days of Reform in 1898. The 
transition of state identification has been recorded in many Chinese literatures. For example, the lack of 
folk education and awareness of China as ‘country/nation/state’ with ‘Chinese ethnic’ was considered as 
one of the causes why there were so many traitors during the Japanese invasion period(1937-1945). Such 
as recorded in Deng Xiaoping’s speech in 1938, see X Deng, Selected Papers of Deng Xiaoping, vol 1 
(Renmin Press 2008) 1. 
225 ȹZĄn, this slogan is disputed among historians. According to some historians’ view, this slogan 
never existed. 
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landlord class; however, the CPC represents the peasantry. Mao Tse-Tung wrote in his 
report that, ‘Revolution is rebellion, it is a violent movement that is used by one class 
to annihilate another class. The revolutions in villages are the rebellions by which the 
peasantries annihilate the power of landlords’. 226  In fact, during the Northern 
Expedition, the CPC already started the revolution mentioned in Mao’s report. Some 
of the landlords lost their properties and some even lost their lives. In 1927, Chiang 
Kaishek started to purge the government from the CPC, and numerous CPC members 
were killed. The split of the CPC and KMT led to the Chinese Civil War.227 Although 
CPC and KMT later united to fight against the Japanese invasion(1937), before the 
surrender of Japan, the two parties started their war again.  
 
The lack of a sense of power limitation led the two parties to fight against each other. 
The awareness and acceptance of the concept of law was not fully executed. The 
indigenous acknowledgement ‘Nothing above one extreme power (emperor)’ led the 
two parties an unsuccessful negotiation, and aimed at annihilating each other. This was 
exactly as in Mao’s famous saying, ‘power grows from the barrel of the gun’. Although 
the concept of law was imported into China, power and armed force was a central focus 
during these 28 years. 
 
5.3 1949-1978: The Establishment of New Authority 
 
1949-1976: What Shall Be the Central Authority? (II) 
The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. China was involved in the 
Korean War one year later. The appraisals of this war differ between history books that 
                                                
226 Ǔ£zƱʛȵąŚÃ	(Investigation Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan), ‘˔ÆŻƁ
Ż$˂ȣťȳ$˂ȣǲƁzƑ˔ÆŻzƱ˂ȣťȳŜÒ(˂ȣǲƏǲ˔Æ’ 
227 One definition of the Chinese Civil War is that it lasted from 1945 until 1949. However, some 
historians think that the Civil War actually started in 1927, when the KMT and the CPC officially started 
against each other. This essay follows the second definition, because after 1927, China was already 
divided into two parts that were governed separately by KMT and CPC. 
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were published in mainland China and Taiwan; however, after sorting out the 
information, the objective facts are, but are not limited to, the following:228 (1) the 
Korean War offered a potential opportunity for the Republic of China to retake the 
mainland; (2) it made the relationship between China and the Soviet Union closer, but 
on the other hand, China became even more distant from the western countries; and (3) 
it caused an obvious increase in political struggles. 
 
The first fact directly led to the ‘three movements’229 and ‘three transformations,’230 
and it was a cause of the third fact mentioned above.  
 
Three movements were the (1) land reform, (2) punishment of counter-revolutionaries, 
and (3) resistance to U.S aggression and aid to Korea. In order to stop the Republic of 
China from retaking mainland China, the Instruction On The Suppression of Counter-
revolutionary Activities came into force.231 However, the three movements lacked 
sufficient disclosure. Articles in the Regulation On Punishment To The Counter-
Revolutionary232 had a very broad description of situations where a person could be 
convicted as guilty, but regulated the death penalty as well as lifelong or long-term 
imprisonment as a punishment. Moreover, Article 17 regulated that people who were 
convicted as guilty shall be deprived of political rights as well as part, or all, of their 
personal property. The number of sentenced prisoners was 1 000 000 according to Mao 
Tse-tung’s report in the Lushan Meeting in 1959. Unfortunately, the trial procedures 
had no clear rules and the conviction had no detailed legal standards for sentencing. 
Abuse of the death penalty was very common during the three movements. 
 
                                                
228 The personal prestige of Peng Dehuai went up after the Korean War. Mao Anying, son of Mao 
Zedong, died during this war. These two facts indirectly catalyzed the later political movements.  
229 äʛ 
230 äŧʥ 
231%n%ço8ʻ¨­˔ÆǈǲŞȂ1950 (Directive of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China on the suppression of counter revolutionary activities(1950)) 
<http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66655/4492589.html > accessed 1 November 2012. 
232 %¡AƱnÇÏňƽ­˔ÆƒW(Regulation On Punishment To The Counter-Revolutionary of 
People’s Republic of China )<http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2008-12/15/content_1462048.htm> 
accessed 1 November 2012. 
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In order to establish indigenous industry and also reduce the financial stress caused by 
the Korean War, three transformations were followed. From a legal point of view, this 
historical fact marks the first time that public property rights were prioritized over 
individual property rights in the People’s Republic of China. 
 
Legalized political instructions, together with overgeneralized legislation and abused 
execution increased political struggles. Compared with the three movements, the later 
movements233 all caused similar or even worse situations among ordinary citizens. At 
the same time, Chinese legislation closely followed the modes and concepts from the 
Soviet Union. 
 
All the movements economically, intellectually, and politically ruined the old authority, 
established a new order, and raised social awareness of the new power. Despite the 
order on political, intellectual, and economic levels, a new order was also needed on 
the cultural level. The establishment of a new authority on the cultural level started with 
destruction in 1963.234 All the movements lacked both safeguarding of the law and the 
limitation of Confucianism; they were like preludes to the Cultural Revolution. After 
the Cultural Revolution, rehabilitation was carried out for most of the victims, but 
compensation for the victims was very limited and justice was too late for those who 
lost their lives. Facts on the Cultural Revolution are still not sufficiently disclosed, 
including the number of victims, which is still under discussion.235 In ‘Deng Xiaoping 
Answers to Italian Journalist Olin Ena Faraci’s Questions’ (1980), Deng Xiaoping 
reviewed the mistakes of Cultural Revolution in detail with a political perspective. 
                                                
233 The followed movements, which due to the length limitation will not be discussed in detail, are as 
follows: Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns, 1952 (political level); The Hundred Flowers Campaigns, 
1956 (intellectual level); the Anti-Rightist Movement, 1957 (political level); the Three Grand Flags 
Movement, 1958 (economic level); the Anti-Rightist Movement, 1959 (political level, Peng Dehuai lost 
power); and the Destruction of Four Olds, 1963 (cultural level). 
234 B Ahn, ‘The Making of the Cultural Revolution’ in B Ahn, Chinese Politics and the Cultural 
Revolution (University of Washington Press 1976). 
235 JW Esherick, PG Pickowicz and AG Walder, The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History (Stanford 
University Press 2005). 
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Deng pointed out that one of the causes of the Cultural Revolution was a faulty 
system.236 
 
Although most Chinese folk cannot really define what law is, an impression has been 
left among the public that the sentencing of most of the individuals during the 
movements was due to political and governmental needs, but not based on the justice 
of law. Therefore, the first impression of law to Chinese people, which still exists 
nowadays, is that law is always strongly connected with political needs. At the same 
time, since law is so broadly implemented and interpreted, a lack of stability is also an 
impression of law. Based on historical facts, the rehabilitation of individuals was 
carried out as a result of improved political awareness, rather than from a legal 
perspective. This perhaps is one reason why average Chinese citizens are more likely 
to believe in individual officers to provide solutions, but not in the justice of law, even 
nowadays. Moreover, the historical facts leave a big question mark in the minds of the 
Chinese public concerning the concepts that law publicizes, such as freedom of speech, 
individual rights, and respect for individual property rights. The central authority of law 
did not become properly established in the Chinese people’s view during the historical 
process. Therefore, many Chinese citizens are more concerned with the reality of how 
legal theories are implemented in practice than with how nice such legal theories sound. 
This was, after all, a hard lesson. 
 
During this period, the theories of Confucianism were strongly criticized and denied, 
especially in the Destruction of Four Olds and the Cultural Revolution. Although the 
Chinese were ‘desperately’ trying to dispose of Confucianism, the thoughts of 
Confucianism simply changed their form of existence into a negative manner. Although 
Confucianism was no longer an official source of guidance, its effect on the way of 
behaving remained. For example, slogans, which contained indigenous concepts, were 
                                                
236 ʩċĠʩċĠŭʣ1975-1982AƱǛȄ 1983 (X Deng, Selected Papers of Deng Xiaoping 
(1975-1982) (Renmin Press 1983)) 303. 
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used as an indication of loyalty during this period.237 Family, public reputation, and 
peace after death are the basic concepts of the Rites. The form of punishment, for 
example for the Five Black Categories, exceeded the castigations to individual family 
members. ‘No Peace After Death’ was still the worst form of punishment. Many tombs 
were destroyed during the movements; politicians who lost power were not allowed to 
use their own names after death.238 Sullying one’s public reputation was also widely 
used during the movements. Prosecution and public humiliation between family 
members was very common during this historical period. 
 
1976-1979: Opening A New Balance 
Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1973. The Reform and Opening-Up Policy was 
introduced in the end of 1978. The Four Cardinal Principles239 were established in 
1979. The Confucius concept of a ‘well-off society’ were modernized and brought back 
to Chinese society by Deng Xiaoping in the same year. China aimed to achieve the 
status of a well-off society by 2020. This is the first time that the Chinese government 
used a classic Chinese concept from Confucianism as its policy as well as its 
developmental goal.  
 
It is difficult to indicate how much Confucianism has influenced China. However, the 
Doctrine of the Mean has again appeared, such as reflected by a basic cardinal principle 
in the Chinese government ‘anti-leftist on the economic side and anti-rightist on the 
political side’.240  This is a reflection that the norm of law and Confucianism has 
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reached a balance inside China. They have developed into two norms that improve, 
balance, and limit each other. ‘A harmonized society’ became the main voice.  
 
From 1979 until today, China has been involved in the process of achieving a ‘well-off 
society’ via the rule of law. How the new era will look remains to be seen. China used 
and is still using the previous fests to boost national pride. Cherishing the great era of 
the Han and Tang Dynasty is one of the indications that China is still under the shadow 
of frustration.  
 
Indigenous concepts and law have had many strong clashes with each other in Chinese 
history. Between 1840 and the present, China may have had two ‘cultural revolutions’ 
in the author’s opinion. One was the Boxer Rebellion, which was strongly against all 
western thoughts and goods. The other was the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, which 
was strongly against tradition. However, the transplanted concept and indigenous 
civilization can reach harmony instead of destroying each other. There is no better 
historical support for this fact than modern Chinese history. It can be considered as a 
perfect example that an alien concept, ‘modern law’ itself, into another complex system 
may cause the concept to operate in a completely different way. During the last decades, 
Confucianism has been strongly criticized as something negative and blamed as the 
main reason that stopped China from undergoing modernization. It is worth mentioning 
that, even if there is a complete collapse of Confucianism inside China, the authority of 
law may still take time to be properly constructed in the society.  
 
Under this general picture, it may not difficult to realize and accept the fact that, after 
all, IP is such a small matter at the beginning of the modern history of China. 
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Because of the Korean War, China had to implement its industrialization under a format 
of state capitalism.241 Therefore, the Chinese macro strategy, also known as ‘grand 
strategy’, offers a broader and more comprehensive content for its micro strategies, in 
order to obtain political objectives, which include the assurance of external security and 
internal social development in peace and war. The dominant 21st-century task for the 
Chinese government is its economic and domestic development. Under this dominant 
task, the Chinese government confronts some problems: (1) the gap between the 
ambition of China’s plan and their uneven implementation,242 and (2) unavoidable 
developmental diversity from one region to another. The delivery of policies may be 
localized and decentralized; it would be questionable if the development of the national 
S&T and IP system integrate with each other. 
 
1. Before 1949 
 
Before the People’s Republic of China, the first patent law of China was made in 1898 
in the Qing Dynasty. This patent law was not properly implemented because of the 
failure of the Hundred days of Reform and the collapse of the monarchy. The 
technology of the Qing dynasty was visibly fallen behind the western world, though the 
Qing government tried to introduce modern industries into the country. These imported 
industries were at a very low technological level. China signed a treaty with the US, 
obliging it to provide formal protection of IPRs to foreigners in 1903, which was the 
first treaty that imposed foreign IPR standards on China.243 The Republic of China 
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made its patent law in 1944.244 This patent law entered into force in 1949, but the 
government of KMT was incapable of implementing it because of its loss of power in 
mainland China.245 The implementation of republican legislations was completely shut 
down due to the political alternation of the People’s Republic of China. 246  The 
discontinuous of the technology and IP law made it practically very difficult to estimate 
the integration between IP law implementation and technology before 1949. 
 
2. 1949-1978  
 
The reconstruction of the country’s industrialization started with the assistance of the 
Soviet Union after 1949. The ‘156 Big Projects’ and most of the sub-projects were 
heavily industry-oriented, focused on constructing the foundation of the industrial 
system of China.247 The ‘156 Big Projects’ were carried out via plants constructions 
together with whole equipment imports, and 150 of them were implemented. Due to 
the shortage of local capacities after the Japanese Invasion and Civil War, China in total 
constructed plants and imported equipment up to 7.3 billion RMB during the period of 
1950 to 1959. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union sent out 8500 experts for technology 
direction, consultation, and human resource training. China sent out 20 000 students 
and technical personnel to study or receive training in the Soviet Union. Within that 
decade, for the total foreign exchange amount of 270 million US dollar, China signed 
in total 420 whole-set equipment and 163 single equipment import contracts with the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. Among these contracts, only 1% 
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involved technology-collaboration contracts.248 There were no charges on IPRs.249 
Apart from the close political relationships between China and the Soviet Union in that 
decade, the understanding of private rights and IP were very different from those after 
1979 as described in the introduction chapter. Private ownership of properties was 
considered strongly against the ideology of socialism. 250  Individual welfare is 
subordinate to the social welfare and national interest,251 and the newly established 
Chinese government is based on the socialist ideology. It carried out intensive measures 
aiming at abolishing all private property rights. Technology and intellectual 
achievements were considered as the common wealth of the state but not private 
property. During this period, China had a strong impact from the Soviet Union and 
transplanted many legal norms from it. 252  In 1950, the Chinese government 
promulgated the Provisional Regulations on the Protection of Inventions Rights and 
Patent Rights. By awarding ‘certificate of innovation’, the Chinese government entitled 
inventors to honorary recognition and the monetary rewards were tied to the cost-
savings made from the invention, which was a lump sum bonus.253 Other invention 
related rights, such as exploitation and dissemination, were kept to the state. 254 
Although there were alternative options (known as a ‘two-track’ system255), where the 
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Chinese government alternatively offered patents that had vested inventors with 
ownership and fundamental control on the invention, 256  the later Regulation on 
Invention Reward in 1963 had stressed the public ownership of inventions by regulating 
‘all inventions are national assets; any individuals and organizations are not allowed to 
apply for a monopoly. All the organizations around the country, including collective 
enterprises can use them’.257 
 
During the period of 1949 to 1963, China managed to establish its basis for modern 
industrialization, 135 big projects among the 156 projects started working until the end 
of 1957. Among these projects, 68 had been completed or partly completed.258 These 
intensive technology transplants at some degree made China nearly achieve the level 
of the Soviet Union’s first five-year plan regarding steel, coal, electricity, and 
petroleum.259  
 
China issued The Perspective Plan for Science and Technology Development from 
1956-1967 260  in 1956, also known as the Twelve Years Plan on Science and 
Technology. This is the first science and technology plan China had. Led by the Prime 
Minister Zhou Enlai, the government collected hundreds of scientists of various 
categories and disciplines to participate in the preparation. China also invited 16 well-
known scientists in various disciplines from the Soviet Union to draft this plan. The 
Twelve Years Plan was a guideline for China to ‘focus on the development and catch 
up’. This plan came out together with four annexes, which were, (1) Statements On 
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Important National Science Missions And The Central Problems, (2) Planning Manual 
of Basic Scientific Disciplines, (3) Urgent Measures in 1956 and Main points of 
Research Program in 1957; and (4) List Of The Names Of The Tasks And The Central 
Issues. The Twelve Years Plan contained 57 major scientific and technological tasks 
from 13 different aspects; 616 central issues, which raised further integrated 12 key 
tasks; and general guidelines on: (1) the system of research institutions; (2) policies on 
the usage of existing personnel; (3) general plans on training of cadres and the 
allocation ratio; and (4) principles of research institutions.261 
 
Although it stressed the importance of S&T for national development, its main focuses 
were on constructing, developing and catch-up the basic foundation of S&T for a 
country’s needs, such as equipment, funding, human resources, and institutional 
arrangements. 262  It was not a plan at the national strategy level, but it played a 
significant and decisive role for (1) the layout of China’s scientific research institutions; 
(2) the adjustment of universities and professional disciplines; (3) the directions for 
utilization and training of scientific and technological personnel; (4) the management 
methods and systems for technologies; and (5) the formation of the S&T system.263 
 
Meanwhile, the period from 1949 to1953 was the constructing period of the Chinese 
legal system. During this period, China had no constitutional law except for the 
Common Program for Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference which was 
published on 29 September 1949. It had a temporarily quasi constitution-like function. 
The Interim Organization Regulations on the Supreme People’s Court of the Central 
People’s Government regulated the supreme people’s court as the highest judicial organ 
of China. The Provisional Organization Regulations on People’s Court regulated a 
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three-level court system, which contained courts at the county (or city) or province (or 
municipality directly under the central government) level and the Supreme People’s 
Court. Moreover, China released the Provisional of People’s Mediation Committee’s 
Organization on 25 February 1954, which indicated the Chinese-characterized 
mediation system was properly established.264 
 
The first Constitution of China was presented to the public on 20 September 1954. 
While formulating the first constitution, the National People’s Congress also 
promulgated Court Organization Law (COL). Instead of the three levels court system, 
the COL regulated a four levels court system together with the special courts, and this 
system is valid until today. The construction of the Chinese legal system was extremely 
fast during the period of 1954 to 1957. The focus of the judicial system was on 
supporting the social transformation to socialism during this period.265 
 
The People’s Republic of China almost abandoned the Republic of China’s IP 
legislations, especially for patents.266 The previous republican government presumed 
the existence of a marketplace, but it was not accepted by the government of the 
People’s Republic of China. China issued only 4 patents from 1949 to1963.267  
 
Generally speaking, during this period of time, the concept of private property rights 
was hardly welcomed in China, nor was the awareness of IP. The ideology base did not 
properly support the private property norm of IP. As the precondition for IP was not 
formulated during that time. There was neither judicial nor administrative enforcement 
of IPR at the beginning of the People’s Republic of China.  
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The Chinese government launched the ‘Great Leap Movement’ in 1957. In 1959, for 
political reasons, the Soviet Union unilaterally tore up the contracts with China and all 
the experts were withdrawn in 1960.268 Meanwhile, China suffered three years of 
natural disasters. This strongly damaged the national economy. The main guideline was 
focused on ‘adjusting, consolidating, substantiating, and improving’ in 1960. These 
four words were also the main characteristics of the development of S&T in that period 
until 1966. 269  With the approval of central government, and in addition to the 
implementation of the Twelve Years Plan, China promulgated the 1963-1972 Plan for 
Development of Science and Technology in 1963,270 also known as the Ten Years 
Guidelines. The Ten Years Guidelines were aimed at strengthening the S&T basis for 
the country’s industrialization, mainly concentrated on the key breakthroughs that 
could be achieved within a short time period. ‘Self-dependence and catch-up’ was the 
main emphasis of the Ten Years Guidelines.271 
 
After the departure of the Soviet Union, counting on the limited existing materials, self-
dependence was emphasized in solving key-problems and the government mobilized 
resources all over the country.272 The catch-up was carried out during the historical 
period of the ‘cold war’. Together with the withdrawal of technology transfers from the 
Soviet Union, China hardly had access to, nor obtained any advanced technologies from 
abroad. The level of technology was lower than 1957. However, during this period, the 
indigenous capacities of technology development were fostered. Moreover, the 
significant integration of resources established a solid base for further industrialization. 
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The core view of the Ten Years Guidelines was ‘modernization of science and 
technology in the key among the moderations of agriculture, industry, national defense 
and science and technology’. It contained 77 volumes and covered aspects of: (1) 
project planning; (2) development planning; (3) surveys on agriculture, industries, and 
resources; (4) medical and health and its relevant aspects of professional planning; (5) 
technical planning science; and (6) basic science plan.273 This Ten Years Guidelines 
released 374 pilot projects, 3205 central issues, and 15,000 research subjects. However, 
the Ten Years Guidelines only implemented for three years.274 In 1966, the Cultural 
Revolution prioritized political movement over industrialization and invention.275  
 
The legal and judicial system during the same period was considerably damaged. Since 
the second half year of 1957 until 1960, the legal system was heavily criticized and 
damaged because of the left-leaning political movements. A significant amount of 
personnel from the judicial system was accused and punished because of the 
movements. Many places merged the public security bureau, Procuratorate, and Courts 
into one unit as a Public Security Bureau of Politics and Law. The People’s Mediation 
Committee and the Public Security Committee were merged into a Policing Mediation 
Committee. All the special courts of railways and waterways were revoked. The public 
notarization system and lawyer system was shut down. The Justice Department and the 
State Council Legislative Affairs Bureau was shut down in 1959, as were the local 
offices of both units. All the legislative affairs were under the side-responsibilities of 
the people’s court. 276  The Fifth National Judicial Conference proposed ‘a 
comprehensive leap for people’s judicial works’ in 1962. The Sixth National Judicial 
Conference continued the proposal to ‘carry out the production, and conduct the judicial 
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actions only when needed’,277 ‘carry out the production and implement case-hearings 
only when needed’.278 The Seventh National Judicial Conference then brought forward 
that: the judicial procedures were ‘cumbersome philosophies’, following the strict 
procedures for cases were ‘old legal norms’, the judicial branch should ‘break the old 
rules, change the old ones, and innovate the new ones.’ The construction of the judicial 
system was horribly damaged since 1957.  
 
Although from 1962 until 1964, there were slight adjustments in the judicial system,279 
the Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966. China then was under public chaos and the 
judicial system was completely paralysed. People carried out ‘Smashing the policy 
offices, procuratorate, and courts’, ‘Breaking the rules’ during the Cultural Revolution. 
These movements destroyed many working places of the judicial system, and a large 
number of judges, policemen as well as procurators were exiled or punished as ‘spies’, 
‘betrayers’, or ‘capitalists’. Some lost their lives during this revolution. The National 
Procuratorate was officially revoked in 1969.280 
 
During this historical period, there was no IP in China, neither for its concept nor 
enforcement. As a popular saying during the Cultural Revolution indicated ‘Is it 
necessary for a steel worker to put his name on a steel ingot that he products in the 
course of his duty? If not, why should a member of the intelligentsia enjoy the privilege 
of putting his name on what he produces?’ The award system for inventors was 
abolished during the Cultural Revolution.281 The Chinese government registered only 
7,700 items of S&T achievements during the period of 1966 to 1978.282 
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During the 1949-1978 period, without ideological recognition of innovation as 
intangible property, it was groundless to discuss IP or its enforcement. IP as a 
conceptual design is based on the norm that it is an optimization benefit balance for 
innovators and the society. 283  However, during this period China maximized and 
prioritized the country’s benefit, and equalled the country’s development to individual 
development. Internally, innovation was not considered as a format of private property.  
 
Many may claim that the ignorance of IP may have been due to cultural reasons. 
However, this may be an oversimplification? As briefly mentioned in the first chapter, 
China did not have a peaceful development environment for more than one century 
after the First Opium War in 1840. In contrast to many now-developed countries, China 
failed to participate in the Industrial Revolutions after the First World War. In contrast 
to Japan and France, which gained impressive economic growth after the Second World 
War,284 China did not manage to do the same. The economy and development of China 
was damaged or even discontinued, because the country experienced various war or 
semi-war situations or political struggles between 1840 and 1978. During such a special 
historical period, culture itself may be discontinued, transformed, or even abandoned. 
The Confucianism that we interpret today could considerably differ from that of 1840, 
which in turn may differ very much from that of Analects in 206 BC.285 Culture played 
a very minimal role under these circumstances. The base for conceptual awareness of 
IP concept simply failed to exist if people were constantly under the pressure of survival.  
 
As a constructed and conceptual norm, from top to bottom, the central government of 
the People’s Republic of China was unwilling to have a similar IP system to that of the 
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Western world during 1949-1978. As a governance measure,286 the People’s Republic 
of China at that time saw no need to have an IP system. In contrast to many now-
developed countries, such as Britain in the fourteenth century, 287  China hosted 
insufficient capital, technology, or educated human capital288 at the beginning of the 
People’s Republic of China. From the local level, the country had neither technology 
nor market economy nor human resources to generate an IP system from the bottom up.    
 
One significant difference worth highlighting is that, in contrast to many now-
developed countries, such as Britain and the United States, the international 
environment surrounding China was completely different. Externally, China had rare 
contact with the rest of world, except for the Soviet Union. Internationally speaking, 
during 1949 to 1978, IP as a legal institution was not a required element for China’s 
industrialization or foreign cooperation.   
 
3. After 1978 
 
3.1 The First Phase S&T Policies and Patent Law 1984 
Economic reform was put forward as the very first agenda for China in December 1978. 
The Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Eleventh Central Committee 
decided that the primary mission of China is its economic development. Deng Xiaoping 
and the ‘Reform and Opening-up Policy’ in 1979 indicated the start of China’s 
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comprehensive industrialization and ‘catch-up’. By adopting this policy, the Chinese 
central government recognized the importance of foreign capital and advanced 
technologies to the country’s process to modernization.289  
 
Similar to the measures prior to 1960, the first import wave of foreign technologies 
focused on constructing new plants and importing whole-set equipment.290 However, 
during plant construction, a problem soon occurred when the Chinese side wanted to 
know why the equipment operated as it did. The foreign technology exporters noticed 
that China failed to sufficiently recognize the value of intangible items. Meanwhile, the 
Chinese side complained that the foreign parties kept the technological secrets in order 
to charge more, and the foreign companies took advantage of China’s inexperienced 
labour.291  
 
In the Symposium on Science and Education in 1977, Deng pointed out that science 
and education are the main approaches for China to catch-up. During this symposium, 
Deng suggested that China needed a mechanism, which shall unify the planning, 
coordination, arrangements, guidance, and cooperation for the country’s science and 
education.292 Under his leadership, the Chinese government issued the 1978-1985 Plan 
for Development of Science and TechnologyDraft293 in March 1978, which is also 
known as the Eight Years Guidelines. China then released the Reform and Opening-up 
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Policy. The Eight Years Guidelines were implemented in parallel with the economic 
policies.  
 
Together with the Eight Years Guidelines, the Chinese government also issued ‘Major 
Scientific and Technological Research Tasks’, ‘Layout of Basic Sciences’, and ‘Layout 
of Technical Sciences’. During the implementation of the Eight Years Guidelines, Deng 
presented the strategic guidelines, which were ‘science and technology is the first 
productivity’ and the ‘modern science and technology is the key in order to achieve 
four modernizations’. 294  These two guidelines adjusted the ideological base with 
Chinese characteristics and offered a theoretical foundation for the basic principles and 
policies of the national economy and S&T. The main content of the Eight Years 
Guidelines was adjusted to 38 research projects under the format of national research 
programs in 1982. This is the first national S&T plan of the People’s Republic of 
China.295 
 
By 1980, China established four special economic zones and extended these zones to 
other coastline cities. Meanwhile, China acknowledged the need for capital. In order to 
attract foreign direct investments (FDIs), China offered many preferential policies. 
They covered taxations, tariffs, land usages, offices, as well as administrative 
supports.296 For example, for income tax, the local enterprises had a normal rate of 
33%. The foreign companies, including both joint ventures and wholly owned, are 
exempt from income tax for the first two years and only had a rate of 15% for the third 
year.297 Attracting the FDIs was considered necessary for China to solve the problem 
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of capital shortage. This was accepted and carried out by the authorities at every level. 
Moreover, many scholars pointed out that this keystone policy was also a shortcut to 
update technologies for China.298 
 
The Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Eleventh Central Committee in 
December 1978 also decided that ‘In order to protect people's democracy, we must 
strengthen the socialist legal system, institutionalize democracy and law, so that law 
must be strictly enforced, and violators are prosecuted’.299 This indicated that the 
establishment of the Chinese legal system entered a new chapter. Because the lack of 
substance of Chinese legal institutions before the Cultural Revolution and their 
subsequent disappearance during the revolution, legal reform had to include the revival 
of some institutions, and the judicial system was one of them. The legal system had to 
revive and restore its role; some scholars even defined this as ‘creating entirely new 
legal institutions’.300  
 
The first consequence for legal reform was legislative explosion. After 1979, China 
started intensive drafting of codes and statutes. Legislatively speaking, the 5th People’s 
Congress promulgated the Constitution in 1982. Until 1988, China in total promulgated 
47 legislations, amended 49 legislations, 634 administrative regulations, 464 economic 
regulations, and many regional regulations on administrative and economic related 
matters.301 Among the very first generation of law-making process, together with the 
Reform and Opening-up Policy, China promulgated Law of Joint Ventures Using 
Chinese and Foreign Investments in 1979, which announced that industrial property 
could be regarded as an investment and emphasized technology transfer in its 
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corresponding articles. This was considered as the establishment of principle of ‘market 
for technology strategy’, and it is valid nowadays.302 It also indicated that, for the first 
time, market-related legislations became the safeguard for both market and the state 
technology strategy. 
 
The second consequence for the legal reform was the construction of an enforcement 
system. China amended the COL and the People’s Procuratorate Organization Law. 
The National People’s Congress promulgated the Procedural Law for criminal and civil 
litigations, the provisional Lawyer’s Act and Notarization Act, and the Regulation on 
Economic Contract Arbitrations.303 The people’s mediation system was revived as 
well. China intensively fostered the human resources for the enforcement system, 
which included expanding the number of law schools, reopening the University of 
Political Sciences and Law, and training many professionals via various ways in order 
to speed up the growth of legal talents. Moreover, China considerably enhanced the 
construction of the lawyers’ system, arbitrators’ system, system of people’s mediators, 
as well as the notary system.304 
 
It is worth highlighting that, internationally speaking, regarding IP during this period 
of legal reform, China and the US signed the Agreement on Trade Relations in 1979. 
Inside this agreement, it mentioned reciprocal protection for copyrights, trademarks, 
and patents. This agreement, as many Chinese scholars claimed, caused an assumption 
to China that China bared legal obligation for IP protection even before the country had 
properly established its own IP system. 305  Although the system caused some 
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ideological debates,306 China introduced the Trademark Law in 1982 and its Patent 
Law in 1984.  
 
Internally speaking, via going through the S&T strategy after China’s opening-up, it is 
obvious that the construction of the IP system in China was not only a pressure caused 
by foreign countries, but also an internal need. Because of the absence of IP, China had 
no ground for negotiations for its technology imports. For example, many technology 
transactions were charged several times higher than normal prices. Because the foreign 
firms noticed that the transferred technology to one firm maybe used freely by another, 
especially if it was a case of purchase made by the state-owned enterprise.307 Moreover, 
the institutional absence of IP also made China lack an evaluation base for determining 
the prices of imported technologies. For example, Chinese parties found themselves 
paid lots of money but imported invalid or out of protection patents due to the lack of 
knowledge of IP.308 
 
The Chinese government carried out intensive market-related law reform in order to 
push the market mechanisms deeper into its economy. The Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party issued the Decision on the Reform of Economy System in 
1984. Right after the start of economy reform, by issuing the Decision on the Reform 
of the Science and Technology System in 1985 (1985 Decision), the Chinese 
government carried out reforms in its S&T system. This decision established the Public 
Research Institutes, Higher Education Institute, and separated the enterprises from 
these two. This means that China resolved the division of R&D, education, and the 
production sectors. The separation pushed the Public Research Institutes to seek 
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external funding, because the operative funding for them were reduced by the 
government after the 1985 Decision. The 1985 Decision also put forward the further 
development for the technology market, which offered the motivation for selling 
innovations.309  
 
In contrast to previous national plans, an obvious adjustment was to add the economic 
factor into its national S&T strategy. Following the 1985 Decision, China released the 
1986-2000 Plans On S&T Development (1986-2000 Plan). The 1986-2000 Plan’s 
principle focus was that ‘science and technology must serve economic construction, 
economic construction must rely on science and technology.’310 This basic principle 
clearly pointed out the focus of China for its development, and switched from the earlier 
exhaustive approach to an economy-oriented approach. Instead of the short-sighted 
pursuit, China switched its development to an economy and S&T parallel system with 
Chinese characteristics closely linked with the country’s actual conditions. The 1986-
2000 Plan included: (1) National Science and Technology Development Plan 1986 -
2000; (2) National Development Plan of Science and Technology 1986-1990; and (3) 
technological policies in 12 fields. The technological policies were later expanded to 
14 fields in 1988.  
 
Deployed by the State Council, the State Science and Technology Commission, the 
State Planning Commission, and the State Economic and Trade Commission jointly 
organized feasibility studies for national technology policy with 3000 experts. The 
‘planning office’ invited leading experts from Western Germany, Japan, the European 
Community, the United States, and other countries, in order to catch up the international 
trends and learn from other countries’ experiences.311 
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Following the 1985 Decision, and the 1986-2000 Plan, China issued Technology 
Contract Law in 1987, which properly established the framework for the technology 
market. Then the National Science Foundation was founded to incentivise the public 
research institutes. Venture capital also played a very positive role in the introduction 
of external funding after the Technology Contract Law was introduced. During this 
period, the Chinese government launched the National High-technology R&D 
program312—the Spark Program in 1986 and Torch Program in 1988. Together with 
these programs, China established its own research funding system. Moreover, during 
this period, China untied the control of S&T personnel, allowed them to be free 
entrepreneurs and offered financial encouragements to them. For example, the Lenovo 
Group313 was founded by 11 technicians in 1984, and those technicians were originally 
from the Chinese Academy of Science.314 Together with these policies and decisions 
on capital and technology, China also enhanced its human capital by issuing the 
Decision on the Reform of the Education System in 1985 and applied similar polices 
for Higher Education Institutes.  
 
Reviewing this period, the importance of IP was properly addressed for the first time 
after 1979. Its influence became increasingly obvious for China’s own open up and 
reform and its efforts toward a market-based economy. In contrast to Western Society, 
where IP was an institutional invention sourced out of a market-based economy, in 
China it functioned and was implemented as a complementary measure for establishing 
the market-economy. 
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One may already sense the similarities in the Chinese S&T policies with Japan and 
Korea. 315  Instead of having the internal and external investments enter China 
haphazardly, China applied a very systematic designed planning system together with 
government investment programs similar to Japan.316  
 
China had tightly planned its industrial policy framework together with human-capital-
related and learning-related policies at the very beginning of its reform and opening-up, 
of which an extremely similar case can be found in Korea.317 Administratively and 
legislatively speaking, similar as Japan and Korea did, technology licensing and FDIs 
were regulated and implemented with an attempt to maximize the spill-over of the 
technology. This was carried out in a systematic way.318 The Patent Law in 1984 
enabled the individuals to file patents, although it was difficult for obtaining monopoly 
rents at that time, the law regulated material rewards.319  
 
A significant level of similarities are evident between the Chinese Patent Law (1984) 
and the Japanese Patent Law, but relatively little similarity is found comparing to 
Europe or the US. For example, the Patent Law 1984 offered three types of patent, 
which were invention, design, and utility model. The term of protection were shorter 
comparing to the EU and USA. The term of protection for invention patents was 15 
years, and 5 years respectively for utility models and design patents. Moreover, the 
Patent Law (1984) adopted the ‘first-to-file’ principle but not the ‘first-to-invent’. All 
these aimed to a smooth circulation of new technologies.  
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The patent law also launched the ‘petty patent’ system for native applicants. The 
enactment of utility model and design patents, was intended to prompt the behaviour of 
‘inventing around’.320  This systematic design later brought a very visible impact, 
especially at the beginning of the 21st Century. It contributed to the country’s later S&T 
strategy. The Chinese IT industry significantly benefited from this institutional design, 
for example, Huawei is one of the representative cases.321  
 
Moreover, SIPO’s official data visibly reflected the positive impacts of ‘petty patent’ 
to the domestic players. Until the end of 2010, the total number of utility model and 
design applications in total reached 2 387 500 pieces more than the invention patent 
applications.322 The number of domestic utility model applications was almost 143 
times the foreign applications. The number of domestic design patent applications was 
17 times the foreign design applications.  
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As Deng’s famous slogan of indicated, ‘science and technology is the first productive 
force’, the obvious attempts to upgrade the country’s education system, training system 
as well as the R&D system via different reforms, clearly was aiming to support the 
country’s skill base as well as its technological capabilities but not a result purely 
created by external pressure. During the Patent Law (1984) period, the patent system 
was designed and functioned for this goal as well. The domestic economy was not 
properly established to enable the stage for IPR implementation and protection. At this 
phase, IPR protection could not sufficiently bring economic development. The lack of 
a set of domestic interests led to the lack of economic advantages of the IPR in the 
1980s. Although the adequate economic values of the IP system were recognized by 
the Chinese central government, the system had no social and industry foundation to 
create stronger demands for IPR protection at the enforcement level. Existing research 
has shown that radical strategy for the stronger demands of IPR protection can 
destructive enthusiasm and may turn into a legal failure.323 Under the social conditions 
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in the 1980s, pushing an IP system to be the same as the developed countries may have 
receded the incentive of innovation, and the underpinnings which sustained creativities 
may have even collapsed. 
 
During the period of the Patent Law 1984, state owned enterprises (SOEs) were not 
allowed to deal their patents unless otherwise authorized by the administrative 
authorities.324 The autonomy of implementing patent rights was very limited. This 
strict IP control also covered licensing out. Scholars claimed that this type of limitation 
inhibited SOEs and their research personnel from enthusiastically investing in R&D.325 
Is this really the case? An economy can only commit substantial resources to R&D 
when it reaches a certain stage of overall development.326  
 
This phenomenon in fact is not something new generated in China, but a fundamental 
problem sourced out of the IP system. IPR as a constructed notion of balance is 
designed in order to optimize benefit for both innovators and society.327 Over-extended 
protection of IPR can actually recede the innovation. 328  Overprotection of IPR 
emasculates the balance between right proprietors and society at large.329 It is reflected 
by China with some Chinese characteristics strongly aligned with the country’s 
economic strengths and comparative advantages. Comparing to the EU countries, 
during the Patent Law (1984) period, from the S&T strategy, it showed very clearly 
that China lacked sufficient capital, technologies, or human capital. But this did not 
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lead to an immediate opening for foreign capital to all industries. Article 25 of the 
Patent Law 1984 excluded chemical, pharmaceutical, and alimentary or process 
inventions from patentability, in order to favour domestic industries and to reduce the 
will of foreign capital in these sectors.330  
 
Apart from capital and technologies, all economies require human capital to play a core 
role for promoting economic growth. When technical competitiveness had not yet been 
established, it was then insufficient to produce desirable inventions.331 IP’s role in a 
country’s development has been advertised to be way too positive. It is not necessarily 
a positive and single answer if IP motivates innovation or if IP increases a nation’s 
economic growth. IP as a link between ‘innovation and law’ as well as ‘economy and 
law’ is not a simple or even naïve case as such. Depending on the orientation of a 
country on the ‘ladder of development’, IPR can either elicit or impede innovation. IP 
can either foster or handicap economic growth. 332  Above all, from a historical 
perspective, the Patent Law (1984) period reflects China’s radical and reserved attitude 
towards IP at the beginning of the nation’s reform and opening-up. 
3.2 The Second Phase S&T Policies and Patent Law (First Amendment 1992) 
The State Council passed The Ten-year Science and Technology Development Plan of 
the People’s Republic of China and the Eighth Five Years Plan (1991-2000)333 in 1991. 
Based on the previous 15 years experiences, this 1991-2000 Plan adjusted the 
objectives and content. In 1991, the state council approved the National Long-term 
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Science and Technology Development Program 334 (1991 Programme) and it was 
launched in the late 1980s. Both were promulgated for national implementation in 1992. 
In the same year, the Patent Law was amended for the first time, and Trademark Law 
was amended one year after. Based on the 1991-2000 Plan, China macroscopically 
settled the general picture of national S&T development for 2000 and for 2020. The 
1991 Programme furthered the overall, directional, and urgent 27 industrial fields, and 
carried out a detailed analysis for the long-term and major S&T tasks. China made a 
parallel division between the 1991 Programme and the 1991-2000 Plan. It had 
continued the strategy of the 1986-2000 Plan. The 1991-2000 Plan respectively 
clarified the goals for technological development and tasks for five years and for a 
decade.335  
 
The State Planning Commission and the State Science and Technology Commission 
jointly organized and set up an inter-ministerial coordination leading group in 1994. 
The leading group compiled the 9th Five Years Plan of the National Science and 
Technology Development and the 2010 Long-Term Plan, 336  which included the 
situation and the status quo, the guiding ideology and basic principles, development 
goals and tasks, development keystones, reforms of the scientific and technological 
system, constructions of the personnel training and technology teams, supporting 
conditions, and other measures. For various reasons, the 1994 plan was not officially 
released.337  
 
After the 1991-2000 Plan, the 211 program and 985 program were launched in 1992. 
The 211 program aims to build 100 high-level research universities in the 21st Century, 
                                                
334 Available at <www.most.gov.cn/ztzl/gjzcqgy/zcqgylshg/200508/t20050831_24436.htm> accessed 
29 July 2017. 
335 Ministry of Science and Technology, ‘Science and Technology Development Plans in the History’ 
<www.most.gov.cn/kjgh/lskjgh/> accessed 7 July 2015. 
336 Available at <www.most.gov.cn/ztzl/gjzcqgy/zcqgylshg/200508/t20050831_24435.htm> accessed 
29 July 2017. 
337 Ministry of Science and Technology, ‘Science and Technology Development Plans in the History’ 
<www.most.gov.cn/kjgh/lskjgh/> accessed 7 July 2015. 
 <;;
and the 985 program aims to build up world-class universities. 338  The Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council issued the Decision 
on Accelerating Scientific and Technological Progress, which introduced the national 
strategy ‘revitalizing the nation through science, technology, and education’.339 After 
this decision, the Chinese government invested a significant amount in basic and high-
technology research. It pushed the applied research and its development more to the 
market. In 1996, China launched the second 863 program, in order to: (1) foster the 
overall innovation capacity in high-technology sectors, including IT, biotechnology, 
new energy, and new materials; and (2) improve the internal competitiveness of 
resultant industries.  
 
The national core development was guided by three doctrines toward the 21st Century, 
‘revitalizing the nation through science, technology and education’, ‘sustainable 
development’, and ‘revitalizing the nation through its talents’.340 These three doctrines 
remained until today as internal strategy for the country’s international ‘peaceful 
rise’.341 ‘China relies on domestic institutional innovations, industrial restructuring, 
developing domestic markets, transforming high savings into investment capital, and 
improving the quality of the workforce to overcome the limitations imposed by 
resources and other circumstantial problems’.342 
 
China carried out intensive reforms on the workforce in the S&T field during the period 
of Patent Law (1992 amendment). The Higher Education Law came into force in 1998, 
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and an amendment was issued in 2015, which legalized the task of the Chinese higher 
education in Art. 5, ‘to foster innovative and practical capacity of senior specialized 
talents, to develop the culture of science and technology and promote socialist 
modernization’. The new amendment came into force on June 1, 2016. The task of 
higher education was updated to train senior specialized talents with social 
responsibilities, together with innovative and practical capacities. The higher education 
of China has been continuously encouraged since 1998, to ‘independently conduct 
scientific research, technological development, and social services. The State 
encourages institutions of higher learning and enterprises, institutions, social 
organizations and other social organizations in various forms of cooperation in 
scientific research, technological development and popularization. State supports 
qualified higher education institutions to become research bases’.343 The enrolment 
scale of higher educational institutions and the sizes of these institutions have been 
considerably enlarged from 1999. Statistics show that the number of undergraduate 
entrants was 0.6 million in 1999, and later reaching 2.5 million in 2005. The enrolment 
of undergraduate students in higher education institutions was 1.8 million in 1999, and 
rising to 7.9 million in 2005.344 During the 1991-2000 Plan, China carried out the 
transformation and commercialization of the S&T achievements. Data shows that from 
1998 until 2003, there were 1050 public research institutions transferred to enterprises 
and 204,000 employees, including 111,000 S&T personnel moved from science to 
industry.345 
 
During the 1991-2000 Plan, the Chinese government promulgated a significant number 
of statutes to ensure private property rights in general, whilst encouraging various types 
of investments, introducing diverse ownerships, and enhancing the protection of 
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contracts. For example, the Economic Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China 
was amended in 1993,346 and Contract Law was promulgated in 1999.347  All these 
measures attracted FDIs to China during the period of 1991-2000.348 During this period, 
China transferred its partial opening strategy to a comprehensive opening strategy, and 
started the negotiations to join the WTO in 1996.  
 
Together with the foreign investments, the amount of technology importation severely 
increased during the period of 1991 to 2000. The reasons for this considerable amount 
of multinational technology transfer were market access and cost saving. However, 
these transfers were mainly aimed at short-term profits. The foreign investors 
confronted a dilemma that although they wanted to access the Chinese market, the 
leakage of technology was intentionally controlled to a minimum level.349 Statistics 
show that the major business mode for technology transfer350 was the establishment of 
joint ventures, which was twice as common as technology licensing. The amount of 
technology buying-out was comparatively extremely low, however. Three-quarters of 
the foreign players kept their core technologies away from the transferring process. 
Meanwhile, more than three-quarters of foreign players claimed that the protection of 
IP in China was insufficient.351  
 
After eight years of collecting experiences, the Patent Law was amended in 1992. This 
amendment was also born from the external pressure from the developed countries, 
especially the US.352 The Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government 
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of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
on the Protection of Intellectual Property in 1992 led to some significant changes in 
Chinese Patent Law.353 
 
The Patent Law (1992 amendment) improved the level of protection for invention 
patents. The 1992 amendment: (1) granted patentability to chemical, pharmaceutical, 
and alimentary or process inventions; (2) expanded substantive rights to cover the right 
to import and the protection for method patents extended to the relevant products; (3) 
expanded the term of protection for innovation patents to 20 years counted from the 
date of application, and the term of protection for utility model and design patents to 
10 years counted from the date of application; (4) introduced the priority system; (5) 
Comparing to the patent law of 1984, the 1992 amendment relatively shortened the 
period of examination; 354  and (6) it allowed employee invention, in which an 
individual can own patents for the inventions created at work if an agreement was made 
between the inventors and employers.355Moreover, the Chinese Patent Law started to 
follow the TRIPS rhetoric since this amendment, even though TRIPS356 was still a 
draft at the time.357 
 
From 1985 to 1994, the Chinese domestic players obtained a dominant position in 
regard the number of patent filings inside China. Among these applications, very few 
invention patents were filed compared to the filings of utility model and design patents. 
The filings of invention patents were 8558 pieces during Patent Law (1984) and only 
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increased to 11423 pieces in 1992. In contrast, utility model filings grew 8.5 times from 
5174 pieces until 44369 pieces; and design filings increased 13 times from 640 pieces 
to 8357 pieces. The number of domestic applications on the invention patent was very 
similar to foreign applications, and it was even higher than the foreign filings in 1990.358  
 
During 1985 to 1994, the utility model was the most favoured patent filing type for 
domestic players. This preference persisted until the 21st Century. Moreover, 
individuals filed most of the applications, which was a very rare phenomenon compared 
to other countries. This phenomenon also existed in Chinese invention patent filings. 
The phenomenon was a visible reform result caused by the 1986-2000 Plan, when the 
public research institutes and higher education institutes allowed individuals to spin-
off. The patentees were the individual entrepreneur or technician but not the enterprises.  
 
After the amendment of the Patent Law in 1992, filings on invention patent increased. 
Utility model was still a preference for the domestic players. SIPO’s statistic shows that 
the number of filings on design patent had a considerable boost. It raised almost 6 times, 
from 8357 pieces in 1992 until 50120 pieces in 2000.359 Different from the Patent Law 
in 1984, the amendment made in 1992 caused a filing escalation on the invention 
patents filed by the foreign applicants. The number of filings raised from 4387 pieces 
in 1992 until 26401 pieces in 2000.360 As showed in table 1, it is visible that the number 
of foreign filings on utility model was very low, and foreign applicants preferred more 
design filings. Some scholars pointed out that, foreign companies combined the register 
of trademark with the application of design patents. 361  In contrast to the foreign 
practice, in Chinese practice, domestic players combined the register of utility models 
and invention patents.  
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359 Detailed statistics see <http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/> accessed 29 July 2017. 
360 Detailed statistics see <http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/> accessed 29 July 2017. 
361 D Yang, M Sonmez and D Bosworth, ‘Intellectual Property Abuses: How Should Multinationals 
Respond?’ [2004] 37 Long Range Planning 459. 
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Up until this point, the Chinese IP system was more focused on creating rights, 
clarifying ambiguities, and filling-up gaps, but no emphasis was made on insufficient 
remedial measures. In fact, the IP system failed to sufficiently address the issues of 
remedies. It was heavily dependent on the existing administrative remedies generated 
by the controlled economy. Both the judicial and administrative remedies remained 
insufficient, dependent, and unprofessional.362  
 
This enforcement defect was reflected very well by the external pressures from foreign 
governments, that continued to ask China for a further IP reform; US-Sino IP disputes 
were particularly representative. In fact, the USA is one of the most representative 
developed countries to push pressures on China via government negotiations. 363 
Warren Maruyama, the former general counsel of the US Trade Representative 
described the negotiation agenda in his article ‘At a 1985 meeting to the US – China 
Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade, the US for the first time expressed concerns 
about weak Chinese IPR standards. In 1987, the US put IPR on the agenda for US- 
China market access talks’.364 
 
The focus of the US government at that time was not on patents or trademarks, but on 
copyrights. For example, statistics show that the Chinese patent system was mainly 
consumed by domestic applicants before 1992, the filings of invention patents from 
abroad was 4493 in 1985, but decreased to 4387 in 1992.365 The delay of copyright law 
in China was considered extremely problematic for the US government, especially for 
its movie, music, and software industries. A lack of both market access and copyright 
protections had motivated the US government to constantly put pressure on the Chinese 
                                                
362 WP Alford, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization 
(Standford University Press 1995). 
363 C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th edn, Renmin University Press 2014). 
364 M Warren, ‘US- China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual Property, and the Rule of Law in a 
Global Economy’ in MA Cohen, E Bang and S Mitchell (eds), Chinese Intellectual Property Law and 
Practice (Kluwer Law International 1999). 
365 See <http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/index.html> accessed 29 July 2017. 
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government. This led to a memorandum of understanding in 1989,366 which led to the 
adoption of the Chinese Copyright Law in 1990, and the Computer Software Protection 
Regulations in 1991. The US charged China under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 
1974 for violating IPRs.367 The charge was later on reconciled in the Sino-American 
Memorandum of Understanding on the protection of Intellectual Property in 1992, in 
which ‘both governments will provide procedures and remedies to prevent or stop, 
internally and at their boarders, infringement of intellectual property rights and to deter 
further infringement’.368 China and US passed the Accord of Intellectual Protection in 
1995, in which China shall ‘take immediate steps to address rampant piracy throughout 
China; to make long-term changes to ensure effective enforcement of intellectual 
property rights; and to provide US right holders with enhanced access to the Chinese 
market’.369  
 
The Patent Law amended in 1992 was also aimed at reforming the patent system toward 
commercializing the inventions. This governance mechanism undoubtedly encouraged 
innovations in the whole country. Up until this point, it is not difficult to sense three 
visible forces for IP development in China: (1) the central government and the national 
needs, transforming China from planned economy to market economy, using S&T and 
IP as stimulus; (2) the foreign investors and foreign governments as external pressures, 
which required market access with IP protection; and (3) the domestic players and 
insufficient enforcement at different levels, caused an obvious gap between the unified 
central planning and uneven local implementations.  
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367 SK Sell, ‘Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World Crisis, Coercion, 
and Choice’ [1995] 49 International Organization 315. 
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4. S&T Policies and Patent Law in the 21st Century  
 
Since October 1998, the MOST carried out preliminary studies on the 10th Five-year 
Plan for National Economic and Social Development. In February 2000, the drafting 
group was set up and consisted of the State Planning Commission, MOST, the State 
Economic and Trade Commission and others—a total of 11 units. Instructed by the 
State Council, the State Planning Commission and MOST jointly promulgated the 10th 
Five-year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (The 10th Five-year 
Plan) in May 2001.370 
 
Based on the previous 1991-2000 Plan, the 10th Five-Year Plan371 added guiding 
principles as ‘dos and don’ts, overall follow-up with major breakthroughs, develop high 
technology, actualize industrialization, improve the S&T’s capacity of substantive 
innovation, leap forward in technology development.’ The 10th Five-Year Plan 
mentioned the establishment of a national innovation system for the first time, and its 
main theme was referred as ‘innovation and industrialization’. Moreover, it was a 
strategic plan with two levels, which were: (1) to promote the upgrade of industrial 
technologies; and (2) to improve the capacity of S&T for substantive innovations. The 
content of the 10th Five-Year Plan is relatively more specific and more operational 
compared to the previous plans. While programming this plan, China introduced the 
‘3+2’ programme system. The ‘3’ meant three main national S&T program, which were 
the 863 plan, plans to tackle key problems, and basic research programmes. The ‘2’ 
meant the construction of two environments: (1) the construction of sufficient 
conditions for research and development; and (2) the construction of an environment 
                                                
370 Ministry of Science and Technology, ‘Science and Technology Development Plans in the History’ 
<www.most.gov.cn/kjgh/lskjgh/> accessed 7 July 2015. 
371 Available at <www.most.gov.cn/ztzl/gjzcqgy/zcqgylshg/200508/t20050831_24434.htm> accessed 
29 July 2017. 
 <;C
for the technology industry. The detailed 10th Five-Year Plan was implemented in its 
following annual plans.372 
 
During the implementing period of the 10th Five-year Plan, the MOST strengthened 
strategic research on the technological development at the macro-level and adjusted the 
work approaches on S&T. Firstly, it adjusted the guiding ideology for the S&T 
innovation strategy, emphasized more on the original innovations, and strived to 
achieve the leap forward of S&T. Secondly, it adjusted the concept of S&T and its 
management system. Meanwhile, it firmly established the concept of ‘people-oriented’ 
and its relevant value system for the S&T. Thirdly, it adjusted the policy of S&T and 
pooled the resources together to solve major problems. Fourthly, it adjusted the mode 
of S&T. It meant the MOST switched the focus from individual innovations to the 
integrations of various technologies, with an emphasis on formulating competitive 
products and constructing the relevant industries based on such integrations. Fifthly, it 
adjusted the S&T policy object. The MOST switched the focus from research 
institutions to mobilize and organize the S&T in the whole society.  
 
China joined the WTO in 2001, which indicated its proper entry to the global market. 
In order to respond to the new trend after joining the WTO, China put forward and 
implemented three strategies, which were ‘talents, patents and technical standards’. 
Since then, China highlighted the focus, tackled the key problems, and implemented 12 
major S&T projects. Patents have been lifted to a new level of significance. A 
continuous and steady national S&T policy has been formulated since the 10th Five-
years Plan. Following the 10th Five-Year Plan, the Chinese government issued the 11th 
Five-Year Plan together with the Medium And Long Term Scientific and Technological 
Development Plan and the 12th Five-year Plan respectively in 2006 and 2011. These 
latest policies were already discussed in detail in Chapter 1, thus will not be repeated 
in this chapter.  
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All the discussed policies are well summarized by another fellow and worth citing at 
length,373 and this manuscript expanded it to the latest 13th Five-year Plan. 
 
Name Year  Issued by Contents 
The 
Perspective 
Plan for 
Science and 
Technology 
Development 
from 1956-
1967  
1956 The CPC 
Central 
Committee and 
State Council  
Detailed provisions on scientific research 
systems, scientific research institution 
settings, scientific and technological 
personnel use and training, such as the 
general principles of the scientific 
research institutions, human and material 
resources, the principle of scientific 
research and personnel training and 
selection 
The 1963-
1972 Plan for 
Development 
of Science and 
Technology 
1963 The CPC 
Central 
Committee and 
State Council 
Provisions on 12 aspects, such as 
professional research institution 
construction, training of research 
personnel, scientific investment 
management, appraisal and reward 
systems for scientific research 
achievements, technology promotion, 
involving the systems for personnel 
training, selection, assignment, transfer, 
reward, management, and research 
awards. 
The 1978-
1985 National 
1978 State Council In addition to key research planning 
objectives, it singled out the goals of 
                                                
373 Special thanks to Yang Lihua and the well summarized table. Original table and detailed description 
please see, L Yang, ‘Implementation of China’s Rejuvenation through Knowledge’ in K Shao and X 
Feng (eds), Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2012). 
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Science and 
Technology 
Development 
Plan 
scientific research teams and institutional 
development. It proposed 14 aspects of 
security measures, including the 
development of higher education, 
accelerating scientific and technological 
personnel training; accelerating the 
popularization and application of 
scientific and technological achievements; 
establishment of national science awards 
system. 
The 1986-
2000 Science 
and 
Technology 
Development 
Plan 
1986 State Council It emphasizes the combination of 
technology and economy, and pushing 
forward the reform of science and 
technology systems, unveiling science and 
technology plans such as the high-tech 
research and development plan (the 863 
plan), the torch programme for promoting 
the industrialization of high-tech industry, 
the Spark Program to support rural areas, 
and National Natural Science Foundation 
to support basic research. 
The Ten-year 
Science and 
Technology 
Development 
Plan of the 
People’s 
Republic of 
China and the 
1991 State Council  Emphasized the reform of science and 
technology system, reflected the changes 
in the reform from the planned economy 
to market economy system, proposed 
explicitly for the first time that the growth 
of investment in science and technology 
shall exceed that of GNP, and put forward 
clear objectives for R&D funds, and to 
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Eighth five 
years plan 
(1991-2000) 
take measures to promote scientific and 
technological progress. 
The Science, 
technology 
and Education 
Development 
Program of the 
10th Five-year 
Plan for 
National 
Economic and 
Social 
Development 
2001 The former 
State Planning 
Commission 
and the 
Ministry of 
Science and 
Technology 
It proposed to establish a national 
innovation system, to improve the ability 
of independent innovation, to enhance the 
quality in science and technology, to 
continue to implement technological 
innovation projects, to encourage 
enterprises to become the subjects of 
technological progress and innovation, to 
establish national knowledge innovation 
system, and to promote knowledge 
innovation projects. 
The Medium 
and Long-term 
Scientific and 
Technological 
Development 
Plan 
2006 State Council  This plan proposed the guidelines for 
scientific and technological work and is 
clearly put forward to build a national 
innovation system. The policies, 
government procurement, intellectual 
property strategy, monetary policy, 
science and technology investment system 
and so on. 
National 
Eleventh Five-
year Science 
and 
Technology 
Development 
Plan 
2006 The Ministry 
of Science and 
Technology  
It proposed to establish a national 
innovation system with Chinese 
characteristics, including the 
technological innovation system with 
enterprises as subjects, the knowledge 
innovation system with the combination 
of scientific research and higher 
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education, the innovation system of 
national defence science and technology, 
the regional innovation system, and the 
technology intermediary service system. 
Twelfth Five-
year National 
Science and 
Technology 
Development 
Plan 
2011 The Ministry 
of Science and 
Technology  
It proposed to comprehensively promote 
the construction of a national innovation 
system, to speed up the implementation of 
the national science and technology major 
projects, foster and develop vigorously 
strategic emerging industries, 
strengthening the construction of science 
and technology innovation base and 
platform, vigorously foster innovative 
talents of science and technology, 
optimize the societal environment of 
innovation. 
Thirteenth 
Five-year 
National 
Science and 
Technology 
Innovation 
Plan374 
2016 State Council It proposed the action guidelines to be a 
member of the ranks of innovative 
countries, to overall improve the 
independent innovation capability, 
enhance the leading role of scientific and 
technological innovation support, 
promote the scale and quality of talents, 
mature and stereotype the institutional 
mechanisms conducive to innovation, and 
optimize the ecology of innovation and 
entrepreneurship. 
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Thirteenth 
Five-year 
National 
Science and 
Technology 
Innovation and 
Social 
Development 
Planning375 
2016 The Ministry 
of Science and 
Technology 
It emphasized the deep integration of S&T 
and social development. It aims to 
improve the social development, S&T 
strength and innovative ability, make 
intensive breakthroughs in key 
technologies, make S&T more effectively 
benefit the people, achieve the rapid 
development of related industries, apply 
S&T support to ensure and achieve new 
breakthroughs on social security.  
 
Since the 10th Five-year Plan, China has deepened the reform of the S&T system, and 
actively promoted the construction of the NIS; patents also became a new form of 
evaluation indicators for industrial innovations.  
 
Chinese government, both at the state level and regional levels gave out subvention and 
bonuses to the patent applicants, which especially encouraged the invention patents. To 
the inventors and designers, the Patent Law (2000 amendment) regulated in art. 16 ‘The 
entity to whom a patent right is granted shall award to the inventor or creator of the 
service invention or creation a reward and shall, after exploitation of the patented 
invention or creation, pay the inventor or creator a reasonable remuneration on the basis 
of the scope of spreading and application as well as the economic benefits yielded.’ 
Based on art.16, the chapter VI of the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the 
Patent Law of the People's Republic of China 2001,376 has regulated a very detailed 
subvention and bonuses system.377 
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National Science and Technology Innovation and Social Development PlanningMinistry of Science 
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376 Amended in 2002 and 2003.  
377 Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China  
Article 74 A state-owned enterprise or institution which has been granted a patent right shall, within 3 
months as of the announcement of the patent right, award the inventor or designer a money prize. The 
sum of money prize for a patent for invention shall be no less than 2,000 Yuan; the sum of money prize 
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These measures intensely boosted enthusiasm for domestic patent filings. On top of the 
subvention and bonuses system, Chinese governments of all levels also introduced tax 
credit on the R&D expenditure to high-tech enterprises, and the R&D centres in certain 
areas or certain sectors.378 Different provinces released relevant encouragements based 
on their regional conditions, such as Ningxia, Guizhou, Jiangsu, Henan, Shanxi, 
Chongqing, and Hubei. Statistics show that, domestic R&D increased 3.4 times 
between 2000 and 2006.379 
 
To enterprises, the subvention and bonuses were carried out considerably via taxation 
privileges, regulated by the Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) Law of the People's Republic 
of China (2007).380 Moreover, the Regulation on the Implementation of the EIT Law of 
                                                
for a patent for utility model or design shall be no less than 500 Yuan. Where an invention-creation was 
made on the basis of an inventor's or designer's proposal adopted by the entity to which he belongs, the 
state-owned enterprise or institution which has been granted a patent right shall award to him a higher 
money prize liberally. Any enterprise holding the patent right may include the said money prize paid to 
such inventors or designers into its production cost; any institution holding the patent right may disburse 
the said money prize out of its operating expenses. 
Article 75 A state-owned enterprise or institution which has been granted a patent right shall, after 
exploiting the patent for invention-creation and within the duration of the patent right, draw each year 
from any increase in profits after taxation a percentage of no less than 2% due to the exploitation of the 
patent for invention or utility model, or a percentage of no less than 0.2% due to the exploitation of the 
patent for design, and award it to the inventor or designer as remuneration. The entity may, otherwise, 
by making reference to the above said percentage, award a lump sum of money to the inventor or 
designer as remuneration. 
Article 76 Where a state-owned enterprise or institution which has been granted a patent right authorizes 
other entities or individuals to exploit the patent, it shall, after taxation, draw a percentage of no less 
than 10% from the fee which is charged from the license of exploitation of this patent and award it to the 
inventor or designer as remuneration. 
Article 77 Other Chinese entities may award money prizes and remuneration by making reference to the 
provisions in this Chapter 
378 For example, the 2009 Circular of the State Administration of Taxation on the Issues Concerning 
Implementation of the Preferential Income Tax for Hi-Tech Enterprises regulated in Art. 4 Any qualified 
hi-tech enterprise after identification (re-examination) may apply for preferential enterprise income tax 
from the year when the approval of identification (re-examination) is valid. After acquiring the hi-tech 
enterprise certificate issued by hi-tech enterprise identification administration agencies of provinces, 
autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Government and separately planning cities, 
a hi-tech enterprise may hold the ‘hi-tech enterprise certificate’ and its copies and relevant materials to 
apply to the competent tax authority for handling the formalities of reduction or exemption of tax. 
Consequently, the hi-tech enterprise may make pre-declaration of enterprise income tax payment or 
enjoy transitional preferential taxation at the tax rate of 15%. 
379 OECD, ‘OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy CHINA’ (2008). 
380 Article 27 The enterprise income tax on the following incomes may be exempted or reduced: (4) The 
incomes incurred from the transfer of technologies, which meets the relevant requirements. 
Article 28 The enterprise income tax on important high- and new-tech enterprises that are necessary to 
be supported by the state shall be levied at the reduced tax rate of 15%.  
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the People's Republic of China (2007) has furthered the detailed implementation of Art. 
27 (4) and Art. 30 (1) of the EIT Law.381 
 
By increasing the funding, the Chinese government encouraged talents who studied and 
worked abroad to return home to China. This talent attraction measure goes alone with 
the principle of ‘talents, patents and technical standards’. Those overseas talents could 
bring back knowledge, experience, and technology with up-to-date international 
technical standards.382 They are the new generation of human resources, which is very 
different from the first-generation labour model in 1979. 
 
The Patent Law of China was amended in 2000 in order to accompany economic reform 
and technology development, whilst fulfilling the WTO’s basic requirements on 
legislations.383  In short, comparing to the 1992 amendment, the 2000 amendment 
contained: (1) a further expansion of the exclusivity of patent right in Art. 11, from ‘[…] 
make, use or sell the patented product, or use the patented process and use or sell the 
product directly obtained by the patented process […]’ to ‘[…] make, use, promise the 
sale of, sell or import the patented product, or use the patented process and use, promise 
the sale of, sell or import the product directly obtained from the patented process[…]’; 
(2) the inclusion of patent examination into judicial guidance; (3) a further procedure 
guarantee for the patent right holders by adding the litigation preservation system, 
which is a similar system comparing to the injunction system in civil law system; and 
                                                
Article 30 The following expenses of an enterprise may be additionally calculated and deducted: (1) The 
expenses for the research and development of new technologies, new products and new techniques. 
381 Article 90 The term ‘reduction and exemption of EIT for qualifying technological transfers’ as used 
in Article 27 (4) of the EIT Law refers to the portion not exceeding 5 million yuan obtained by a resident 
enterprise from technological transfer shall be exempted from EIT, and the excess shall be taxed at the 
reduced half rate. 
Article 95 The term ‘additional deduction of research and development expenses’ as used in Article 30 
(1) of the EIT Law refers to an additional 50% deduction of the research and development expenses 
incurred from the research and development of new technologies, new products, and new techniques on 
the basis of the actual deductions where the enterprise when no intangible asset has been formed and 
calculated into the current gains and losses. If intangible assets have been formed, they shall be 
amortized at 150% of the cost of the intangible assets. 
382 H Yanfg and Y Cheng, ‘The Empirical Analysis of Evaluating the Implement Effect of Introduction 
Overseas High-Level Talents Policy’ [2013] 16 Science& Technology Progress Policy. 
383 C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th edn, Renmin University Press 2014). 
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(4) a further simplified patent filing procedure, which deleted the patent revoke system 
regulated in the 1992 Amendment and inosculated it into the patent invalidation system. 
 
Legislatively speaking, since the beginning of the 21st Century, the Chinese patent 
system reached international standards. Within less than two decades, China developed 
its patent legislation from scratch to an international level. Internationally speaking, the 
fast construction of Chinese IP legislations is unique. 384  The construction and 
modernization of the IP system took three decades in total, whilst a similar process took 
over hundreds of years in the EU member states or in the US.385  
 
The amendment in 2000 adopted TRIPS into Chinese patent law and adjusted the dual-
track enforcement system. Under the patent law 1984 and 1992 amendments, local 
courts only held jurisdiction over administrative decisions on application, invalidation, 
revocation, or objection of invention patents. Administrative decisions on invalidation, 
revocation, or objection of utility models or design patents were under the supervision 
of the Board of Re-examination of Patent, and the Board’s decision was final.386 But 
the amendment in 2000 made the Chinese patent system, both legislation and 
enforcement, meet the requirements of TRIPS. It significantly raised the judicial level 
of protection on patents to international standards.387  
 
Meanwhile, the trend of Chinese patent filings changed its emphasis during the period 
of 2000 to 2007, and switched from utility model filings to the filings of invention 
patents and designs. The visible boost of filings on invention patents and designs was 
                                                
384 P Yu, ‘Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle’ in D Gervais (ed), 
Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: strategies to optimize economic development in a TRIPS 
Plus Era (Oxford University Press 2007). 
385 Z Jiang and R Kariyawasam, Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology Laws (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2011). 
386 H Guo, ‘Patents’ in Z Jiang and R Kariyawasam (eds), Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology 
Laws (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011). 
387 H Guo, ‘Patents’ in Z Jiang and R Kariyawasam (eds), Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology 
Laws (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011). 
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obviously different from many other countries’ IP experiences. This reflects the focus 
on the social transition of China to become an innovative country.388 The available 
statistics clearly show that, before the 2008 patent law amendment, the number of 
filings on invention patents in 2000 was 51,747 pieces, reaching 245,161 pieces in 2007. 
During the same time period, the number of utility model applications was 68,815 
pieces in 2000 and 181,324 pieces in 2007. The number of design applications was 
50,120 pieces in 2000 and 267,432 pieces in 2007.389  
 
The third amendment of patent law began in 2005. In contrast to previous revisions, the 
third amendment raised the state’s internal needs of patent law to a relatively more 
significant level, and many articles were revised to match the national development 
level of economy and S&T. Before the amendment, China carried out 40 research 
projects focused on various specific patent-related legal issues. Based on the reports of 
these projects, China revised its patent law and published it for public review.390 The 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed the third amendment of 
Chinese Patent Law in December 2008.391 
 
(1) This amendment has upgraded the standard of mixed novelty requirement to 
absolute novelty, in Art. 22, from ‘[…] Novelty means that, before the date of filing, 
no identical invention or utility model has been publicly disclosed in publications in the 
country or abroad or has been publicly used or made known to the public by any other 
means in the country, nor has any other person filed previously with the Patent Office 
an application which described the identical invention or utility model and was 
published after the said date of filing.’ To ‘[…] Novelty means that the invention or 
                                                
388 K Shao, ‘Patent Law, National Strategies and Policy Incentives: China Road to a Leading Innovator’ 
[2011] 14 The International Trade and Business Law Review 85. 
389 See <http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/index.html> accessed 29 July 2017. 
390 C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th edn, Renmin University Press 2014). 
391 Studies on the 2008 amendments, such as see Y Wei-Ning and Y Y Anderw, ‘The Dragon Gets 
New IP Claws: The Latest Amendments to the Chinese Patent Law’ [2009] Intellectual Property & 
Technology Law Journal, < http://www.ipo.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/DragonGetsNewIPClaws.pdf>, accessed 27 July 2017. 
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utility model is not an existing technology, and prior to the date of application, no entity 
or individual has filed an application heretofore with the patent administrative 
department of the State Council for the identical invention or utility model and recorded 
it in the patent application documents or patent documents released after the said date 
of application.’  
 
(2) It added and separately defined ‘invention patent, utility model, and design 
patent’.392 Moreover, it further detailed the grant conditions for design patent in Art. 
23 ‘Any design for which a patent right is granted shall not be attributed to the existing 
design, and no entity or individual, before the date of application, filed an application 
with the patent administrative department of the State Council on the identical design 
and recorded it in the patent documents published after the date of application. As 
compared with the existing design or combination of the existing design features, the 
design for which a patent is granted shall have distinctive features. The patented design 
may not conflict with the lawful rights that have been obtained by any other person 
prior to the date of application. The term “existing design” as used in this Law refers to 
a design known to the general public both at home and abroad prior to the date of 
application’.  
 
(3) This amendment set forward the legal requirements with respect to the validity of 
acquiring genetic resources and disclosure of source for the intentions and creations 
depending on the genetic resource, ‘[…] No patent will be granted for an invention 
based on genetic resources if the access or utilization of the said genetic resources is in 
violation of any law or administrative regulation.’393 and ‘[…]For an invention based 
on genetic resources, the applicant shall state the direct source and the original source 
of the genetic resources in the application documents. If the applicant is not able to state 
the original source, it or he shall state the reasons’.394 
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(4) It removed the clause on foreign-related patent agencies. Any legally formalized 
patent agency can handle foreign patent issues.  
 
(5) Considerable changes were made on the compulsory licenses. This amendment re-
added rules on compulsory license concerning fails to exploit in Art. 48 ‘The patentee, 
after the lapse of 3 full years from the date patent is granted and after the lapse of 4 full 
years from the date when a patent application is filed, fails to exploit or to fully exploit 
its or his patent without any justifiable reason […]’ Regulated compulsory licenses on 
medicine and semi-conductor technology. One article is added to grant the Chinese 
government additional trading power while negotiating with the right holders as Article 
50: ‘For the purpose of public health, the patent administrative department of the State 
Council may grant a compulsory license for a patented medicine so as to produce and 
export it to the country or region which conforms to the provisions of the relevant 
international treaty to which the People's Republic of China has acceded.’ Another 
article is added as Article 52: ‘Where the invention involved in the compulsory license 
is a semi-conductor technology, the exploitation of the compulsory license shall be 
limited only to public interests and the circumstance as described in Article 48 (2) of 
this Law.’ Nowadays, the compulsory license also functions as a remedy for patent 
misuse in China.395 And,  
 
(6) The 2008 amendment newly regulated limitation of patent rights and excluded two 
more activities from patent infringement, regulated in Art. 69: ‘ […](3) for any foreign 
means of transport which temporarily passes through the territory, territorial waters or 
territorial airspace of China, its using the relevant patents in accordance with any 
agreement concluded between China and that country to which the foreign means of 
transport belongs, or in accordance with any international treaty to which both countries 
                                                
395 Q Kong, ‘China In the WTO: Enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Agenda’ in R 
Kariyawasam (ed), Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology Laws (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited 2011). 
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have acceded, or on the basis of the principle of reciprocity, for its own needs, in its 
devices and installations […] (5) producing, using or importing patented medicine or 
patented medicinal equipment for the purpose of providing the information as required 
for administrative examination and approval, and producing and importing the patented 
medicine or patented medicinal equipment exclusively for the said purpose’.  
 
Continuous stimulus of both policies and legislations considerably outstretched the 
patent filings inside China. The number of filings for invention patents in 2014 reached 
a ratio of 39.3% among all the patent filings. In contrast to the early years when patent 
holders were individuals, within the total of 801,000 filings of invention patents, 60.5% 
were corporate patents in 2014. Foreign filings on invention patents reached 127,000 
pieces. The ratio of filings for utility model (861,000) and design patents (548,000) 
continuously dropped. Moreover, the top-ten ranked invention patent applicants were 
all domestic funded enterprises. Those enterprises were:396 
 
 Company Name Number of applications 
1 State Grid Corporation  10091 
2 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.  4119 
3 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation  4073 
4 ZTE Corporation  3270 
5 Lenovo (Beijing) Co., Ltd.  2260 
6 BOE Technology Group Co., Ltd.  2183 
7 Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.  1770 
8 Semiconductor Manufacturing International 
(Shanghai) Co., Ltd. 
1524 
9 China National Petroleum Corp.  1390 
10 Beijing Qihoo Technology Co., Ltd.  1358 
                                                
396  China Science and Technology Statistics, ‘Patent Statistical Analysis of 2014’ (2014) 
<www.sts.org.cn/tjbg/cgylw/documents/2016/2014ġŏÏȬɧƘ.pdf> accessed 29 July 2017. 
 <=<
 
Meanwhile, China demonstrated an obvious and unique growth in international patent 
filings. China is the only double-digit growth country in the PCT filings. The number 
of applications reached 26,000 pieces in 2014 and this growth raised 18.7% comparing 
to the previous year. China remained the third biggest filing country of the world. The 
ratio of Chinese filings among all the international filings reached 11.9%. Individual 
enterprises, Huawei (3442 pieces) and ZTE (2179 pieces) became the world first and 
third PCT applicants in 2014.397 
 
5. Conclusion 
Reviewing the patent legislation catch-up and upgrade process, from the adoption of 
Chinese patent law in 1984 until its first amendment 1992, it was an 8-year process of 
development. It was another 8 years before the second amendment in 2000, and then 
another 8 years until the third amendment in 2008. This could be a coincidence.398  
 
However, reviewing the IP system and the S&T policies together reveals another 
picture. Indeed, the complexity of modern society made it difficult to absorb an exact 
understanding of which institutions or policies are really critical for economic 
development. 399  For developed countries, many institutions are considered as 
necessary for economic development, such as the IP system, whereas others may be 
considered mainly the outcomes of their economic development rather than the 
causes.400 The Chinese IP system and its related policies are both relatively flexible, 
                                                
397  China Science and Technology Statistics, ‘Patent Statistical Analysis of 2014’ (2014) 
<www.sts.org.cn/tjbg/cgylw/documents/2016/2014ġŏÏȬɧƘ.pdf> accessed 29 July 2017. 
398 C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th edn, Renmin University Press 2014); See also H Guo, ‘Patents’ 
in R Kariyawasam (ed), Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology Laws (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited 2011). 
399 H-J Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem 
Press 2002). 
400 H-J Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem 
Press 2002). 
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which differs from many other countries, where institutions are more permanent 
arrangements while policies are more changeable. During the past three decades, both 
policies and institutions in China are characterized in a variable way in order to properly 
embark on the country’s industrialization. Combining together the data recorded in this 
chapter, it shows that the adopting of an IP system in China is positive.  
 
The following table lists the milestone S&T policies and IP legislations together, to 
illustrate the main research result that: S&T policies and IP legislation upgrades come 
hand in hand after the Reform and Opening-up Policy. China joined the international 
IP treaties according its country’s level of S&T development. Moreover, China updates 
its IP system strictly in line with its level of national S&T development. The main 
research finding of this chapter can be confirmed with the latest Legislative Work Plan 
of The Standing Committee of The National People’s Congress,401 which came into 
force in April 2017. After releasing the 13th Five-year National Science and Technology 
Innovation Plan and confirming the development of China’s S&T level into the ranks 
of innovative countries, the Standing Committee of The National People’s Congress 
started its new round of patent law amendments.  
 
S&T Policies and IP legislations in China 
Year S&T National 
Strategy 
Year National IP Laws 
And Regulations 
International IP Law 
And Regulations402 
  1950 •Provisional 
Regulation On The 
Protection Of 
 
                                                
401 jÏAäĞñO 2017 ġȒƿĕUɧ (Legislative Work Plan of The Standing Committee of 
The National People's Congress in 2017). 
402 X Wen, ‘Planning Development Department of the State Intellectual Property Office: Improving 
Intellectual Property Protection, Establishing Innovative Countries’ [2007] 1 Patent Statistics Bulletin 
25-42. 
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Invention Rights And 
Patent Rights 
•Provisional 
Regulation On 
Trademark  
1956 The Perspective Plan 
For Science And 
Technology 
Development From 
1956-1967  
   
1963 The 1963-1972 Plan 
For Development Of 
Science And 
Technology 
1963 •Regulation To 
Encourage 
Inventions 
•Regulations 
Governing The 
Control Of 
Trademarks 
Regulations To 
Encourage 
Improvements In 
Technology 
 
1978 The 1978-1985 
National Science And 
Technology 
Development Plan 
   
  1980  Convention 
Establishing The 
World Intellectual 
Property 
 <=?
Organization And A 
Contracting Country 
Of WIPO 
  1982 Trademark Law  
  1984 Patent Law  
  1985  Paris Convention For 
The Protection Of 
Industrial Property  
1986 The 1986-2000 
Science And 
Technology 
Development Plan 
   
  1989  •Treaty On IP 
Respect Of Integrated 
Circuits 
•Madrid Agreement 
Concerning The 
International 
Registration Of 
Marks 
  1990 •Regulation For The 
Protection Of 
Computer Software  
•Copyright Law 
 
1991 The Ten-Year 
Science And 
Technology 
Development Plan Of 
The People’s 
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Republic Of China 
And The Eighth Five 
Years Plan (1991-
2000) 
  1992 First Amendment Of 
Patent Law 
Berne Convention Of 
The Protection Of 
Literary And Artistic 
Works Universal 
Copyright 
Convention 
  1993 First Amendment Of 
Trademark Law 
Geneva Convention 
For The Protection Of 
Producers Of 
Phonograms Against 
Unauthorized 
Duplication Of Their 
Phonograms 
1994 The 9th Five Years 
Plan Of The National 
Science And 
Technology 
Development And 
The 2010 Long-Term 
Plan (Not Official 
Released) 
1994  •Patent Cooperation 
Treaty  
•Nice Agreement 
Concerning The 
International 
Classification Of 
Goods And Services 
For The Purposes Of 
The Registration Of 
Marks 
  1995  Budapest Treaty On 
The International 
 <=A
Recognition Of The 
Deposit Of 
Microorganisms For 
The Purpose Of 
Patent Procedure  
  1996  Locarno Agreement 
On Establishing An 
International 
Classification For 
Industrial Designs 
  1997 Regulation On The 
Protection Of New 
Varieties Of Plants  
Strasburg Agreement 
Concerning The 
International Patent 
Classification 
  1999  International 
Convention For The 
Protection Of New 
Varieties Of Plants  
  2000 Second Amendment 
Of Patent Law 
Patent Law Treaty 
2001 The Science, 
Technology And 
Education 
Development 
Program Of The 10th 
Five-Year Plan For 
National Economic 
And Social 
Development 
2001 •Regulations On The 
Protection Of Layout 
Design Of Integrated 
Circuits 
•Second Amendment 
Of Trademark Law  
•First Amendment Of 
Copyright Law 
 
Agreement On Trade 
Related Aspects Of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) 
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  2004 Regulations On The 
Protection Of 
Customs Protection 
Of Intellectual 
Property 
 
2006 •Outline For Medium 
And Long-Term 
Program For Science 
And Technology 
Development 2006-
2020  
•National Eleventh 
Five-Year Science 
And Technology 
Development Plan 
   
  2008 •Outline Of The 
National Intellectual 
Property Strategy  
•Third Amendment 
Of Patent Law 
 
2010 Decision Of The 
State Council On 
Accelerating The 
Fostering And 
Development Of 
Strategic Emerging 
Industries 
2010 •National Patent 
Development 
Strategy 2011-2020 
•Second Amendment 
Of Copyright Law 
 
 
2011 Twelfth Five-Year 
National Science And 
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Technology 
Development Plan 
2012 Opinion On 
Deepening 
Institutional Reforms 
Of Science And 
Technology And 
Fastening The 
Construction Of 
National Innovation 
System 
2012 Notice Of The 
General Office Of 
The State Council On 
Forwarding Several 
Opinions Of The 
State Intellectual 
Property Office And 
Other Departments 
On Strengthening 
The Work Of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights In Strategic 
Emerging Industries 
 
  2013 Third Amendment 
Of Trademark Law 
 
2016 Thirteenth Five-year 
National Science and 
Technology 
Innovation Plan 
   
  2017 Legislative Work 
Plan of The Standing 
Committee of The 
National People's 
Congress published 
(Preparation and 
Research 
Demonstration on the 
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4th amendment of 
Patent Law) 
 
This table clearly demonstrates that policies and legislations coordinated with each 
other in a very sophisticated way in China. The intensive attempt to upgrade the 
country’s technological capabilities is obvious. The Chinese central government 
managed its complementary investments through a systematized way together with 
indicative planning and direct investment programmes from both national and local 
governments. Meanwhile, policies on human capital were very forcefully designed 
together with the state’s S&T and IP systems. The effective improvements made in 
these policies and legislations at the national and international level have benefited 
China’s development. The whole process of evolution has proved the original 
characteristics designed for Chinese Patent Law originated in the 1980s, when 
legislators defined the patent system for China as a ‘technical system with legal 
overtones which could be utilized by a socialist state, and the establishing a patent 
system in China would benefit the country’.403  
 
Previous studies on the IP system, from various scholars, have shown that strengthening 
IP in general may not favour the interests of the poorest developing countries.404 
However, for scientifically-sophisticated developing countries, such as the China case 
discussed in this chapter, the impact of IPR brought positive results, which warrants 
further attention for the country’s development. However, it is also undeniable that 
during and after the establishment of the system, its maintenance demands a 
considerable amount of capital and skilled human resources. It is costly to run the 
system properly.405  
                                                
403  H Guo, ‘Patents’ in R Kariyawasam (ed), Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology Laws 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011). 
404 K Shao and X Feng, Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 
2014). 
405 N Gallini and S Scotchmer, ‘Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?’ [2001] 
UC Berkeley Department of Economics Working Paper 
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The connection between China and the rest of the world is becoming consistently 
stronger. The rise of China is concrete, which plays an increasingly important role at 
an international level, and Chinese businesses are now growing as competitors, 
bringing challenges to other country’s economic competitiveness. Regarding IPR 
protections, even though China has matched its national IP law together with 
international standards, legislatively speaking; undeniable cultural, legal, and 
institutional gaps and differences remain,406 such as the US and China IP dispute. IPR 
infringement has been taken as one of the many major problems between China and the 
US. 407  In 2003, the US government provided intensive training for Chinese IP 
professionals, including judges, prosecutors, and customs officers. 408  Since 2004, 
intellectual property rights have been linked to national security in the US.409 In 2005, 
the US again addressed a need for strong IP enforcement, heavy fines, and 
imprisonment of IPR infringers to reduce IP infringement in China.410 The US has 
addressed a need for strong IP enforcement for years and linked IPR infringements 
together with its national economic and business losses. In fact, evaluating IPR 
infringements became one of the major grounds for the developed country to gauge 
China as an economic rival.411   
 
China holds a very positive, open-minded and practical attitude on IP. The Chinese 
government acknowledges the important role of IP both nationally and internationally, 
                                                
406 WP Alford, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization 
(Standford University Press 1995). 
407 J Kynge, China Shakes the World: A Titan’s Rise and Troubled Future- and the Challenges for 
America (A Mariner Book Hougton Mifflin Company 2007). 
408 US Department of State, ‘Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business 
Affairs, E. Anthony Wayne before the Senate Judiciary Committee’ (2004). 
409 US Department of State, ‘Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business 
Affairs, E. Anthony Wayne before the Senate Judiciary Committee’ (2004). 
410 US Department of State, ‘Trade Official Urges China to Punish IPR Violators Forcefully’ (2005). 
411  CKC Gordon, Intellectual Property Rights in China: Politics of Piracy, Trade and Protection 
(Routledge 2009). 
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which ‘China should consider in depth how to make use of the intellectual property 
system to promote economic and social progress and achieve a win-win result in 
international cooperation and exchange’.412There are undeniable improvements needed 
for the system, however. The Chinese government places great efforts into continuously 
strengthening the IP enforcement system, in order to provide effective and appropriate 
protection for IP. 
 
During the period of establishing IP legislation, the IP enforcement of China was 
criticized as weak, 413 and many developed countries even claimed it to be non-existent. 
However, despite insufficient enforcement of IP globally, as well as the economic, legal, 
cultural, and ideological differences, no enforcement system can work unless its 
government agrees and the country’s people are willing to enforce.  
 
Therefore, the following chapter observes the IP system as a functional key during the 
country’s catch up, and deliberates how IP enforcement is coordinated together with 
the country’s development. 
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1. Introduction 
 
                                                
412 Y Wu, ‘Promoting IPR Policy and Enforcement in China - Summary of OECD-China Dialogues on 
Intellectual Property Rights Policy and Enforcement’ (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2005). See also ʭŎł, ŎłĬɣĵ (ǽɳ=ƏǛȄ 2012) (C Zheng, Chengsi’s 
Enlightenments (Intellectual Property Press 2012)). 
413 US Department of State, ‘Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business 
Affairs, E. Anthony Wayne Before the Senate Judiciary Committee’ (2004). 
414 Partly published as ‘The Chinese Developments Regarding the Judicial Enforcement Mechanisms in 
Intellectual Property Law’ in N Lee, N Bruun and M Li (eds), Governance of Intellectual Property rights 
in China and Europe (Elgar Intellectual Property and Global Development 2016). 
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The Chinese government passed the Decision On Reform Of The Science And 
Technology System in 1985 and confirmed its science and technology policy and 
development strategy which is ‘economic construction must rely on science and 
technology and scientific and technological work must be geared to the needs of 
economic construction’.415 China entered into a socialist market economy416 in 1992. 
After the Reform and Opening-up Policy until the early 21st Century, Chinese economy 
and a significant level of its S&T development counted on the introduction of foreign 
capital and technology, with key technologies being imported. 417  Some scholars 
summarize this period of development as ‘exchanging market for technology’.418 In 
2006, the Chinese government specified independent innovations as orientation for the 
new strategy. Moreover, the perspective of the first NIS in China is that Chinese 
enterprises are the main generators of S&T in the market economy.419 The social 
transfer of China after the Reform and Opening-up Policy is strongly related with its 
catch-up process. Such social transfer is reflected in IP policies and law.  
 
The catch-up on patent legislation can be summarized as following: the Chinese Patent 
Law entered into force on April 1, 1985. This Patent Law has been amended three times 
with the latest version entering into force on September 1, 2009. From the legislative 
perspective, the first amendment in 1992 aimed at making Chinese Patent Law fulfil 
the requirements of TRIPS in order to join the WTO, and the second in 2000 assisted 
                                                
415 L Yang, ‘Implementation of China’s Rejuvenation through Knowledge’ in K Shao and X Feng (eds), 
Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2012). 
416 The socialist market economy is a concept introduced by Deng Xiaoping. Mr. Deng pointed out in 
his speeches that market economy is not about capitalism, planned economy is not about communism. 
Both market economy and planned economy are just different means to serve the development of China. 
Mr. Deng’s speeches later on formulated into the Deng Xiaoping Theories. For detailed discussions of 
the socialist market economy, seeʩċĠʩċĠŭʣȗ¥AƱǛȄ 1993ȗ 366-383
˕. X Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol 3 (Renmin Press, 1993), p366-383 
417 C Chen, Foreign Direct Investment in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011). 
418 L Yang, ‘Implementation of China’s Rejuvenation through Knowledge’ in K Shao and X Feng (eds), 
Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2012). 
419 L Yang, ‘Implementation of China’s Rejuvenation through Knowledge’ in K Shao and X Feng (eds), 
Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2012). 
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China to become better accepted by the WTO members.420 After joining the WTO, IP 
law-making in China is no longer a purely domestic affair.421 The latest amendment in 
2008 was made because of the Chinese economic, technological, and cultural interests, 
which meant that a real internationalized patent system came into force in China in 
2009. 
 
The first two amendments of the Chinese Patent Law were reformed in order to serve 
Chinese S&T, trade policies, and to benefit its economic development. However, there 
has been a shift after 2008 when the State Council issued the Outline of the National 
Intellectual Property Strategy 2008. It confirmed the IP-based or innovation-based 
economic development model. This 2008 outline was made to reform the national 
economy model, rather than serve economic development.422  
 
Moreover, the third amendment was the first important implementation of the 2008 
outline.423 New patent law aims to: (1) improve patent quality; (2) safeguard national 
security and other ‘substantial interests’, improving the balance between patent 
protection and public interest and; (3) put in place measures to improve patent 
enforcement and prevent abuse of rights. 424  By 2020, the IP system should be 
significantly improved so that China could develop into ‘a country good at the creation, 
utilization, protection and administration of intellectual property.’ This state level 
                                                
420 J Song, Deputy Director of Department of International Cooperation, ‘State Intellectual Property 
Office, Official Report on Latest Developments of Chinese Patent Law and its Practice’ (2004). 
421 ƔÏ¡, %Ïi WTOƿĹˀ˚ɮ (ƿĹǛȄ 1999) (G Yang, Monograph on the Legal 
Issues of China Joining WTO (Law Press 1999)). 
422 H He and P Zhang, ‘Impact of the Intellectual Property System on Economic Growth Country Report 
China’ (WIPO-JPO-UNU Joint Research Project 2007) <www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-
ip/en/studies/pdf/wipo_unu_07_china.pdf> accessed 29 July 2017. 
423 S Luginbuehl, ‘China’s Patent Policy’ in S Luginbuehl and P Ganea (eds), Patent Law in Greater 
China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014). 
424 EU-China IP2, ‘Third Revision of China’s Patent Law, Legal Texts and Documents on the Drafting 
Process 2006-2008’ (2010) <www.ipkey.org/zh/resources/ip-information-centre/22-patent/2079-third-
revision-of-china-s-patent-law-legal-texts-and-documents-on-the-drafting-process-2006-2008_2079> 
accessed 12 June 2014. 
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strategy aims to boost the domestic innovation economy, and it is considered an 
essential part of public policies of China. The strategy takes into the consideration the 
Chinese national conditions under the changing global environment.   
 
After the release of the state strategy in 2008, China also introduced local IP strategies 
and policies, implementation measures, continued law making, and various activities 
to improve the general environment for innovation.425 For example, after the Decision 
on Accelerating the Fostering and Development of Strategic Emerging Industries, the 
General Office of the State Council has issued a Notice of the General Office of the 
State Council on Forwarding Several Opinions of the State Intellectual Property Office 
and Other Departments on Strengthening the Work of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Strategic Emerging Industries in 2012, which is an interpretation of the decision on IP 
matters.426 Reviewing the development of Chinese patent law and its state IP strategy, 
the process reflects that public policies are legalized, and meanwhile the legal system 
is actively reacting with public policies.427  
 
In summary, the IP system was not prioritized until the early 21st Century. Its grand 
historical background has been briefly illustrated in the first chapter and a detailed 
review of IP development has been discussed in Chapter 2. The implementation of the 
IP system is a joint activity of the central government, provincial, city, and even some 
county level governments and different entities, such as the judicial organs as well as 
different business players. Moreover, apart from the national IP strategy, all provinces 
and cities above the county level issued IP strategies based on their regional 
development. Thus, when there are judicial IP cases, Chinese courts consistently seek 
                                                
425 After 2008, China has amended and drafted about 54 IP-related law and policies.  
426 Ïˆk¦ʔ®ǽɳ=ƏčȘʮʿo8ĳőǮŃůp=ǽɳ=ƏĕUɌğŊɝǲʤǽ
(Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Forwarding Several Opinions of the State 
Intellectual Property Office and Other Departments on Strengthening the Work of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Strategic Emerging Industries (2012) 
<http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=172998&lib=law> accessed 29 July 2017. 
427 F Xi, China’s Path to Innovation (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
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for balance among all the stakeholders.428 Therefore, the IP system is absorbed into the 
Chinese society via the judicial branches. 
 
China’s introduction of modern IP legislation fulfils the basic standards set out in the 
Berne and Paris Conventions, as well as in the TRIPS-agreement, which has been a 
rather recent and fast development.429 Since ‘law in books has never really become law 
in practice’, it is general knowledge that the introduction of basic material standards in 
IP law does not necessarily translate into practice.430 The first prerequisite for an IP 
system to function well is that IP protection has to be recognized, and in cases where 
registration is required, it must be registered. Second, the management of IP-rights must 
be handled in an efficient manner and there must be exploitation avenues for rights, so 
that a process from innovation to business practice can take place. Third, in cases of 
infringements, the protection must be enforced. 
 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, it is clear China has made significant progress in developing 
its IP system since 2008. The numbers of patent applications and IP registrations have 
been increasing with an impressive frequency. China has a modern IP system in place 
and it is highly used nowadays. One SPC chief justice announced that the Chinese court 
deals approximately 15,000 civil IP cases a year, among which 95% were Chinese 
domestic litigation cases and 5% were between foreign and Chinese companies.431 
China’s efforts to further improve its IP policy and enforcement system are aimed to 
support its modernisation strategy based on technological innovation, openness to 
                                                
428 X Kong and W Du, ‘Efforts and Tendencies in China’s Judicial Practice of Intellectual Property’ in 
K Shao and X Feng (eds), Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited 2014). 
429 S Luginbuehl, ‘China’s Patent Policy’ in S Luginbuehl and Peter Ganea (eds), Patent Law in Greater 
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foreign direct investment and further integration into the global economy.432 As every 
developing country, its IP system also needs to function in a way which enables 
maximum technology diffusion. 433  Therefore, the Chinese challenges are mainly 
related to: (1) IP management, how to design and adapt the IPR policies to 
accommodate changing needs and new requirements;434 and (2) IP enforcement.435 
 
As a socialist country with decades of history of ‘planned economy’, it is not strange to 
find Chinese society accepts the idea of viewing the private IPRs as public rights. This 
is very dangerous in practice. Chinese views on IP are under the main guidance of 
TRIPS since becoming a member of the WTO in 2001. Thus, it is necessary to 
substantively adopt TRIPS into Chinese IP views.436 In particular, as stated in the 
preamble in TRIPS, ‘All members should recognize intellectual property rights as 
private rights’. The role of this declaration is significant to Chinese society. It is a 
reference point for guiding Chinese social transition and economic development, as 
well as for the Chinese people in supporting their understanding of the improvement of 
the IP system.437  
 
The Chinese challenges are evident both in its judicial system and as more general 
concerns, which seem to be common world over. Some general concerns relate to the 
capabilities and competence of the courts to deal with complex issues related to new 
                                                
432 OECD, ‘Promoting IPR Policy and Enforcement in China - Summary of OECD-China Dialogues on 
Intellectual Property Rights Policy and Enforcement’ (OECD 2005). 
433 H-J Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem 
Press 2002). 
434 OECD, ‘Promoting IPR Policy and Enforcement in China - Summary of OECD-China Dialogues on 
Intellectual Property Rights Policy and Enforcement’ (OECD 2005). 
435 J Cao, ‘Dual Enforcement System’ in S Luginbuehl and Peter Ganea (eds), Patent Law in Greater 
China (Edward Elgar 2014) 195-208. 
436 C Liu, ‘Copyright Protection under the Network Environment’ in R Kariyawasam (ed), Chinese 
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technology, the duration of the court procedures and the predictability of outcomes. 
Specific Chinese features are related to the relative weakness of the rule of law tradition 
in China with the SPC as both a last instance appeal court, but also as an instance issuing 
guidelines and guidance especially for lower courts. Furthermore, there is a strong 
tradition of administrative adjudication of IP disputes in China, for instance, the SIPO 
and its regional offices have a role in this administrative procedure. The huge regional 
differences regarding technological development and relevant IP problems raise 
specific challenges for the Chinese IP system.  
 
China offers its IP rights holders different means to enforce the rights. Administrative 
enforcement is a unique feature among all the enforcement mechanisms. In general, the 
IP enforcement mechanisms in China and their features and weakness are well 
summarized by Elaine Wu in the following table which is worth citing at length438:  
 
                                                
438 Source: ‘Promoting IPR Policy and Enforcement in China - Summary of OECD-China Dialogues on 
Intellectual Property Rights Policy and Enforcement’ (OECD 2005). 
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However, it is necessary to address that China is not a unique country in regarding IP 
system reformation. Considering the leading developing countries from the early 21st 
Century until today, or other already-developed Asian countries from even earlier in 
history, such as Korea and Japan, IPR-system reform has been very similar, which can 
be summarised as:  
 
Expanded coverage of patent law: patentability was expanded in order to cover new 
technologies, such as the three patent law amendments in China; 
 
Offered Incentives for patenting in public research organisations, such as in the Chinese 
Patent Law 2000 Amendment; 
 
Increased flexibility of the IP administrative agencies, such as simplified filing 
procedure and reduced patent filing costs, connecting with international organizations 
and improved international filings, e.g having WIPO agency in Beijing in 2014.439  
 
Reinforced patent holders’ rights via establishing special IP courts, such as Beijing IP 
court, Shanghai IP court and Guangzhou IP court.440 
 
Many countries experiences have showed that the scale of IP protections continuously 
expands in line with the national level of industrialization and follows the steps to the 
global economy.441  
 
                                                
439  SIPO, ‘WIPO Chinese Agency Opened in Beijing’ (16 July 2014) 
<http://english.sipo.gov.cn/news/official/201407/t20140716_980595.html> accessed 22 August 2014. 
440 M Li, ‘Special Intellectual Property Court in China’ in N Lee, N Bruun and M Li (eds), Governance 
of Intellectual Property rights in China and Europe (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2016). 
441 OECD, ‘Promoting IPR Policy and Enforcement in China - Summary of OECD-China Dialogues on 
Intellectual Property Rights Policy and Enforcement’ (2005). 
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Enforcement problems in China became a serious concern that received even more 
attention than the IPR legislations both in China and many other countries. Judicial 
enforcement hardly functioned and both the administrative and even criminal 
enforcement was considered insufficient for preventing IPR infringement activities 
inside China.442 China then noticed that it was necessary to make the judicial channels 
into a greater role. A series of necessary steps were taken to lower the threshold for 
criminal penalties in judicial execution, and China carried out considerable reforms in 
its judicial system for a relatively stronger IP enforcement.443  
 
Under this general frame, this chapter focuses on the Chinese IP enforcement. 
 
2. The Dual-Enforcement System 
2.1 Developments Within the Chinese Court System 
Over the last few decades, China has made significant improvements in the field of IP 
law and its enforcement. For example, the number of IP cases has increased 
considerably in the last few years. The number of all first and second instances, and 
protest cases444 for civil IP cases from 2001 until November 2006 was 64,099. The 
number of filed cases already reached 66,609 during the first six months of 2014.445 
According to the Supreme People’s Court’s annual report of 2013, there were 114,075 
                                                
442 Quality Brand Protection Committee of China Association of Enterprise with Foreign Investment, 
‘Annual Review of Counterfeiting Development 2000’ (2004). 
443  OECD, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in China: Governance Challenges and Perspectives’ in 
Governance in China (2005). 
444 Protest cases are cases which are reheard by the People’s Court, based on the protest procedures 
carried out by the People's Procuratorate. It is a legal supervision mechanism of China, because based 
on the art. 129 of the Constitution, people’s procuratorates are ‘state organs for legal supervision’. When 
a decision contains mistakes made by the People’s Court, according to the law, the People’s Procuratorate 
can protest the incorrect decision, and require to reopen the proceedings and rehear the case.  
445 öː<o8Ñ?, ǌ, ĤĔɰȒǽɳ=Əƿˆǲ|þ>ţƘ	%ÏǛƏ	2014 ġ
ȗ 5 ƈ±ªɝ 2014 ġǽɳ=ƏÒɮÖ (L Sun, ‘Analysis on the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress Decision on the Establishment of Intellectual Property Court in Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou’ [2014] 5 China Copyright 5. Published also at the Shangdi Forum of Intellectual 
Property 2014). 
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first and second instances IP cases. The number of first-instance foreign-related IP civil 
cases was 1697, which meant an increase of 18.75% compared to 2012.446  
 
Within the coming three years, China will significantly enhance the implementation of 
Chinese IP rights via the establishment of specialized courts and IP tribunals. On the 
other hand, China faces many challenges in harmonizing IP enforcement nationwide, 
especially in the field of patents.  
 
The Chinese judicial system is under the supervision of the SPC. The organization and 
administrative supervision among each level is regulated by the COL. Under the SPC, 
the system has three levels of local courts, they are: 32 higher courts, 409 intermediate 
courts, and 3117 basic courts.447  Furthermore, there are military courts and other 
specialized courts. The IP courts, which were established in late 2014, are a new form 
of intermediate courts. These IP courts will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
The geographical division of the courts and their levels follow the national division and 
levels of local governments.448 Generally speaking, the organizations of the Chinese 
courts are very similar from one to another. Before 2016, patent cases were normally 
heard in the division of a court (often no.3 or no. 5).449  
 
The basic people’s courts hear the first instance trials, unless otherwise stipulated by 
law.450 They have no jurisdiction over patent infringement cases. But certain courts 
                                                
446 ƃˣAƱƿˆ2013ġ%Ïƿˆǽɳ=Ə¸ƿ\řǝ}	AƱƿˆŚ	2014ġ 4Ƅ
25 ŵ (SPC: 2013 China IPR Judicial Protection in Court, People’s Court News (25 April 2014)) 
<www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/04/id/1283299.shtml> accessed 6 June 2015. 
447 ƃˣAƱƿˆAƱƿˆțD	 (The Supreme People’s Court of China, ‘Introduction of the 
People’s Courts’) <http://www.court.gov.cn/jgsz/rmfyjj/> accessed 2 May 2014. 
448 W Shao, Patent Litigation Practices in Mainland China (Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Intellectual Property Office 2011). 
449 JM Duncan, MA Sherwood, and Y Shen, ‘A Comparison between the Judicial and Administrative 
Routes to Enforce Intellectual Property Rights in China’ [2008] 7 The John Marshall Review of 
Intellectual Property Law 529. 
450 Art. 20 and 21 of the COL. 
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have been authorized by the SPC to hear first instance trials on contractual issues, which 
involve patent matters. Due to differences in regional development, the SPC has also 
authorized some basic courts to hear the first instance trials on infringement cases on 
utility models and designs.451 It was earlier predicted as a trend that, in the future, with 
the improvement in Chinese IP legal practice, basic courts would have an increasing 
jurisdiction over patent cases. However, after the establishment of IP courts inside 
China, it is unclear how this will be developed in the near future. The issue will be 
discussed further in part 3 and 4 of this chapter.  
 
The intermediate people’s courts only hear the first instance trials that: (1) are stipulated 
by law, or (2) the cases that are transferred from its related lower court. They also have 
jurisdiction as second instance courts in trials, which are (1) appeals of the cases that 
are firstly heard at its lower courts, or (2) protest cases that are against the lower courts’ 
judgments, which are raised from the People’s Procuratorate according to the trial 
supervision procedure.452  
 
According to the law, patent infringement cases on innovation patents will be heard at 
least on the level of intermediate courts. Intermediate Courts are situated in the capital 
cities of the provinces, the autonomous regions, and the municipalities which are 
directly under the control of the central government, and function as first instance in 
these cases.  
 
According to article 27 of the COL, the higher people’s court of each province can only 
hear the trials as first instance cases if: (1) this is stipulated in laws and/or regulations 
decree; or (2) if the cases are transferred to it from an intermediate people’s court. They 
also hear appeals or protest cases regarding the intermediate courts’ judgments. In 
contrast to the basic and intermediate people’s courts, the higher people’s courts cannot 
                                                
451 Examples of such courts are the Yiwu Court of Zhejiang Province, the Kunshan Court of Jiangsu, 
and the Haidian Regional Court of Beijing, which hear first instance civil trials regarding patents of 
utility models and designs. 
452 Art. 24 of the COL. 
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request to transfer a filed case to be heard at its higher level because the SPC does not 
hear any transferred case from its lower level.  
 
The SPC is at the highest level and supervises the judicial workings of the other 
courts.453 It also has the authority to interpret the application of law.454 The SPC only 
hears cases as the first instance if: (1) the laws and/or regulations stipulate so; or (2) if 
it is considered necessary. It hears cases as the second instance, which are appeals or 
protest cases regarding the higher courts or special courts’ judgments.  
 
The SPC has an IP division, which consists of 5 benches with 25 judges, 1 assistant, 
and 7 clerks. This division has jurisdiction over: (1) civil cases on IP or competition 
matters; (2) administrative cases regarding the licenses and authorization of patents, 
trademarks, and other IP rights; and (3) hearing and judicial supervision of the refusals 
of its lower courts’ effective judgments of the previously mentioned two case types.455 
According to the trial supervision process, protests that are raised by the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate will also be heard inside this division, except for the cases that 
are originally heard by one of the benches inside the division. The division also has 
authority to review the IP cases or provide consultative instructions according to the 
requests from its lower courts. Moreover, this IP division of the SPC is responsible for 
research, guidance, and supervision of all national IP trials and anti-trust cases; and it 
is responsible for the implementation of the national IP strategy.456 By issuing the 
Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the 
Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy in 2009457, the SPC has 
                                                
453 Art. 29 of the COL.  
454 Art. 32 of the COL. 
455 The division has authority to deny the application of retrial and hear the retrial in the mentioned civil 
and administrative cases. 
456 ƃˣAƱƿˆƃˣƿˆǽɳ=ƏĩDȩ	 (People’s Supreme Court, ‘Introduction of the IP 
division of the SPC’) (12 April 2010) <www.court.gov.cn/zscq/zscqt/201004/t20100412_3940.html> 
accessed 31 July 2014. 
457 Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Implementation of the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy, No. 16 [2009] of the Supreme People’s Court. 
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set forth six main means with a coverage of 36 perspectives to implement the national 
IP strategy.458 
 
China has a dual enforcement system for IP protections, which offers administrative 
protection to its IP right holders, separate from judicial enforcement. 459  The IP 
administrative protection is a legal protection mechanism that is carried out by the 
relevant national administrative authorities in compliance with the relevant legal 
procedures and measures. It deals with IP disputes, maintains IP order, and enhances 
IP social awareness.460 The contents of administrative protection of IP covers, but is 
limited to, the following: (1) authorizations and recognitions; (2) administrative 
procedures regarding mediation, ruling, reconsideration, arbitration; (3) investigations 
regarding fine and enforcement;461 (4) remedies; (5) sanctions;462 (6) legal supervision; 
                                                
458 The six main means are formulated according to the requirements of the national IP strategy and by 
taking into account the actualities of the judicial protection of IP by the people’s courts. The SPC’s 
particular implementations of the national IP strategy are: (1) to fully apprehend the significance of the 
implementation of the national IP strategy and earnestly enhance the sense of responsibility and mission 
of the people’s courts in respect of the judicial protection of IP; (2) to give full play to the leading role 
of judicial protection of IP and effectively guarantee the building of an innovative country; (3) to properly 
hear the various categories of IP cases and effectively intensify the judicial protection of IP; (4) to 
improve the trial system and work mechanism for IP and optimize the allocation of trial resources; (5) to 
strengthen the judicial interpretation of IP and improve the IP litigation system; and (6) to strengthen the 
construction of the IP judges team and enhance the capacity of judicial protection of IP. 
459 SIPO and its 62 regional offices. 
460 ʩĬľ, ¢Žg, ‘ŏÏǽɳ=ƏɕŨ\řǲǏ,’ [2007] 1ǽɳ=Əƿ 62 (J Deng and X Shan, 
‘The Conception of IP Administrative Protection in China’ [2007] 1 Intellectual Property Law 62). 
461 Patent Law (2008 Amendment): Art. 63 Whoever counterfeits the patent of anyone else shall, in 
addition to bearing civil liabilities in accordance with the law, be ordered by the patent administrative 
department to make a correction and be announced by the patent administrative department; its or his 
illegal gains, if any, shall be confiscated, and it or he may be fined up to three times the illegal gains. If 
there is no illegal gain, it or he may be fined up to 200, 000 Yuan. If any crime is constituted, it or he 
shall be subject to criminal liabilities according to law. 
Art. 64 When the patent administrative department investigates into and deals with a suspected 
counterfeit patent case on the basis of the evidence it has already gathered, it may query the relevant 
parties so as to find the information relevant to the suspected violation, may conduct an on-site inspection 
over the site of party suspected of having committed the violation, may consult and copy the contracts, 
invoices, account books and other materials relating to the suspected violation, may check the products 
relating to the suspected violation, and may seal up or detain the counterfeit patented product as proved 
by evidence.  
When the patent administrative department exercises the functions as prescribed in the preceding 
paragraph according to law, the parties shall assist and cooperate with it and shall not reject or hamper 
it. 
462 For the detailed administrative remedies and sanctions for patent infringement, see Patent Law (2008 
Amendment): Art. 60 […] the patentee or any interested party may either bring a lawsuit with the 
people’s court, or request the patent administrative department, for settlement. If the patent 
administrative department ascertains at the time of settlement that infringement exists, it may order the 
infringer to immediately stop the infringement act. The party dissatisfied may, within 15 days as of receipt 
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and (7) administrative services.463 The administrative authorities offer remedies for 
right holders in IP infringement cases and it is a parallel protection system compared to 
judicial protection. Namely, IP protection in China offers a ‘dual-enforcement’ 
system.464 Based on real needs, IP right holders can either seek remedies from the 
relevant State Council departments and their regional offices or from the judicial 
branches. For the administrative authorities, it is normally a two-level system where the 
central offices directly under the State Council are responsible for IPR examinations 
and registrations, and their local administrative offices conduct the general 
administrative works and IPR administrative enforcements. 
 
2.2 The Administrative Enforcement System 
In China, the highest authority is the National People’s Congress.465 Both the National 
People’s Congress and its Standing Committee are the legislative organs of China.466 
But only the People’s Congress is responsible for constitution-related amendments and 
supervisions. The People’s Congress also has the highest authority to enact and amend 
basic laws governing criminal offences, civil affairs, the state organs, and other 
matters.467  
 
                                                
of the notification, bring a lawsuit with the people’s court in accordance with the Administrative 
Procedural Law of the People’s Republic of China. If the infringer neither brings a lawsuit within the 
time limit nor stops the infringement act, the patent administrative department may apply to the people’s 
court for compulsory enforcement. The patent administrative department that settles the dispute may, 
upon request of the parties may hold a mediation regarding the compensation amount for infringement 
upon the patent right. If no agreement is reached through mediation, either party may bring a lawsuit 
with the people's court in accordance with the ‘Civil Procedural Law of the People’s Republic of China’. 
463 ʩĬľ,¢Žg:ŏÏǽɳ=ƏɕŨ\řǲǏ,	ǽɳ=Əƿ	2007ġȗ 1ƈ (J Deng 
and X Shan, ‘The Conception of IP Administrative Protection in China’ [2007] 1 Intellectual Property 
Law 62). 
464 ĒŏÏǽɳ=ƏYƏŪǊ‘¬ʓ’ǲƨĴŃ	ǽɳ=Əƿ	2008ġȗ 2ƈ (F Liu, 
‘The Justice Analysis On the ‘Dual Enforcement System’ of Patent Infringement Remedies in China’ 
[2008] 2 Intellectual Property Law 50). 
465 Constitution (2004 Amendment) Art. 57 
466 Constitution (2004 Amendment) Art. 58 
467 Constitution (2004 Amendment) Art. 62 
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The Chinese central government is the State Council.468 It has the power to adopt 
administrative measures, enact administrative rules and regulations and issue decisions 
and orders in accordance with the Constitution and the law.469 The local people’s 
congress can enact local laws or regulations.470 The local rules must not contravene the 
Constitution and the law and administrative rules and regulations, and local regulations 
shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and be 
recorded. The ministries and commissions within the State Council have the authority 
to issue orders, directives, and regulations within the jurisdiction of their respective 
departments and in accordance with the law and the administrative rules and regulations, 
decisions and orders issued by the State Council.471  Therefore, China has a four-
levelled hierarchy system of laws, within which, the Chinese constitution is the highest, 
and the laws are then enacted by the National People’s Congress at the second level. 
The administrative regulations enacted by the State Council are on the third level, and 
the local regulations and department regulations are on the bottom level.472 
 
Therefore, under the State Council, China has a two-levelled administrative system for 
IP issues. The central administrative bodies are under the direct governance of the State 
Council, which are responsible for granting the IPRs. The local administrative 
authorities under the central administrative bodies are responsible for administering and 
administrative enforcement of IPR within their territorial jurisprudence. International 
affairs are handled at the level of central administrative bodies. 473  China’s 
administrative organisations that are dealing with IPR-related issues and their functions 
have been briefly summarized as following:474 
                                                
468 Constitution (2004 Amendment) Art. 85 
469 Constitution (2004 Amendment) Art. 89 
470 Constitution (2004 Amendment) Art. 100 
471 Constitution (2004 Amendment) Art. 90 
472 CC Donald, China’s Legal System: New Developments, New Challenges (Cambridge University 
Press 2008). 
473 ǒŶǽɳ=ƏĹĜÛȀÿAƱäúǛȄ 2014 (X Wen, Intellectual Property Lawyer 
Based Legal Practices (Renmin University Press 2014)). 
474 Source: OECD, ‘Promoting IPR Policy and Enforcement in China - Summary of OECD-China 
Dialogues on Intellectual Property Rights Policy and Enforcement’ (2005) 46. 
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Generally speaking, compared to the judicial remedies, administrative remedies are 
faster for infringement cases, the procedures are less complicated, and the enforcement 
of its decision is also more efficient. However, if one of the parties decides to challenge 
the administrative decision and initiates a judicial appeal in the related intermediate 
court, then the process would be longer. Moreover, the administrative remedies do not 
offer compensation to the rights holders. 475  On the other hand, administrative 
protection still maintains its popularity because it costs less than the judicial procedure, 
                                                
475 W Shao, Patent Litigation Practices in Mainland China (Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Intellectual Property Office 2011). 
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and frequently brings parties to mediation.476 Taking patent cases as example, Chinese 
law and its enforcement regulation allows the administrative patent authorities to settle 
cases related to: infringements477, utilisation fees for the period between the publication 
of the patent application and the granting of patent rights, application rights and 
ownership rights, and rewards and payments of officially recognized inventors. SIPO 
issued Guidelines for the Administrative Mediation of Patent Disputes (for Trial 
Implementation) in May 2016.478 
 
2.3 The Relationship Between the Administrative & Judicial Enforcement 
The ‘dual-track’ enforcement system of IPR in China is unique, offering both 
administrative and judicial protections for the right holders. The administrative and 
judicial protections are not in conflict, but cooperate with each other. Under the ‘dual-
track’ system, judicial protection holds a dominant position. The on-going enforcement 
reform enhances the role and importance of IPR judicial protection in dealing with 
infringement cases, and the administrative protection will function to assist, which is 
more efficient in counterfeit and piracy-related cases.479 The adoption of the ‘dual 
protection, parallel operation’ mechanism of China regarding IP enforcement fits well 
into the Chinese conditions and functions effectively inside the country.480 
 
                                                
476 S Luginbuehl, ‘China’s Patent Policy’ in S Luginbuehl and P Ganea (eds), Patent Law in Greater 
China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014). 
477 Art.60, Patent Law 
478 Notice of the State Intellectual Property Office on Issuing the Guide to the Determination of Patent 
Infringements (for Trial Implementation), the Rules of Evidence for Agency Law Enforcement Involving 
Patents (for Trial Implementation) and the Guidelines for the Administrative Mediation of Patent 
Disputes (for Trial Implementation) 2016. 
479 Z Jiang and R Kariyawasam, Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology Laws (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2011). 
480 OECD, ‘Promoting IPR Policy and Enforcement in China - Summary of OECD-China Dialogues on 
Intellectual Property Rights Policy and Enforcement’ (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2005). 
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The administrative enforcements of IPR in China derive from Chinese history as far 
back as the early years of the People’s Republic of China.481  The administrative 
enforcements have played a constructive role for IP development in China. However, 
since the judicial enforcement matured, the current ‘dual-track’ system brings new 
challenges, such as, how to have judicial enforcement and administrative enforcement 
corresponding with each other and how to reach a balance between the judicial and 
administrative power.482 According to the IP Strategy Outlines 2008, the historical 
mission of administrative protection as a transitional measure will be completed once 
the judicial mechanism is mature. Since 2008, although a ‘dual-track’ system is still 
maintained, judicial protection has gradually become the dominant trend.483 
 
3. The ‘Three-In-One’ Model 
IP law enforcement has become of greater concern since 2008 with increased 
motivation to transition China to be an innovative country; the requirements of an 
internationalized economy; the increased difficulty and complexity of the IP cases; and 
the need for an unified judicial implementation of IP law inside China.484 The Chinese 
State Council has stated in its 12 years strategy: ‘We should improve the trial system 
for intellectual property-related cases, optimize the allocation of judicial resources, and 
                                                
481 WP Alford, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization 
(Stanford University Press 1995). 
482 ƐÀ, ‘źǨǽɳ=Ə\řƣĮˀ˚ƤȰÓ“ǺǥƜ”Įǲäɨɮ’ [2016] ƿƽÅƊ (H 
Li, ‘Liu Chuntian: There is a lack of great discussion of ‘criterion of truth’ for intellectual property 
protection mechanism’ [2016] Legal Weekly) <http://news.hexun.com/2016-06-23/184551233.html> 
accessed 23 June 2016. 
483 ƐÀ, ‘źǨǽɳ=Ə\řƣĮˀ˚ƤȰÓ“ǺǥƜ”Įǲäɨɮ’ [2016] ƿƽÅƊ (H 
Li, ‘Liu Chuntian: There is a lack of great discussion of ‘criterion of truth’ for intellectual property 
protection mechanism’ [2016] Legal Weekly) <http://news.hexun.com/2016-06-23/184551233.html> 
accessed 23 June 2016. 
484 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, National Intellectual Property Strategy Outline (5 
June 2008) <www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_1018942.htm> accessed 6 June 2015. 
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simplify remedy procedures. We should consider setting up special tribunals to accept 
civil, administrative, or criminal cases involving intellectual property’.485 
 
The first model of the improvements, carried out by the regional courts, is the ‘three-
in-one’ pilot tribunal in different provinces. Generally speaking, it is a trial model that 
either hears all civil, administrative, and criminal IP cases in one tribunal; or hears the 
IP cases with a collegial panel of judges that are from civil, administrative and criminal 
tribunals; or a mixed use of the two. The representative models are: Pudong model 
(1996 January), Nanhai model (2006 July), Xi’an model (2006 December), Wuhan 
model (2008 April), Chongqing model (2008 November), Beijing No.2 Intermediate 
Court model (2008 December), and Zhuhai model (2009 December).486 
 
It is not only a model for the hearing of cases but also a matter of how to organize the 
court.487 The non-unified implementation at the provincial level shows that: (1) the 
court level for the first instance of the ‘three-in-one’ model is different from one 
province to another. Legislatively speaking, at which court level the IP tribunal shall 
belong and how it shall be organized is still under discussion;488 (2) some provinces 
establish a separate, qualified and specialized tribunal for IP cases, some are hearing 
                                                
485 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Outline 
of the National Intellectual Property Strategy (State Council 2008) para 45. 
486 ȾǐǤ, ‘ɮǽɳ=ƏƿˆƿĩǲĬȒćŏʚǽɳ=ƏĀRŧ˔ǲǥŃłȵ’ 
[2010] 4 ǽɳ=Ə 37 (S Hu, ‘Discussions On the Establishment of IP Court’ [2010] 4 Intellectual 
Property 37). See also ÅľP, ŒÁǆ, ŏÏǽɳ=ƏƿˆɰȒŰƠţɨ2014 ġǽɳ=ƏÒ
ɮÖ (Z Zhou and Q Dai, ‘Analysis on the Establishment of China Exclusive Intellectual Property 
Courts’ [2014] Shangdi Forum of Intellectual Property). 
487 This current situation is caused due to the legal reform development of China. After the open and 
reform policy, even though China achieved considerable improvements in the field of legal enforcement, 
it is still undeniable that the legal practices for hearing IP cases are limited. Hence, according to the law, 
the qualified court has the autonomy to organize and adjust the IP chamber according to its regional 
situations. The court experiments with the model via organizing different modes, and at the same time 
hearing cases. Thus, the three-in-one model contains two characteristics. It is an inventive case hearing 
model and at the same time a court-organizing model. It is a mechanism that China uses to collect 
practical experiences and handle real cases at the same time. 
488 ȾǐǤ, ‘ɮǽɳ=ƏƿˆƿĩǲĬȒćŏʚǽɳ=ƏĀRŧ˔ǲǥŃłȵ’ 
[2010] 4 ǽɳ=Ə 37 (S Hu, ‘Discussions On the Establishment of IP Court’ [2010] 4 Intellectual 
Property 37). 
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the case within each of the original chambers; and (3) some models concentrate on 
enhancing the court in general and some focus on improving the panel of judges. 
 
Even though, at the central state level, the strategy outlines a clear aim, the 
implementation differs noticeably at the provincial level. How the differences will be 
harmonized is unclear.  
 
From an international perspective, the ‘three-in-one’ model is a uniquely Chinese 
system. Although it has been implemented differently, it is a common mechanism that 
the Chinese courts use to support and enhance the openness of information and 
resources.489 Until 2014, China had six high people’s courts, 74 intermediate courts, 
and 80 basic people’s courts applying a three-in-one model in IP cases.490 
 
In July 2016, the SPC published Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Promoting 
the ‘Three in One’ Trial of Civil, Administrative and Criminal Cases Involving 
Intellectual Property Rights in Courts Nationwide,491 which promote the establishment 
of IP tribunals nationally. This decision renames intellectual property right trial 
divisions of the people's courts at all levels into an intellectual property right tribunal, 
where earlier inside the court, they were referred to as ‘No. x Division of Civil Trial’.492  
 
In order to enhance the general effectiveness of IP protection by building a working 
mechanism and trial system in conformity with the judicial characteristics and pattern 
                                                
489 Ɛċƫ%Ïǽɳ=ƏƿˆǲɰȒǶǲ	2014ġǽɳ=ƏÒɮÖ (X Li, ‘The Aims of 
the Establishment of the Chinese Intellectual Property Court’, [2014] Shangdi Forum of Intellectual 
Property). 
490 ɘþǀ,ɰȒǽɳ=ƏƿˆŊÑɟɎĚÓȓ5ƿŵŚ2014 ġ 6 Ƅ 9 ŵ (D Yuan, 
‘Establishing the Intellectual Property Court Aims to Standardize the Market Competition’ Legal Daily 
(9 June 2014)). 
491 ƿ®201617·ƃˣAƱƿˆo8ÑjÏƿˆťʝǽɳ=ƏƱ6ɕŨÇ6ƠIĀ
‘»’ĕUǲŊɝ	(Supreme People's Court Decision on Promoting Intellectual Property Civil, 
Administrative and Criminal Cases ‘three in one’ Trail in all National Courts [2016] No. 17). 
492 Art. 5 
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of intellectual property rights. It joins the forces of the judicial and administrative 
authorities to achieve a comprehensive remedy. The SPC foresees the three-in-one 
approach will unify judicial standards, as well as improve trial quality and efficiency. 
Meanwhile, the three-in-one approach can support the development of the specialized 
IP trial teams and advance the quality of IP trial teams. 
 
According to this decision, the SPC will establish a ‘Three-in-One Work Coordination 
Group’ to coordinate and guide the three-in-one work of courts nationwide. Meanwhile, 
this decision has significantly deepened judicial reform. All higher and intermediate 
people’s courts shall establish corresponding coordination bodies to organize 
coordination of the three-in-one work within their jurisdictions, take the specific 
responsibility of the jurisdictional distribution, guidance and supervision of the 
intellectual property right cases within their jurisdictions, connect the higher and lower 
levels, and coordinate internally and externally. This decision has also specified the 
civil, administrative, and criminal IP cases in detail in Art. 7.493 
 
Data released in July 2016 shows that China presently has 158 basic people’s courts in 
total, with jurisdiction over IP cases: there are 6 in Beijing, 2 in Tianjin, 6 in Shanghai, 
3 in Chongqing, 3 in Anhui, 4 in Fujian, 2 in Gansu, 32 in Guangdong, 2 in Guangxi, 1 
                                                
493 ‘Civil cases involving intellectual property rights’ means civil dispute cases involving copyrights, 
trademark rights, patent rights, technology contracts, trade secrets, new varieties of plants, integrated 
circuit layout designs, or other intellectual property rights or involving unfair competition, monopoly, 
or franchise contracts.  
‘General civil dispute cases involving intellectual property rights’ means civil dispute cases involving 
intellectual property rights expect those involving patents, new varieties of plants, integrated circuit 
layout designs, know-how, computer software, determination of famous trademarks, or monopoly. 
‘Administrative cases involving intellectual property rights’ means administrative dispute cases filed by 
the parties with the people's courts against administrative actions taken by the administrative agencies 
in respect of copyrights, trademark rights, patent rights, or other intellectual property rights or unfair 
competition.  
‘Criminal cases involving intellectual property rights’ means criminal cases involving infringement of 
intellectual property rights as provided for in Section 7, Chapter III: Crimes of Undermining the Order 
of Socialist Market Economy, Specific Provisions of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China. 
In respect of the criminal cases of private prosecution involving intellectual property rights, the people’s 
courts may still exercise jurisdiction according to the principle of territorial jurisdiction specified in the 
Criminal Procedure Law. 
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in Henan, 3 in Hubei, 6 in Hunan, 35 in Jiangsu, 3 in Jiangxi, 2 in Liaoning, 5 in 
Shandong, 2 in Shanxi, 6 in Sichuan, 2 in Xingjiang, and 33 in Zhejiang.494 
 
Jurisdictions on civil cases involving IPR shall continue to be governed by the 
provisions and official replies regarding the jurisdiction of the people’s courts. In 
addition, Art. 8 of the new decision further detailed the jurisdictions for various 
situations:  
 
‘Where no basic people’s court within the jurisdiction of an intermediate people’s 
court has jurisdiction over general civil dispute cases involving intellectual property 
rights, a report may be submitted level by level to the Supreme People’s Court for 
designation of a basic people’s court to exercise unified jurisdiction, or the 
intermediate people’s court may directly exercise jurisdiction over administrative 
and criminal cases involving intellectual property rights within its jurisdiction. 
  
Where there are two or more basic people’s courts having jurisdiction over general 
civil dispute cases involving intellectual property rights within the jurisdiction of an 
intermediate people’s court, the scope of jurisdiction of each basic people’s court 
may, after a report is submitted level by level to and approved by the Supreme 
People’s Court, based on the number of cases, trial forces, and other circumstances 
within the jurisdiction, be defined and adjusted. 
 
A basic people’s court having jurisdiction over general civil dispute cases involving 
intellectual property rights shall try criminal and administrative cases involving 
intellectual property rights as court of first instance within the region specified by 
the intermediate people’s court. Where a basic people’s court without jurisdiction 
over general civil dispute cases involving intellectual property rights discovers that 
the case before it is an administrative or criminal case involving an intellectual 
                                                
494  Z Jiang, SPC: Intellectual Property Jurisdiction of the Basic People’s Courts (July 2016) 
<http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/u7LzMXLO1pw1b3ajTIx_eg> accessed 17 July 2016. 
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property right, it shall transfer the case to a basic people’s court having jurisdiction 
over general civil dispute cases involving intellectual property rights as designated 
by the intermediate people’s court.   
 
The intellectual property right tribunal of an intermediate people’s court shall try 
appeals from administrative and criminal cases involving intellectual property rights 
closed by the basic people’s courts within its jurisdiction and the criminal cases 
involving intellectual property rights appealed by the people’s procuratorate at the 
same level. 
 
The intellectual property right tribunal of a higher people’s court shall try appeals 
from administrative and criminal cases involving intellectual property rights closed 
by the intermediate people’s courts within its jurisdiction, administrative and 
criminal retrial petition cases involving intellectual property rights, and the criminal 
cases involving intellectual property rights appealed by the people’s procuratorate 
at the same level. 
 
The intellectual property right tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court shall try 
appeals from administrative and criminal cases involving intellectual property rights 
closed by higher people’s courts, administrative and criminal retrial petition cases 
involving intellectual property rights, and the criminal cases involving intellectual 
property rights appealed by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.’ 
 
This new decision indicates a significant step forward for a systematization of IPR 
enforcement and further pushes forward IPR enforcement at the province level. In 
January 2017, the SPC newly established the IP tribunal in Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuhan 
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and Chengdu.495 The ‘three-in-one’ model does not apply to courts inside Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou.  
 
4. The Intellectual Property Court in Beijing, Shanghai And Guangzhou 
 
On 31 August 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of 
China published A Decision to Establish Intellectual Property Court in Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou (the Decision).496 According to articles 3 and 4 of the Decision, 
IP courts are intermediate courts. The IP courts are under the supervision of the SPC 
and the High People’s Court of its region.497 Meanwhile, the jurisdiction of these three 
courts is stipulated in the SPC Rules for the Jurisdiction of the IP Courts of Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou released on 27 October 2014 (the Rules).498 
 
These three courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the first instance cases inside their 
municipal district concerning: (1) civil and administrative cases on patents, new plant 
varieties, layout designs, technical secrets, and computer software; (2) administrative 
cases on administrative acts carried out by State Council departments or local people’s 
governments above the county level, that involve copyright, trademark, or unfair 
competition; and (3) civil cases involving well-known trademarks.499 In contrast to 
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\$Uʗ_Nɳ=ƏBM5% 2017 (Supreme People's Court’s Consent of Establishing the IP 
Tribunal in Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu’s Intermediate People's Court and Cross-Regional 
Jurisdiction of Some Intellectual Property Cases 2017). 
496 jÏAƱFɗäOĞñÄOo8Ñ?ǌĤĔɰȒǽɳ=Əƿˆǲ|þ	2014 
(Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Decision on the Establishment of Intellectual 
Property Court in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou (31 August 2014)) 
<http://npc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0901/c14576-25581035.html> accessed 6 June 2015. 
497 Art. 5 of the Decision.  
498 ƃˣAƱƿˆo8?ǌĤĔǽɳ=ƏƿˆƠIȝʗǲɟþ	ƿʱ201412
·(No 12 SPC Rules on the Jurisdiction of the IP Courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (27 
October 2014)) <http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2014/10/id/147980.shtml> accessed 6 June 2015. 
499 Art. 1 of the Rules. 
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Beijing and Shanghai, the IP court in Guangzhou has its regional jurisdiction on the 
first and third type of cases within the whole Guangdong province.500 
 
The rules have excluded copyright and trademark civil cases from the first instance of 
the IP courts. The newly established IP courts will only function as second instance 
appeal courts for cases as such, unless otherwise stipulated. There are many questions 
remaining in practice, which require the SPC’s guidelines or interpretations. An 
example of such cases concerns the unification of jurisdiction over complicated cases 
that contain patent, trademark, and copyright at the same time, and the standards and 
procedure for transferring copyright and trademark cases from the basic people’s courts 
to the IP courts in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.501 
 
The earlier authorized basic people’s courts no longer held jurisdiction over the 
aforementioned three types of cases inside Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou after the 
Rules came into force. The intermediate courts of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou 
have no jurisdiction on the mentioned three types of cases, but the administrative cases 
carried out in the municipal district of Guangzhou will still be heard at its original 
intermediate courts inside Guangdong. Cases that partly have the mentioned three types 
of cases will also be heard inside the IP courts.  
 
The newly established IP courts differ from the already existing three-in-one model; 
they are ‘two-in-one’: the newly established IP courts hear only civil and administrative 
cases. Moreover, at the provincial level, the administrative cases on administrative acts, 
which are carried out by State Council departments or local people’s governments 
above the county level—that involve copyright, trademark, or unfair competition—are 
                                                
500 Art. 2 of the Rules. SeeÂƴ!, ǽɳ=ƏƿˆǲʿƿˆĐŃĐȝʗȸȿ, AƱƿˆ
Ś (Wu H, The Characters and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Intellectual Property Court) 2014 People
s Court News, http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/images/2014-09/03/05/2014090305_pdf.pdf 
501 {Ž˒ƫľ÷ŏÏǽɳ=ƏƿˆžʤƿˆoȞǾȋ	2014 ġǽɳ=ƏÒɮÖ (X 
Fen and Z Wu, ‘Research on the Relationships between Intellectual Property Court and General Court 
in China’ [2014] Shangdi Forum of Intellectual Property). 
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left out. The second instance of the aforementioned three types of IP cases are heard 
inside the higher people’s court in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.  
 
In this context, China will not establish a separate high people’s court for IP cases. 
Firstly, if the high court does not hear the first instance of IP cases, or only hear the 
listed type of cases for IP courts, the number of cases for the special IP courts is not big 
enough for a separate high court.502 Secondly, the establishment of a specific high 
people’s court for IP, would face other legal problems, such as how to fit it in the current 
court system, which level of government it is responsible to, how to manage its team 
of judges and so on. Thirdly, the current IP courts are still in the phase of collecting 
experience, China might establish a high people’s court at a later stage.  
 
5. The Impacts of IP Courts on the ‘Dual-Enforcement System’  
 
It is difficult to say if there will be any substantive change to the dual enforcement 
system with an administrative enforcement on one hand and judicial on the other. The 
establishment of IP courts changes and unifies the jurisdiction of civil and 
administrative cases to the IP court inside Beijing and Shanghai, but how this will be 
implemented inside the whole country is unclear at this stage. The establishment of IP 
courts also may harmonize the implementation of substantive law.503  
 
                                                
502 {Ž˒ƫľ÷ŏÏǽɳ=ƏƿˆžʤƿˆoȞǾȋ	2014 ġǽɳ=ƏÒɮÖ (X 
Fen and Z Wu, ‘Research on the Relationships between Intellectual Property Court and General Court 
in China’ [2014] Shangdi Forum of Intellectual Property). 
503 Supported by the SPC, Beijing IP Court plays an important role during the current round of judicial 
reform. Leading by President Su Chi, the Beijing IP Court lunched ‘Precedent Judgement Guidance 
System’ and has an institution specifically conducting researches on standardization of IP court in China. 
The institution is established in 2015. It is focusing on establishing the online database, academic 
researches and collecting practical experiences during 2016-2017. Following the IP court’s action plan, 
the system will be nationally launched by SPC in 2018-2019. 
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The Patent Re-examination Board of SIPO is responsible for examining requests for re-
examination and requests for invalidation and making decisions accordingly.504 Since 
the patent amendment in 2000,505 the Chinese patent system, both legislation and 
enforcement, is fully in line with the requirements of TRIPS. The responsible people’s 
courts have full jurisdiction over administrative decisions on application, invalidation, 
revocation, or objection of all types of patents.506 Following the establishment of the 
special IP courts, there has been a significant change regarding the jurisdiction of 
administrative cases. 
 
According to article 1(2) of the Rules, the jurisdiction of the first instance of 
administrative cases on administrative acts that are carried out by State Council 
departments or local people’s governments above the county level which involve 
copyright, trademark, and/or unfair competition, have all been transferred to IP courts 
instead of the original intermediate courts. However, such unification at this stage is 
only limited to Beijing, Shanghai, and the municipal area of Guangzhou. 
Administrative cases for the aforementioned matters, which are carried outside of 
Guangzhou, will be still heard at the original intermediate courts. 
 
The Rules also stipulate the exclusive jurisdiction of the first instance for IP court in 
Beijing in its article 5 as follows:  
‘(1) refusals of the administrative adjudications or decisions, which are made by 
the State Council departments, on the authorizations or acknowledgements of 
patents, trademarks, new plant varieties, or integrated circuit designs; (2) refusals 
of the administrative decisions on the compulsory licenses, or arbitration decisions 
on compulsory license fees, which are made by the State Council departments, on 
the authorizations or acknowledgements of patents, trademarks, new plant varieties, 
                                                
504 Guidelines for Patent Examination 
505 For the detailed evolution of the Chinese Patent Law, please see Chapter 2.  
506  H Guo, ‘Patents’ in R Kariyawasam (ed), Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology Laws 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011). 
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or integrated circuit designs; and (3) refusals of other administrative acts related to 
IP authorizations or acknowledgements.’  
 
The annual report of the SPC reported 2886 first-instance administrative IP cases in 
2013, among which 1312 (45.23%) were foreign-related cases.507 The unification of 
jurisdiction of administrative cases may significantly raise the public IP awareness. It 
is possible that the establishment of IP courts will have an impact on the preference of 
parties on choosing remedies between the judicial and administrative paths. Meanwhile, 
it follows the IP Strategy 2008, where judicial enforcement shall be the dominant trend.  
 
In June 2016, Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei province officially started the ‘joint meeting 
mechanism’ of the courts. The courts of these three regions will study the necessity and 
feasibility of jurisdictions on the major civil and commercial cases, for which a court 
can have jurisdiction that crosses the administrative divisions. This mechanism mainly 
focuses on exploring and establishing a system, for which IP cases will be all heard in 
Beijing, foreign maritime and commercial cases will be heard in the courts of Tianjin, 
and cross district resources-related cases will be heard in Hebei. This mechanism aims 
to promote judicial unity, and break the barriers of economic and social development 
in these regions. 
 
Under this new mechanism, for IP cases, Beijing courts will have jurisdiction on patent, 
trademark and copyright and other intellectual property civil cases. IP disputes 
involving new energy, new materials, environmental protection, and other new and high 
technology industries will also be heard in Beijing. Anti-trust and unfair-competition 
cases inside the region of cooperation and development will also be heard in Beijing. 
                                                
507 ƃˣAƱƿˆ2013ġ%Ïƿˆǽɳ=Ə¸ƿ\řǝ}	AƱƿˆŚ	2014ġ 4Ƅ
25 ŵ  (2013 China IPR Judicial Protection in Court, People’s Court News (25 April 2014)) 
<www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/04/id/1283299.shtml> accessed 25 April 2014. 
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At the same time, this mechanism will also explore how to properly handle the 
relationship between the judicial protection and administrative protection.508 
 
The reform of the judicial enforcement of IP remains on-going, however according to 
the IP strategy, in the near future there will be more changes in the IP enforcement 
system.  
 
6. Chinese IP Judges 
 
In 2014, China reported 7000 judges in the higher people’s courts and 36,000 in the 
intermediate courts.509 In total, up until 2014, China had 2700 judges for intellectual 
property cases.510  
 
In accordance with article 6 of the Decision, the presiding judges in the newly 
established IP courts will be nominated by the respective Directors’ Meetings of the 
Municipal People’s Congress Standing Committee of Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou; and separately approved by their respective Standing Committee of the 
Municipal People’s Congress. The rest of the judges will be nominated by the presiding 
judge and approved by the respective Standing Committee of the Municipal People’s 
Congress of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. 
 
                                                
508 ‘?ǅtĉţȟʐǽɳ=ƏƠIˍ%ȝʗ’ %Ïǽɳ=ƏŚ2015ġ 6Ƅ 12ŵ (‘Beijing, 
Tianjin and Hebei will explore centralize the jurisdiction of intellectual property cases’, China 
Intellectual Property (12 June 2015)) < http://ip.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0612/c136655-28427113.html > 
accessed 14 June 2016. 
509 ƃˣAƱƿˆAƱƿˆțD	 (The Supreme People’s Court of China ‘Introduction of the 
People’s Courts’) <www.court.gov.cn/jgsz/rmfyjj/> accessed 2 May 2014. 
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Property Court’s Mandate and Mission’ [2014] People’s Court News) 
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The Decision does not mention the specific criteria for electing IP judges. During the 
deliberation of this Decision, members from the deliberating group recommended to 
promulgate standards on electing IP judges. 
 
First, the IP judges are facing the same problems as other judges in the judicial system. 
For example, the remuneration for Chinese judges is paid by their local governments. 
Although it has been commonly understood for many years that the remuneration of 
judges shall not be paid only from the local government, this problem persists.511 In 
short, the SPC has pointed out the following 6 common problems in the judicial system: 
(1) fairness and efficiency of the judgement; (2) difficulties in case filing, litigation, 
and enforcement; (3) the need for improvement in the system and mechanisms to 
guarantee access to an independent and fair judiciary; (4) administrative burden of 
courts affecting quality and efficiency; (5) partiality and corruption in the court officials; 
and, (6) heavy workload with increasing caseloads for some courts and poor working 
conditions for court personnel for the less developed regions.512  
 
Stated in the strategy outline in 2008, these will also be parts of the further reformations 
within the judicial system.  
 
It was claimed that the Chinese courts faced a lack of judges, and many judges were 
short of the relevant background knowledge and experience at the beginning of the 
establishment of IP system. Since the 1980s until now, China and its judicators unified 
the implementation of IP law at a certain level. During the last 30 years of development, 
many professional judges were educated and practically experienced. At the same time, 
                                                
511 L Wang, ‘Intellectual Property Protection in China’ [2004] 36 The International Information & 
Library Review 253. 
512 Q Zhou, ‘Report on the Work of the Supreme People’s Court (2013-2014). Delivered at the Second 
Session of the Twelfth National People’s Congress on 10 March 2014’ <www.china.org.cn/china/2014-
05/08/content_32331522.htm> accessed 6 June 2015. 
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apart from the shortage of judges, the loss of judges also became a problem within the 
Chinese judiciary. 
 
However, there is an opposite voice nowadays. The current reform claims that the 
professionalism as well as the unification of implementation is limited, and therefore 
the judicial system should aim at improving the judiciary. The judicial system is 
introducing ‘Ä˛ (yuán é zhì)’ (elected judiciary/quota system for judges). It is a 
system that, refers to the existing judiciary, according to the workload, the size of the 
city and its population, economic development, and other factors to determine the 
number of judges inside the courts and using only the actual qualified judges. The 
system is a new form of judicial mechanism consisting of judges and judge assistants.513  
 
In contrast to European countries, China is not introducing a pool of IP judges. The 
SPC published its Guidelines on Enrolling Judges for Intellectual Property Courts (the 
Guidelines) on 28 October 2014 and confirmed the application of the new mechanism. 
The judges are elected according to article 3. Based on the Guidelines in 2014, the 
newly established Beijing IP court had 25 judges in total.514 The number of IP judges 
has expanded to 43 up until June 2017.515 The Guangzhou and Shanghai courts were 
separately established on 16 and 28 December 2014. The Guangzhou court has 13 and 
the Shanghai court has 10 IP judges.516 
                                                
513 ʭƳżĬȒƿýÄ˛Ĩ-Ɨŉ[2003] 7AƱ¸ƿ 25 (YX Zheng, ‘The Idea Establishing 
the quota system for judges’ [2003] 7 People’s Judiciary 25). 
514 ?ǽɳ=Əƿˆ?ǽɳ=Əƿˆƿý]Ņ	Ā]Ņȱ (Intellectual Property Court 
in Beijing, ‘Information of IP judges in the Intellectual Property Court in Beijing’) 
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515 ?ǽɳ=Əƿˆ?ǽɳ=Əƿˆƿý]Ņ	Ā]Ņȱ (Intellectual Property Court 
in Beijing, ‘Information of IP judges in the Intellectual Property Court in Beijing’) 
<www.bjcourt.gov.cn/fgxx/detail.htm?court=30&channel=100606002> accessed 20 June 2017. The 
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judges in Beijing IP Court 2016. 
516 %¡AƱnÇÏǽɳ=Əč:ĤĔǽɳ=ƏƿˆŝǜŎȒ	2014 ġ 12 Ƅ 17 ŵ (State 
Intellectual Property Office of the P.R.C, ‘The Guangzhou Intellectual Property Court Is Established’ 
(17 December 2014)) <www.sipo.gov.cn/mtjj/2014/201412/t20141217_1047660.html > accessed 24 
March 2015; %¡AƱnÇÏǽɳ=Əč:ǌǽɳ=ƏƿˆŝǜŎȒ	2014 ġ 12 Ƅ 31 ŵ 
(State Intellectual Property Office Of the P.R.C, ‘The Shanghai Intellectual Property Court Is Established’ 
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Meanwhile, IP judges are facing other specific challenges as well.  
 
Firstly, the establishment of IP courts is a forerunner of the judicial reform. The 
establishment of IP courts is not only a major reform of China’s IPR judicial protection 
system, in fact, it has become the experiment lab and pilot of Chinese judicial reform 
and bears the responsibility of the reform initiatives. 517  Meanwhile, the elected 
judiciary system is still different from the appointed judiciary system. However, too 
many extra political responsibilities and administrative expectations may actually harm 
judicial independence or it may weaken under the stress of too many irrelevant tasks.518 
Whether the model implemented in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou can actually be 
introduced to the whole country is still questionable: for example, how to decide the 
number of judges in a court inside a certain region, under what standards to elect the 
judges from the existing groups, and how to balance the number of cases and judges?519 
 
Secondly, article 4 of the Guidelines stipulates that a person within the judicial 
personnel, who meets the qualifications of the Judges Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, can be a qualified IP judge if he or she meet the following criteria: he or she (1) 
has a level-four senior judge’s qualification; (2) has more than six years of relevant 
experience working in trials; (3) holds a bachelor or above degree of law from the 
ordinary universities; and (4) has strong capacities on presiding over the trials and 
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writing skills for legal documents. The current system does not require the IP judges to 
have a technical background.  
 
The lack of technical background has already caused problems in practice, especially 
for patent cases, where judges lacked effective mechanisms to understand substantive 
technologies. For instance, 70% of second-instance patent cases in Beijing High 
People’s Court were remanded or for retrial due to technological factors.520 Article 5 
allows each region to decide the criteria for other legal professionals as IP judges. Other 
judges highlighted that if, during the further reformation, there is no top-level binding 
guidance on the ratio of judges but each region can decide the number of judges, the 
imbalance of different regions may lead to a harder unification, or even to a bigger mess.  
 
7. Statistic Studies of Beijing IP Court (2015-2016) 
 
The author has selected Beijing IP Court as a specific case study on China’s IP judicial 
mechanisms. Although the Beijing IP Court has only been established for a relatively 
short time, as one of the very first established special IP courts it holds an importance 
and representative meaning for studies on Chinese IP judicial reforms. The practices of 
Beijing IP court follow the detailed implementation of judicial reform. The Beijing IP 
Court functions as a pioneer, vanguard, and an experimental field for Chinese IP 
judicial reforms.521  
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As stated by the presiding judge of the IP division of the SPC, Xiaoming Song, Chinese 
IP courts will be among the largest accepting IP cases in the world. After the 
establishment of specialized IP courts, it is predictable that the number of IP cases will 
increase. Especially in the IP court of Beijing, the number of cases, including the first 
and second instances, will reach more than 10,000. Considering the number of judges 
inside the court, the Beijing court is already facing challenges, such as: how to properly 
and sufficiently resolve the disputes.522  
 
According to the latest accessible data for 2016,523 in Beijing IP Court, first instance 
IP civil cases lasted for an average of 351 days in 2016. The process of second instance 
IP civil cases lasted 108 days. Respectively, the first instance civil process lasted 331 
days for trademark cases, 382 days for patent cases, and 406 days for copyright cases. 
The second instance civil cases lasted 116 days for trademark cases.  
 
The average process for first instance IP administrative cases lasts for 167 days. For 
trademark cases, the process of first instance administrative cases lasts for 158 days. 
However, the period lasts much longer for patent cases. The average process of an 
administrative case on a patent lasts for 356 days. On average, cases last for: 325 days 
for the subject of dissatisfaction with the review decision of the Patent Re-examination 
Board; and 373 days for the subject of dissatisfaction with the decision of the Patent 
Re-examination Board on declaration of patent invalidation/validation. 
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The growth in the number of cases is much faster than the growth of the number of 
judges, the current reformation is on-going under the challenge of ‘too many cases but 
too few judges’.524 The concern of the SPC in 2014 became increasingly visible and 
has been reflected by the Beijing IP Court. 
 
According to the latest accessible data,525 there were 10638 cases filed in Beijing IP 
Court in 2016. Among these filed cases, there were 7071 administrative cases, 3567 
civil cases, and 1104 patent-related administrative cases.  
 
The Beijing IP Court concluded 8111 cases in 2016. The total number of concluded 
cases has risen 49.3% compared to 2015.526 Among these concluded cases, there were 
4976 administrative cases and 3135 civil cases. The court concluded 444 first instance 
patent-related civil cases and 8 second instance cases.527 The details of the 444 first 
instance patent-related civil cases are as follows: there were 15 cases on contract 
disputes; 333 cases on patent infringement issues;528 92 cases on ownership-related 
disputes; and 4 cases on confirmation of non-infringement. Among the 8 second 
instance cases, 7 were contract disputes and 1 was on patent infringement. 
                                                
524 Ⱦʧŕ, ‘Ä˛½ƿýɹîSʣK’gŸŵŚ, 2014ġ 9Ƅ 4ŵ (D Hu, ‘After the elected 
judiciary, how to elect judges’ Guangming Daily (4 September 2014)) 
<www.njfy.gov.cn/www/njfy/xwzx_mb_a3914090559424.htm> accessed 6 June 2015. 
525 Detailed report and all the data cited in this part is available atN=)G97OS2, ‘	N
ɳ=ƏGbGř97@Ś!’ (IP House Judicial Data Analyses Center, ‘Report on Judicial 
Protection Data of Beijing Intellectual Property Court’) (2016) 
<www.iphouse.cn/pdfdata/zhichanfayuan5-31.pdf?from=timeline&isappinstalled=0> accessed 20 June 
2017. 
526 The amount of settled cases was 5432 in 2015. 
527 The IP judgements and judicial decisions from all levels of people’s courts in Beijing are public 
available, detailed info see 
<www.bjcourt.gov.cn/cpws/index.htm?st=1&q=&sxnflx=6&prompt=&dsrName=&ajmc=&ajlb=&jbfy
Id=&zscq=1&ay=&ah=&cwslbmc=&startCprq=2016-01-01&endCprq=2016-12-31&page=98> 
accessed 5 August 2017. 
528 Apart from patent cases that has not been disclosed into statistic studies, among the 333 patent 
infringement cases, the amount of invention patent related cases was 163, the amount of utility model 
cases was 35, the amount of design patent cases was 132. Detailed report and all the data cited in this 
part is available atN=)G97OS2, ‘	Nɳ=ƏGbGř97@Ś!’ (IP House 
Judicial Data Analyses Center, ‘Report on Judicial Protection Data of Beijing Intellectual Property Court’ 
(2016)) < www.iphouse.cn/pdfdata/zhichanfayuan5-31.pdf?from=timeline&isappinstalled=0> accessed 
20 June 2017. 
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The Beijing IP Court heard 592 patent-related administrative cases in 2016. Among 
these administrative cases, 194 were subjected to dissatisfaction with the review 
decision of the Patent Re-examination Board. Respectively, there were 150 invention-
patent-related cases, 14 utility-model-related cases, and 2 design-related cases. The 
Beijing IP Court dismissed 16 review decisions of the Patent Re-examination Board, 
and they are all invention-patent-related cases. 
 
Among the concluded patent-related administrative cases, there were 369 cases which 
were subjected the dissatisfaction with the decision of the Patent Re-examination Board 
on declaration of patent invalidation/validation. Respectively, there were 75 invention-
patent-related cases, 133 utility-model related cases, and 58 design-related cases. The 
Beijing IP Court dismissed 15 cases on invention-patent-related declaration, 15 cases 
on utility-model-related declaration, and 7 cases on design-related declaration. 
 
It is worth mentioning that, within the Beijing IP court, all the mentioned patent cases 
were heard by a team of only 11 judges in 2016. Although it is small while comparing 
the rise of number of Chinese IP judicial cases and filings, it is still a very large number 
of cases in the Beijing IP Court. Predictably, the number of cases will increase, the 
challenge of ‘too many cases but too few judges’ for IP court will remain in the near 
future. However, the limited number of judges can unify the judicial practices, 
sufficiently collect judicial experiences, and speed up the national formulation of court 
hearing standards. 
 
Statistics reflect that the level of economic cooperation and economic development 
reflect IP judicial practices. The Beijing IP court concluded 1462 foreign-related IP 
cases in 2016, these included 1404 administrative cases and 58 civil cases. The cases 
included foreign parties from 59 countries. Parties from the United States occupied 
more than a third of these foreign-related cases (492 cases) and by far the most of any 
foreign nation. Parties from Germany were the second most evident, representing 160 
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cases. The rest of the top-five countries for IP cases were Japan (121 cases), France 
(109 cases), and Britain (96 cases). 
 
A relatively low number of cases are focused on patent-related issues. Within the 
concluded administrative cases, there are 102 patent related cases. Within the 
concluded civil cases, 28 cases were patent-related.  
 
During judicial reform, the rate of mediation remains high for all types of IP suits. 
Among the concluded 28 patent-related civil cases, 24 had foreign plaintiffs. There 
were 15 withdraw cases because of mediation. There were 4 cases succeeded in the 
court. Patent invalidation is applied as a strong mechanism against a foreign counter 
party. In 2016, among these 28 patent civil cases, 4 were dismissed, all due to patent 
invalidation. 

8. Conclusion 
 
At this stage, China is very promising and carrying out considerable legal reform 
regarding IP after joining the WTO. During the adjustment process of market 
internationalization, law has become a packet of complicated public interests, private 
rights, economic reformation, as well as social welfares.529 The country obviously 
notices the need to encourage its domestic innovation and seeks long-term economic 
growth instead of having a market with copies.530  
 
                                                
529 W Liu, ‘Intellectual Property Protection Related to Technology in China’ [2005] 72 Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 339. 
530 GK Leonard and LJ Stiroh (eds), Economic Approaches to Intellectual Property: Policy, Litigation 
and Management (Thomson/West 2006) 11 and 403. 
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The legal reformation is a part of China’s strategy aimed toward creating a technology- 
and capital-intensive economy. Until 2020, the reformation is aimed toward 
‘establishing a comprehensive IP system’, ‘promoting creation and utilization of IP’, 
‘enhancing IP protection’, ‘preventing abuse of IP rights’, and ‘fostering a culture for 
IP rights’.531 Strengthening IPR adjudication is clearly marked out by the SPC. 
 
The newly established IP courts inside China offer more professional IP judges and 
provide valuable experiences for further legal reformation. Moreover, the newly 
implemented ‘elected judiciary’ will significantly enhance the efficiency, as well as the 
quality, of IP cases. The reformation clearly shows that China seeks stronger IP 
protection. On the other hand, stronger IP protection may lead to a possible rise in the 
cost of judicial implementation and enforcement, for both the administration and the 
parties. In this regard, at least on the surface, the development in China is very similar 
to the European development where the establishment of the Unified Patent Court and 
the many efforts to guarantee high quality judges in the new Court system is a main 
priority on the IP Agenda in Europe. 
 
In contrast to the EU, for China it is especially the relationship between private 
enforcement mechanisms in courts and administrative enforcement mechanisms 
involving patent authorities that is in focus. Since the establishment of the special IP 
courts, when big corporations enter into patent disputes, courts appear to be better 
equipped to deal with such conflicts than administrative bodies. 
 
Moreover, although the opinions of the SPC on promoting the ‘three in one’ trial unified 
the IP court hearing of China significantly, the earlier existing triple system already 
indicated a considerable gap inside China between well-developed and developing 
regions. This reflects that the countrywide skill in dealing with IP issues still needs 
                                                
531 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, National Intellectual Property Strategy Outline (5 
June 2008) <www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_1018942.htm> accessed 6 June 2015. 
 <AD
improvement. Will the intensive reformation increase the gap? The diversity generates 
a new challenge for China, which is: how to reduce the gap between the ambition of 
China’s IP reform and its uneven implementations in different provinces.  
 
Throughout the different regions of China, the level of technological innovation is 
particularly diverse. Statistics published by SIPO indicate that the distribution of patent 
filings has considerable gaps among different provinces. Where the highest province 
reached more than 9000 filings (Guangdong) in 2006, and the lowest 5 regions had less 
than 1000 filings (Macao, Tibet, Qinghai, Hainan, Ningxia). The distribution disparity 
is enormous, the following list shows that the total number of patent filings over 21 
years (1985-2006) for the lowest regions were not even close to the developed region’s 
filings over 1 year. Apart from Macao, which has a special economic model532, the rest 
of the regions are all non-developed. 
 
Distribution of Domestic Applications for Patent Received in SIPO (1985-2006)533 
Region 
Accumulated 
Number 
Year 
1985-
2002 
Year 
2003 
Year 
2004 
Year 
2005 
Year 
2006 
Total 2,727,857 1,344,177 251,238 278,943 383,157 470,342 
Macao 207 141 18 9 27 12 
Tibet 447 170 24 62 102 89 
Qinghai 2826 1988 173 124 216 325 
Hainan 5716 3860 445 375 498 538 
Ningxia 5371 3344 441 399 516 671 
Gansu 13702 8612 961 910 1759 1460 
                                                
532 Macao is a well-developed region, where is an international free port and it is one of the world's four 
major casinos. 
533 Source: SIPO, Distribution of Domestic Applications for Patents Received from 1985 to 2006 
<http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/200804/t20080416_380891.html> accessed 29 July 2017. 
 <B;
Inner 
Mongolia 
17282 11031 1393 1457 1455 1946 
Xinjiang 17531 10459 1473 1492 1851 2256 
Hong Kong 21260 12028 1816 2148 2645 2623 
Guizhou 17666 10038 1242 1486 2226 2674 
(Changchun) 14314 4599 2689 1937 2409 2680 
Guangxi 28798 19183 2250 2202 2379 2784 
Shanxi 24513 16012 1743 1949 1985 2824 
(Xiamen) 13684 3895 1957 2070 2796 2966 
Yunnan 25774 16035 1966 2132 2556 3085 
Jiangxi 28750 17645 2434 2685 2815 3171 
(Harbin) 28223 16375 2133 2447 3528 3740 
(Xian) 26084 14421 2341 2200 2950 4172 
(Shenyang) 51177 32832 5696 3898 4414 4337 
Jilin 44197 27594 4267 3657 4101 4578 
Anhui 32413 18599 2676 2943 3516 4679 
Shanxi 44296 27775 3421 3217 4166 5717 
Chongqing 38002 15511 4589 5171 6260 6471 
Heilongjiang 61670 39194 4972 4919 6050 6535 
(Nanjing) 24897 5895 3074 3908 5227 6793 
(Dalian) 31253 11144 3055 4377 5573 7104 
Hebei 69325 44434 5623 5647 6401 7220 
(Qingdao) 33987 14510 2886 2834 5927 7830 
(Wuhan) 38623 16710 3419 4136 6233 8125 
(Jinan) 26977 5331 2853 4067 6507 8219 
(Chengdu) 33194 8436 4169 4324 7241 9024 
Hunan 82125 49366 6054 7693 8763 10249 
Fujian 71068 36523 7236 7498 9460 10351 
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(Ningbo) 26920 4825 1892 2026 7764 10413 
(Hangzhou) 35294 6047 4024 5029 9479 10715 
Henan 72051 39953 5261 6318 8981 11538 
(Guangzhou) 73919 34159 8137 8314 11016 12293 
Sichuan 85779 47400 7443 7260 10567 13109 
Tianjin 70932 30758 6812 8406 11657 13299 
Hubei 77853 37148 6635 7960 11534 14576 
Liaoning 141,098 80134 13545 14695 15672 17052 
Taiwan 172,041 92993 18112 17841 20599 22496 
Beijing 195,597 111,065 17003 18402 22572 26555 
(Shenzhen) 98306 20359 12361 14918 20940 29728 
Shanghai 188,614 76986 22374 20471 32741 36042 
Shandong 195,137 93836 15794 18388 28835 38284 
Zhejiang 234,077 91119 21463 25294 43221 52980 
Jiangsu 214,883 84880 18393 23532 34811 53267 
Guangdong 426,856 168,363 43186 52201 72220 90886 
 
Combing the patent filing statistics and the establishment of three-in-one trial and 
special IP courts shows that the level of IP protection requires the support of advanced 
technology. For legal reform, it is not only limited to the problem of law, but may also 
need to concern other factors, such as an open market.534 Such considerations can be 
found in the current practices of the EU, USA, and China, due to this common problem 
of legal governance.  
 
                                                
534 Similar academic conclusion can be found in other academic researches, see J Ginarte and W Park, 
‘Determinants of Patent Rights: A Cross-National Study’ [1997] 26 Research Policy 283; See also, W 
Liu, ‘Intellectual Property Protection Related to Technology in China’ [2005] 72 Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 339. 
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As a country carrying out vertical legal reform from top to bottom, China has a long 
way to go and needs more time to mature its market. The cooperation of legal reform 
with political as well as economic considerations should be harmonized instead of 
sacrificing the effectiveness of law.535 China is now facing challenges not only to 
carrying out the legal reformation but also harmonizing its socio-economic 
reformations together with different regimes. 
 
Thus, the main finding of this chapter is that, different from the internally standardized 
IP legislation, China’s IP enforcement system is very national oriented and contains 
many Chinese characteristics. China needs flexible IPR policies and institutions, which 
can leave sufficient room for its transition period. Moreover, as IP is a pilot pool for 
China’s legal reform, during the construction of the IP system, China developed its own 
three-stage model, which has strong Chinese characteristics since it is neither a case-
law country nor a typical continental-law country. The first stage is to establish new 
principles based on real cases. The second stage is to collate experiences from similar 
cases and to support the formation of the court’s ‘judicial interpretation’. The last stage 
is to transfer the interpretations into legislation when it is mature.536 The three-stage 
model reflected the flexibility and practicability of the Chinese IP system, which is 
feasible and effective to follow up the fast social transformation of China. It also 
actively involves the judicial understandings of the relationship between innovations, 
                                                
535 W Liu, ‘Intellectual Property Protection Related to Technology in China’ [2005] 72 Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 339. See also GK Leonard and LJ Stiroh (eds), Economic Approaches to 
Intellectual Property: Policy, Litigation and Management (Thomson/West 2006) 11 and 403. 
536 źǨǽɳ=Əƿȗ:ǛAƱäúǛȄ 2014(C Liu, Intellectual Property Law (5th 
edn, Renmin University Press 2014)). 
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the protection of intellectual fruits and the public interest.537 The three-stage model 
will remain as the current practice of China.538 
 
The dominant position for judicial enforcement reflects that the main players in IP will 
be the individual right holders, who are mainly diverse enterprises from different 
industries. Thus, in order to have a properly functioning IP system, the Chinese 
government will simultaneously change its role from the current ‘leader’ to an ‘advisor’ 
later. This requires the Chinese government to split its roles instead of being the one 
who formulates rules of the game, being a player in its own right, as well as a coach. A 
further IP reform in China will then go beyond IP law and the IP system, as a step-by-
step procedure based on many other issues. 

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1. Introduction 
1.1 The Insert of Technical Factor: IT Industry As An Evaluating Example
 
Technology has changed our way of conducting business and directed the economic 
model to reflect the innovation economy. Modern innovations and the innovation 
economy has a strong connection with the patent system, and China is not an exception. 
IP is likened to currency in many ways during modern business activities, such as the 
intensive use of registered IP rights in business negotiations, price bargaining, 
investment means or market value assessments. The following section explains the use 
of the IT industry and IT patents in this monograph, in order to explore how domestic 
                                                
537 X Kong and W Du, ‘Efforts and Tendencies in China’s Judicial Practice of Intellectual Property’ in 
K Shao and X Feng (eds), Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited 2014). 
538 źǨ, ‘ǽɳ=ƏƿˆǲȸʇVÆ’ [2014] AƱƿˆŚC Liu, ‘Intellectual Property Court’s 
Mandate and Mission’ [2014] People’s Court News <http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2014-
09/03/content_87169.htm?div=-1> accessed 5 September 2014. 
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industry has been involved and impacted by the NIS and IP system in China’s catch-
up. This monograph is focused on IT invention patents as an evaluating example, to 
add a technical point to this monograph. The justifications are as follows:  
 
(1) The Outline on National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020 Outline) has identified 11 priority areas and 62 
priority subjects, which have already been mentioned in the National High-tech 
Research and Development Program since 1986. The priority areas are: energy, water 
and mineral resources, environment, agriculture, manufacturing, transplantation, 
information industry and modern service industry, population and health, urbanization 
and city development, public security, and national defence.539 The Chinese State 
Council has also stated 8 frontier technologies in this outline, which are: biotechnology, 
information technology (IT), advanced material technology, advanced manufacturing 
technology, advanced energy technology, marine technology, laser technology, and 
aerospace technology. 540  Within these strategic industries, for public accessible 
technologies, the IT industry has become a leading industry in China.541  
 
On top of the prioritized areas in the 2006-2020 outline, the State Council has also 
identified 7 strategic emerging industries by issuing the Decision on Accelerating the 
Fostering and Development of Strategic Emerging Industries.542 Differing from the 
prioritized areas, the emerging industries are the planned orientation of development, 
                                                
539 Chapter III: Main Areas and Priority Topics, The Outlines on National Medium- and Long-Term 
Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020) 2006, 
<www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/gjkjgh/200811/t20081129_65774.htm> accessed 29 July 2017. 
540 Chapter V: Frontier Technologies, The Outlines on National Medium- and Long-Term Program for 
Science and Technology Development (2006-2020) 2006, 
<www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/gjkjgh/200811/t20081129_65774.htm> accessed 29 July 2017. 
541 TƵ,˄¡‘%ÏőǮŃůp=ǲŘƌůǣǝşő——Û8ŭǞɧʴǲɡĨ 
2012 ȇúúǾȋ 30 (J Yu and K Chen, ‘Current Situation and Challenge of Technological Innovations 
in Chinese Strategic Emerging Industries: A Patentbibilometric Perspective)’ [2012] 30 Studies in 
Science of Science 682). 
542  Ïˆo8ĿÚȽÇ®ďőǮŃůp=ǲ|þ (Decision of the State Council on 
Accelerating the Fostering and Development of Strategic Emerging Industries) 2010. 
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and it is relatively more forward-looking, longer term, and higher sustainability. The 
emerging industries are: energy conservation and environmental protection, new 
generation IT, bio-industry, high-end equipment manufacturing, new/advanced energy, 
new material, and the new energy automobile industry. According to this decision, the 
Chinese government is very committed to further develop its national IT industry. For 
example, an accessible data report543 shows that the annual research and development 
disbursement of the gross domestic expenditure of China on telecommunication 
equipment in 2004 was about 54 times the spending of 1995. For the same time period, 
the investment for the pharmaceutical industry only rose 5 fold, and 10 fold for the 
manufacturing industry. 
 
(2) Among the listed technologies in the 2006-2020 Outline, for the purpose of solving 
the research question, data and cases in the IT industry are relatively easier to access. 
There is also a considerable amount of prior research on the IT industry.  
 
In fact, while China properly established the IP system complying with the relevant 
international standard in 2004, Chinese companies from the IT industry were the only 
ones actively dealing with IP-related legal affairs.544 Those enterprises are among the 
leading business practitioners who are international IP players. It is an undeniable fact 
that the IT industry is the forerunner for the IP-based economy in China. 
 
In 2005, the leading companies in the IT industry, namely Huawei Technologies and 
ZTE Corporation, had 3508 and 909 filings for invention patents. The leading 
pharmaceutical enterprise545 had less than 20 patent applications. The largest company 
                                                
543 H He and P Zhang, ‘Impact of the Intellectual Property System on Economic Growth Country Report 
China’ (WIPO-JPO-UNU Joint Research Project 2007) <www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-
ip/en/studies/pdf/wipo_unu_07_china.pdf> accessed 29 July 2017. 
544 Z Zhang, ‘Roadmaps of China’s National Intellectual Property Strategy Outline’ in K Shao and X 
Feng (eds), Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014). 
545 The enterprise is North China Pharmaceutical Group Corporation, which is one of the best profit-
makers in China. It is necessary to clarify that although the pharmaceutical industry has a small number 
of filings, the number of patent filings is not comparable between the pharmaceutical and IT industry. 
 <BA
of China in developing, manufacturing, and exporting construction machinery546 had 
6 applications. Although the automotive industry in 2005 had 4.5 times the research 
and development disbursement compare to 1998. China’s largest and most extensive 
automotive research and development facility547 had 17 patent filings that year.548  
 
(3) Comparing to other industries, the Chinese IT industry has a relatively long period 
of development. Moreover, it is also an international industry in China with relatively 
sufficient human resources and experience in managing research and development 
activities.549 The Chinese IT industry is committed to developing innovations, and 
holds a strong awareness of IP in daily business. The IT industry has an advanced 
involvement in commercializing innovations; the increase in invention patent 
applications is obvious and stable.550 Moreover, regarding the ‘emerging industries’ in 
China, the IT industry is comparable with similar advanced businesses from developed 
countries relative to IP.  
 
Accessible data from the period of 1985 to 2011 shows that 551  patents in the 
biotechnology industry increased in number since 2007, reaching a peak in 2009. There 
is no Chinese practitioner among the international players in the biotechnology industry, 
which requires further efforts in research and development. The Chinese environment 
                                                
Because the role of patents for these two industries are different due to their different business models: 
for pharmaceutical industry, few essential patents for one pharmaceutical company can mean a lot in the 
market. Moreover, China also offers other administrative protections for pharmaceuticals, such as the 
administrative registration and protection for traditional medicine, for details, see Regulations on 
Protection of Traditional Chinese Medicines (1992). 
546 Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group 
547 China First Automobile Works Group Corporation 
548 H He and P Zhang, ‘Impact of the Intellectual Property System on Economic Growth Country Report 
China’ (WIPO-JPO-UNU Joint Research Project 2007) <www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-
ip/en/studies/pdf/wipo_unu_07_china.pdf> accessed 29 July 2017. 
549 S Jui, Innovation in China: The Chinese Software Industry (Routledge 2010). 
550 X Lan and L Zhang, ‘Relationship between IPR and Technology Catch-up Some Evidence from 
China’ in H Odagiri, A Goto, A Sunami and RR Nelson (eds), Intellectual Property Rights, Development, 
and Catch-up An International Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2012). 
551 ɉơ, TƵ, Ĳʍ, ‘äőǮŃůp=ŘƌůŁǲÏ˃Ưʖ[2014] %ÏȇŘɮÖ 
(Y Liu and others, ‘International Comparison on Patents of Seven Strategic Emerging Industries’ [2014] 
Chinese Science Forum 68). 
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industry published more than 20,000 patents, and China became the No.1 patent filing 
country in this industry since 2007. But internationally speaking, the environment 
industry has no leading company from China at the moment. The right holders of the 
patents are either small-to-medium sized enterprises or individuals. The Chinese 
environment industry also lacks self-driven core technology and the players in this 
industry generally lack the major key and common technologies. The same problem 
exists in the advanced equipment manufacturing industry. Moreover, the advanced 
equipment manufacturing industry needs to avoid technological garden and to catch-up 
with the international leading technologies in this field. The advanced energy 
automotive industry is still a developing industry itself inside China. Its peak of 1600 
patent filings was in 2009. The industry of advanced energy developed slowly before 
2007. Although a considerable boost of patents have been filed since 2008, it has no 
representative company with organized IP groups in this industry. IP right holders in 
the industry of advanced energy are typically small-to-medium sized enterprises. The 
development of the advanced material industry has started slowly since 2000, and has 
been stably rising since 2007. However, under the context of global economy, the 
advanced material industry still needs to seek a technological predominance. Thus, the 
advanced material industry is not entering the phase of general commercialization of 
inventions. Different from the above-mentioned industries, although the new 
generation IT industry still needs to catch up to the leading countries in this field: China 
held less than 1% of the international patents in this industry in 1985, the proportion 
reached 30% in 2011. This statistic has shown that there is significant improvement and 
obvious catch-up in the IT industry in general,552 thus China is catching up with patent 
filings internationally in this filed as well. China’s PCT filings reached 21,516 in 2013, 
which was the third largest number of filed applications for any country. Among the 
                                                
552 ưʵǦ, Ȋŭò, ‘őǮŃůp=ǽɳ=ƏŨșţ 2011 ǽɳ=Əƿ 63 (J Mao and W Chen, 
‘Discussion on the Intellectual Property Policies on the Strategic Emerging Industries’ [2011] Intellectual 
Property Law 63). 
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applications, companies from the IT industry, namely ZTE and Huawei, were the 
applicants who held the largest proportion of applications.553  
 
(4) Although there is a national IP strategy, as well as regional IP strategies, these are 
not automatically categorized as industrial IP strategies. For each industry, the 
implementation of the national and regional IP strategies, and formulation of industry 
specific strategy, takes time and is very challenging.554 Moreover, not every industry 
needs intensive filings of IP. Data shows that the Chinese IT industry has already 
achieved remarkable results under the guidance of the IP strategy. Although industries 
are diverse from one another, making the IT industry an example and a forerunner of 
the implementation of the Chinese IP system holds significant academic value.   
 
The IT industry’s example in this monograph offers a platform to review the IP system 
and its construction inside China, and adds a significant technical factor for further 
analyses. Inserting the IT industry as the technical factor properly bridges the catch-up 
of the IP system and its implementation with industrial practices.  
 
As showed by the discussions in previous chapters, the internal and international 
environments for the development of the Chinese IP system are considerably different 
from many developed countries. The self-sufficiency and self-reliance mode of 
development failed to work out in both the imperial period and early years of the 
People’s Republic of China.555 The modernization of China required, and continues to 
require, foreign technologies. However, the technologies and industries that are 
operating the IP system in China are not under the same conditions as those in the 
developed countries. The world is also transforming from being a post-industrial to an 
                                                
553  ‘US and China Drive International Patent Filing Growth in Recode-Setting Year’ (2014) 
<www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2014/article_0002.html> accessed 13 August 2015. 
554 X Feng, ‘Challenges to China’s Self-Driven Innovation’ in K Shao and X Feng (eds), Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014). 
555 X Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Beijing Renmin Press 1993). 
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information society.556 Within China, the type and capacities of Chinese players are 
diverse, with considerably different responses to the same patent system. 
Internationally speaking, at the beginning of the 21st Century, there were various 
question marks whether China is fully capable to jump into the patent-walled gardens 
of innovation created by the developed countries.557 With years of development, many 
disclosed statistics show that the improvement and achievement from the Chinese side 
is obvious.  
 
The Chinese IT industry has risen to become the leading player in the Chinese market 
among the strategic industries. Until 2012, among every 100 patents, 5 patents related 
to electronic communication technology, reaching a ratio of 36.6% of IT patents.558 
Meanwhile, the IT industry has contemporaneously developed, managed to catch-up, 
and is now even leading internationally (Huawei). Thus, this chapter focuses on IT 
industry and its relevant patent issues as an example, seeking to evaluate how the 
industrial players absorbed the catch-up of the NIS and IP system. 
 
1.2 Brief Introduction of the Chinese IT and Software Industry 
The first numerical computer was invented in 1946 in the US.559 Since then, the global 
computer industry has instigated the software industry, which is nowadays the most 
lucrative industry in the world. China got its first numerical computer in 1958.560 The 
Chinese development of software began in the same period.561 Globally speaking, the 
                                                
556 A Murray, Information Technology Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2016). 
557 Details see, such as, K Shao and X Feng (eds), Innovation and Intellectual Property in China 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014); see also P Drahos, The Global Governance of Knowledge: 
Patent Offices and Their Clients (Cambridge University Press 2010). 
558 TƵ,˄¡‘%ÏőǮŃůp=ǲŘƌůǣǝşő——Û8ŭǞɧʴǲɡĨ 
2012 ȇúúǾȋ 30 (J Yu and K Chen, ‘Current Situation and Challenge of Technological Innovations 
in Chinese Strategic Emerging Industries’ [2012] Studies in Science of Science). 
559 Known as Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator, see S Jui, Innovation in China: The 
Chinese Software Industry (Routledge 2010). 
560 Known as Model 301 
561 S Jui, Innovation in China: The Chinese Software Industry (Routledge 2010). 
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software industry is regarded as the most important for developing the IT industry. 
China is not an exception. The Chinese commercialized software industry has 
developed with sophisticated strategies. 562  National-level policy for the software 
industry in China started in 2000 after the State Council issued Policies for the 
Promotion of Software and Integrated Circuit Industry563. The State Council issued the 
Action Plan for the Rejuvenation of the Software Industry564 in 2002, and the Notice of 
the State Council on Issuing Several Policies on Further Encouraging the Development 
of the Software and Integrated Circuit Industries in 2011.565 These policies reflect 
Chinese macro policy supports, instructions, and an action plan to develop its software 
industry.  
 
As illustrated in the last part of Chapter 1, together with the discussions in Chapter 2, 
the Chinese software industry before the Reform and Opening-up Policy was developed 
under the socio-economic environment. During this time, the focus was on analysis 
programming, compiler and operation systems, and applications for China’s defence 
and S&T sectors. Software was not an independent industry in China until the 
establishment of the China Software Industry Association in September 1984. 566  
China’s commerce-oriented software industry only properly took off in late 1984, 
which was a very late start compared to many developed countries. 
 
For many developed countries, the patent system has developed for centuries before the 
IT industry appeared. The differences are obvious, for example, Microsoft was founded 
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in 1975, which was one decade earlier than the establishment of the modern Chinese 
patent system, because the modern Chinese patent system only began in 1985. The 
Chinese IT industry started almost at the same time, as did the Chinese industrial 
players. The main state-owned software companies were founded in 1985, such as the 
China National Software & Service Co. Ltd, China Computer And Software Company, 
and the China Computer System Integration Company. Lenovo was founded in 1984, 
ZTE (Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation) was founded in 1985, 
and Huawei was founded in 1987. Tencent was only established in late 1998 and Baidu 
only began in 2000. During the 1980s, the Chinese IT industry engaged almost 
exclusively with the Chinese domestic market. 567 Lenovo, ZTE, and Huawei slowly 
set their sights on the international market, allocating resources for the global market 
only since the late 1990s. 
 
2. An Example of Catching Up of China - Patent Development Reflects Within the 
IT and Software Industry  
Patent development for the IT and software industry differs between China and the 
developed countries. While the already-developed countries confront the problems of 
squeezing all the new technologies, such as microelectronic, biotechnology, and 
telecommunications, into the long-existing and one-size-fits-all IP system, and 
questioning whether the system is sufficient and effective568, China was amending its 
IP legislations in order to be more accepted by international society in order to attract 
more FDIs and obtain more accesses to the Western technologies. In short, two 
complete different stories collided.  
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For the already-developed countries, such as the USA, Japan, and the EU member states, 
it is a story about keeping ahead. In contrast, the Chinese case is about catching up. The 
following section uses IT, mainly software, as an example to illustrate these two 
narratives in detail.  
 
The USA started the discussions on the patentability of computer programs since the 
1960s, when the computer program was defined as ‘mental steps’, which were not 
patentable.569 Unless the computer software in question was combined together with 
an object and led to ‘physical transformation of matter’, it was otherwise non-patentable, 
for example, the famous Gottschalk v Benson570 in 1972, where computer software 
was defined as mathematical computing rules.571 Meanwhile, the US court did not 
exclude computer software from patentability. 572  The dominant industries of the 
previous decades in developed countries were raw-materials related industries. Before 
1981, it the USA did not grant patent rights to computer software.573 
 
During the same period, China lost the technical support of the Soviet Union and then 
entered a decade of the Cultural Revolution. Until 1981, the Reform and Opening-up 
policies had begun to be implemented, and the focus was on attracting FDIs. The patent 
system was not even established.574 
 
The USA’s attitude on granting patent rights to computer software appeared to deviate 
from Gottschalk v Benson since 1981. In the case Diamond v Diehr575 in 1981, 
the Supreme Court stated that if a computer software was a part of an industrial process, 
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then the industrial process and the computer software as a whole was patentable. The 
computer software did not exclude the industrial process as a whole away from 
patentability.576 Chinese academia defines the period from 1981 until the 1990s as the 
transition period for computer software patents.577 During this period, the US had 
many important cases that triggered discussion and exploration of how to grant patents 
to computer software, and the US Trademark and Patent Office released the 
Examination Guidelines for Computer-related Inventions in 1996. The deviation and 
transition during this period reflected an obvious broadening of patent protection in 
order to cover computer software.578 
 
The Japanese patent system reacted very actively toward software, its patent law 
offered legislative grounds for patent protection on software since the very beginning579 
and its patent office had opportune updates regarding of its examination guidelines.580 
During this period, in the developed countries, especially in the US and Japan, the 
patent system was actively reacting to the era of information technology. Although the 
European Patent Convention explicitly excluded computer software from patentability 
in Art. 52, in practice, both courts and patent offices kept a close watch on the US 
practices.581 
 
During the same period in China, SIPO released the Examination of Guidelines in 1993, 
which already broaden patent protection to include computer software, although 
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Chinese IT was still an infant industry at the time. This indicated the intention of the 
Chinese patent practices on computer software to connect with the international 
trend.582 Chinese IP academia defined patent protections on software as an indication 
of the growth and maturing of a new technology, and a strategic movement of the US 
software industry, which was a question that goes beyond the patent itself.583 The 
Chinese patent system, or the IP system in general, was a norm taker and a follower, as 
for other developing countries.584 
 
Without a possibility to say no to IP585, the Chinese patent system has had to confront 
and be involved in the global question of IP, before fully understanding patents and 
being able to mature in its own practices: ‘how to squeeze the new technology into the 
relatively old system’. During this period, compared to the US practices, the Chinese 
patent practices on computer software were relatively stricter.586 Moreover, evaluating 
the Chapter 9 on Examination Guideline in 1993, its implementations as well as the 
later judicial practices 587 , it significantly guided the patenting processes on the 
developments of different Chinese characters’ coding systems, which started during the 
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same historical period.588 The examination guidelines created in 1993 played a specific 
part589 regarding the coding of Chinese characters, and distinguished the patentable 
and non-patentable situations. This guideline has been developed further in later 
revisions. In general, IP strength was very low during this period in China, for example, 
Huawei established its IPR management department in 1995, but hardly held any IPR 
at the time.590  
 
Since 1998, the USA entered the IP expansion era, which has expanded patent 
protection on computer software. Moreover, patent protection has been expanded for 
the business methods related to computer software,591 through State Street Bank 
Trust Cov Signature Financial Group Inc.592 in 1998 and At&T Crop. v.  Excel 
Communications, Inc.593 The US judicial practices carried out the transition of subject 
matter from ‘useful arts’ to ‘practical utility’, almost abolished the patentability 
exclusion of business methods in real practices, and actualized granting patent rights 
on individual computer software in 1999.594 
 
The patent practices of computer software in China remained the same as it was in 1993. 
The requirements for novelty, inventive steps, and practically application remain 
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relatively high: individual computer software in many cases is not patentable.595 Since 
2000, the State Council started issuing policies on encouraging the development of 
software and integrated circuit industries.596 The Chinese government acknowledges 
the prominence of the IT industry, aimed at breeding new industries as well as 
engendering new vitalities to the traditional industries. Inside the IT industry, software 
and integrated circuits are outlined as the core industry for the IT industry and the 
foundation for the nation’s informatization.597 Following the State Council Document 
No. 18 in 2000, regional government in each province carried out the implementation 
details and relevant regional policies. These policies contained sectors of governmental 
guidance, funding, and investment on the cultivation of human resources. Since 2000, 
the Chinese government stimulated its IT industry and targeted to reach or get close to 
an internationally advanced level on both R&D capacities as well as commercialization. 
Correspondingly, the software industry can sufficiently supply most of the internal 
needs and have volumes of exportations. The integrated circuits can sufficiently fulfil 
most internal needs, and exportation, meanwhile, lessens the R&D and manufacturing 
disparity with the developed countries. In its chapter 10, the State Council Document 
No. 18 in 2000 also addressed IP policies, but the policies only covered copyright. 
 
After the release of the State Council Document No. 18(2000), the copyright 
administrative departments standardized and strengthened the software copyright 
registration system, and encouraged copyright registration on software. In practice, 
legally registered software has relatively stronger protections according to national 
law.598 Meanwhile, no unit may use unauthorized software products in their computer 
systems.599 Following the Document No. 18, the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry 
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of Information Industry, and the State administration for Industry and Commerce, SIPO, 
the State Copyright Bureau and the State Administration of Taxation jointly and 
regularly carried out fights against smuggling and pirated software, severely cracked 
down on organized productions and sales of pirated software since late 2000. 600 
 
The development of the IT industry has been officially strategized as a precedence over 
other industrial sectors since the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China in 2002. 601Moreover, IT has been extensively applied to economic and social 
fields. IT has been converted as an important driving force for China’s economic and 
social development. The Chinese government ambitiously aimed to establish its IT 
industry as a real global player. 
 
Similar to some eastern Asian countries, such as Japan and South Korea602, the Chinese 
government plays a fundamental role for the infant IT industry and its catch-up. The 
Chinese government has produced a significant number of activist policies on industry, 
trade, and technology since 2000. Since the beginning of the 21st Century, the IT 
industry made considerable improvements in its industrial scales and structures, as well 
as its technical level. 
 
The expeditiousness of catch-up is obvious. Taking the electronic information industry 
as an example, the sales income was about 6300 billion Yuan in 2008; the value added 
was about 1500 billion Yuan which accounted for about 5% of the GDP of China and 
contributed over 0.8 of a percentage point to the GDP growth in that year; the amount 
of exports was as high as USD 521.8 billion which accounted for 36.5% of total exports 
in foreign trade for the whole nation. 603  China became the largest base for 
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manufacturing electronic information products, and has made a series of important 
technical breakthroughs in fields such as telecommunications, high performance 
computers, and digital TV. The electronic information industry is outlined as ‘a 
strategic, fundamental and pioneering pillar industry of the national economy and is of 
great significance to increasing employment, driving economic growth, adjusting the 
industrial structure, transforming the mode of development, and safeguarding national 
security.’ since the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.604 The 
industry started to react closer with the change of the international world, the Chinese 
government sensed and upgraded its relevant policies and released more effective 
measures in accordance with the changes. Following the latest trend of the international 
world, the catch-up continues and the policies upheld a significant level of constancy. 
 
The State Council issued the Notice On Issuing Several Policies on Further 
Encouraging the Development of the Software And Integrated Circuit Industries in 
2011, which further emphasized the strategic importance of the software and integrated 
circuit industries.605 Since then, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China has continued to improve its incentive measures, optimized the environment for 
industrial development, enhanced S&T innovation capabilities, and increased the 
quality and level of industrial development. These polices have involved the 
coordination and cooperation of regional governments and all relevant departments. 
The comprehensive implementations of these polices have been timely followed up and 
controlled by the National Development and Reform Commission.  
 
The current macro policies released in 2011 are the continuation and enhancement of 
Document No. 18, which was released in 2000. These polices apply to all qualified 
enterprises inside the territory of China, and to all types of the ownerships, they cover: 
(1) fiscal and taxation; (2) investment and finance; (3) R&D; (4) import and export; (5) 
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human resources; (6) IP; (7) market; and (8) implementation.606  New IP policies 
continuously provide special preferences to copyright protections, and encourage 
software enterprises to always register their copyrights.607 The protection of software 
copyrights has been increased to adapt to the network environment, and actively 
develop and apply the protection technologies for network copyrights for genuine 
software to effectively protect the IPRs of software.608 
 
Meanwhile, the State Council introduced other encouraging policies and expanded the 
policy scope onto other types of IPRs. In contrast to the IP policies outlined in 
Document No. 18 in 2000, the State Council has started supporting the software and 
integrated circuit enterprises to register IP rights abroad, and providing fiscal funds for 
the enterprises that fulfil the requirements of the relevant law. The State Council has 
intensified its policy support to develop the relevant service industry of IP.609 
 
The level of implementation of the IP system in general has risen since 2011. Crack 
down on IP infringements has been expanded to all types of infringements, instead of 
only the smuggled and pirated software. Moreover, there is an ongoing reduction in 
governmental tolerance on the usage of pirated software. The State Council is 
establishing a long-term and effecting mechanism on using genuine software, 610 
including: (1) prohibition of any kind of pre-installed non-genuine software from sales; 
(2) use of genuine software in the government organs, and the expenses for software 
purchases are part of fiscal cost; (3) improvement in the management of the software 
assets, meanwhile, general software are under the centralized procurement of the 
government; and (4) guidance for enterprises and the general public to use genuine 
software. At a macro level, these policies play a substantial role for its relevant industry.  
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Moreover, although the reserved attitude of the State Council and SIPO remains on 
patent protection of software, and the copyright protections play a dominant position, 
statistics show that the time of patent development of the representative enterprises is 
synchronous with the relevant policies during the same time period. In contrast to 
companies in many developed countries, the Chinese IT giants’ IP strategy was born 
with an international orientation.  
 
For example, after the establishment of the IP management department in 1995, the IP 
strength of Huawei enabled it to make business negotiations with foreign players since 
2000 611  Until the end of 2002, Huawei held 2154 patent applications 
accumulatively.612 Huawei filed approximately 1500 patent applications in 2003. Up 
until November 2003, Huawei had filed 3662 patent applications accumulatively, 
among which 3462 are Chinese patent applications, and 85% are invention patents; and 
200 foreign patent applications and 226 PCT applications.613 Progressively, the patent 
applications of Huawei reached nearly 6000 pieces until the end of 2004.614  The 
accumulative number of patent filings boosted to 19187 pieces in 2006 for Huawei. The 
filing number reached 29,666 in June 2008.615 Globally speaking, Huawei became the 
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no.1 applicant for PCT filings in 2008.616 Huawei took two decades to become a global 
player.617 This catch-up process continues, resembling a race against time, obtaining 
effective patent rights is becoming increasingly important. Until December 31, 2015, 
Huawei had filed 52,550 patent applications in China and 30,613 outside China, among 
which 50,377 applications were granted with patent rights.618  
 
3. IT Patent Protections in China 
 
3.1 Relevant Law and SIPO’s Practices 
 
The relevant IP legislations in China for the IT industry follow the international treaties 
as well as the laws in the developed countries. These regulations include software as 
well as e-commerce related issues, 619  such as, copyright, patent, and anti-unfair 
competition law. In China, the Regulations on the Protection of Computer Software 
(RPCS) specifically regulate copyright related issues for computer software. The first 
RPCS was adopted in 1991, and abolished in 2001. The current RPCS was adopted in 
December 2001 and came into force in 2002. Heretofore, the RPCS has been amended 
twice, respectively in 2011 and 2013, although this thesis will review this in detail. 
 
Comparing to the EU and US, China has no Database Directive at the moment. 
Databases can be protected via either copyright law or unfair competition law. 
Moreover, according to the current practices. SIPO grants patent protections to 
database-related matters as well, if a database is composed of data and a system 
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managing data, the data managing software can be granted patent rights. For example, 
SIPO granted patent rights to a ‘system and method for executing a search in a rational 
database (CN200610064263.4)’ in 2009. 
 
Contract Law plays a role and is always applied by enterprises due to the fact that 
Chinese players are, in many cases, licensees who conducted many software trade 
activities and obtained IT technologies from developed countries.620 Meanwhile, open 
source software has been broadly used in China, but its relevant regulations, legal 
practices, and research on open-source-related license agreements or the legal risks 
caused by applying open source are insufficient.621 
 
In contrast to the European Patent Convention—Art. 52(2)(c), which has explicitly 
listed out and excluded computer software from patentability, Chinese Patent Law 
(2008 amendment) has not listed out computer software as non-patentable subject 
matter and has no specific article for computer software either.622 Computer program 
related patent issues are regulated in the Patent Examination Guidelines (PEG).  
 
The Guidelines for Examination were first promulgated in 1993, then abolished after 
the promulgation of the Guidelines for Examination in 2001. Both Guidelines had a 
separate chapter for computer programs. The guideline in 2001 was then replaced on 
May 24, 2006 and the new guidelines entered into force on July 1, 2006.  
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In accordance with the provisions of Rule 122 of the Implementing Regulations of the 
Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, the PEG is an administrative order of 
department rules promulgated by SIPO. Based on the practical experiences, the newly 
amended patent law in 2008 and its implementing regulations, the Guidelines for 
Examinations was revised into PEG in 2010 and entered into force since February 1, 
2010. So far, PEG has been amended respectively by the Decision of the State 
Intellectual Property Office on Amending the Guidelines for Patent Examination 
(2013), the Decision of the State Intellectual Property Office on Amending the 
Guidelines for Patent Examination (2014), and the Decision of the State Intellectual 
Property Office on Amending the Guidelines for Patent Examination (2017). 
 
The PEG regulates detailed rules and standards for SIPO. Namely, the Patent Office of 
SIPO is authorized to make decisions on the acceptance, examination, and grant patent 
for patent applications, which are made on behalf of, and in the name of, SIPO. The 
Patent Re-examination Board, set up by SIPO, is responsible for examining requests 
for re-examination and requests for invalidation and making decisions accordingly.623 
 
PEG functions as a supplement and it details the provisions of the Patent Law and its 
relevant Implementing Regulations.624 It provides references to the Patent Office and 
Patent Re-examination Board on enforcing the relevant laws and regulations, 
meanwhile it contains regulations that the relevant parties shall abide by.  
 
Chinese patent practices have separated the concept of computer program and computer 
program invention. The Guidelines in 1993 gave no definition on computer program or 
computer-program-related invention. The Guidelines in 2001 gave only the definition 
of computer program, and had a very abstract definition of computer-program-related 
                                                
623 Guidelines for Patent Examination. 
624 Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (2001), 
revised and replaced by Rules for the Implementation of the Patent Law of the People's Republic of 
China (2002 Revision) and then Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Patent Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (2010 Revision). 
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invention as ‘The invention relates to a computer program mentioned in this chapter 
refers to address the issues raised by the invention, all or part of a computer program to 
handle process-based solutions.’ 625  The guidelines in 2006 detailed it into the 
following version, and it is still in use today.  
 
Computer programs defined by the PEG is ‘a coded instruction sequence which can be 
executed by a device capable of information processing, e. g., a computer, so that 
certain results can be obtained, or a symbolized instruction sequence, or a symbolized 
statement sequence, which can be transformed automatically into a coded instruction 
sequence. Computer programs include source programs and object programs’.626 This 
definition is as same as RPCS regulates in its Art. 3(1).  
 
Under Chinese Patent Law, computer programs without technical features are rules and 
methods for mental activities, which are not patentable.627 For example, ‘computer 
program’ merely relates to an algorithm, or mathematical computing rules, or computer 
programs recorded in mediums, or rules or methods for games, for example.628 In 
current practices, many are filing computer software under the format of a combination 
of computer software and a device.  
 
PEG also defines computer-program-related inventions as ‘solutions for solving the 
problems of the invention which are wholly or partly based on the process of computer 
programs and control or process external or internal objects of a computer by the 
computer executing the programs according to the above-mentioned process. The said 
control or process of external objects includes control of certain external operating 
process or external operating device, and process or exchange of external data, etc.; the 
said control or process of internal objects includes improvement of internal 
                                                
625 Examination Guidelines 2001, Part II, Chapter 9 ‘ƋȔŔɼǲǍ«ɧȜƍȊĦǲ®ŸŻŞ'ɢ|
®ŸŦǲˀ˚jʮŐʮGɧȜƍȊĦßǥǉȊ'ÛȀǲɢ|ŰƠ’. 
626 Guidelines for Patent Examination. 
627 Art. 25(2) Patent Law. 
628 Chapter 9 Rule. 2(1) Guidelines for Patent Examination. 
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performance of computer systems, management of internal resources of computer 
systems, and improvement of data transmission, etc. Solutions relating to computer 
programs do not necessarily include changes to computer hardware.’629 For example, 
layer composition, magic channel spacing, materials, which relate to physical 
characteristics improvement, are patentable. 
 
Patents related to computer software shall contain common general characteristics with 
invention applications in other fields, and fulfil the general requirements of an invention 
patent. In addition to the general rules, due to the special characteristics of computer 
programs and computer-program-related inventions, PEG lists specific provisions in 
Chapter 9 and promulgates the details and examples for whether a certain computer 
program is patentable. It lists the cases that fall inside Art. 25(2), such as: (1) a method 
to solve the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter using computer 
programs; (2) a method of automatically computing the coefficient of kinetic friction; 
and (3) a general transition method for global language characters.630 
 
According to the general rule in Art. 25(2) of Chinese Patent Law, rules and methods 
for mental activities are not patentable subject matters. However, if a computer program 
includes not only rules and methods for mental activities, but also technical features, 
then the computer software as such is not rules and methods for mental activities, and 
shall not be excluded from patentability in accordance with Article 25, such as: (1) a 
method for controlling a die forming process of rubber; (2) a method for enlarging 
storage capacity of mobile computing devices; (3) a method of removing image noise; 
and (4) a method of measuring liquid viscosity by using computer programs.631 
 
A computer program falls outside Art. 25(2) of the Patent Law, but does not fulfil the 
requirement of Art. 2, patent right will not be granted, which means the programme 
                                                
629 Guidelines for Patent Examination. 
630 Detailed analysis see Chapter 9, Guidelines for Patent Examination. 
631 Detailed analysis see Chapter 9, Guidelines for Patent Examination. 
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does not solve technical problems, or utilize technical means, or obtain technical effects, 
such as: (1) a method for computer game; and (2) a system for learning foreign language 
with active selection of learning contents.632 
 
A computer program is patentable and it falls under Art. 2 of Chinese Patent Law as a 
technical solution if: (1) the execution of computer programs is functioned as solutions 
for technical problems, and reflects technical means in conformity with the laws of 
nature by computers running programs to control and process external or internal 
objects; or (2) if the execution of computer programs leads to the process of external 
technical data, completes a series of technical process on the technical data in 
accordance with the laws of nature through execution of a kind of technical data process 
program by a computer; or (3) the execution of the computer program improves the 
internal performance of a computer system, completes a series of setting or 
configuration to parts of a computer system in accordance with the laws of nature 
through execution of a kind of system internal performance improvement program by 
a computer. 
 
In China, the current IP system for IT protection is using copyright protection as a main 
base, meanwhile combining patent, trade-secret, trademark, and other protections.633 
As neither of the IP mechanisms are specifically designed for the IT industry, they all 
have disadvantages respectively in theories or in enforcement phase. In contrast to 
copyright, where right holders are entitled to enjoy copyright protection from the date 
when the work is completed, administrative registration is a prerequisite for patent 
protection for software. It worth mentioning that, although registration of software for 
copyright is mainly for the purpose of the administration by relevant organs,634 when 
it comes to right enforcement, it is always recommended to have the right registered. 
 
                                                
632 Detailed analysis see Chapter 9, Guidelines for Patent Examination. 
633 ħŸ,öķ, ɧȜƍʕIǲǽɳ=Ə\ř, ǽɳ=ƏǛȄǛ (2009) (M Ying and Y Sun, 
Intellectual Property Protections on Computer Software (Intellectual Property Publishing House 2009)). 
634 Art. 7 RPCS 
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3.2 The Current Status of IT Patents’ Enforcement– Software as an Example  
  
The total amount of patent activities growing with an accelerating speed. The latest 
statistic shows that, both the administrative and judicial enforcement is exploding. 
SIPO held 24497 patent-related administrative cases in 2014, which raised 50.1% 
comparing to the previous year. The patent-dispute-related cases in total reached 8220 
with an increase of 62.6% comparing to 2013, and among them, the amount of patent 
infringement disputes was 7671. There were 521 foreign635 patent infringement cases. 
The counterfeit-issue-related cases increased 45.5%, and in total reached 16259 
cases.636 Although the total amount of cases was large, the amount of invention-patent-
related dispute cases was small (1239).637 SIPO addressed that the general capacity of 
handling invention patent infringement cases needs further improvements. From above, 
although there is no specific data available, the case amount of software patent 
infringement in administrative enforcement is tiny. 
 
For judicial enforcement, the amount of invention patent infringement cases is very 
little as well. For example, the available literature has demonstrated that the total filings 
of IPR cases from 2000 to 2003 were 23257 cases, among which 80% were trademark 
                                                
635 A civil relationship is ‘foreign’ when: 
(a) one or both parties are foreign nationals, foreign legal persons or other organizations, stateless 
persons; or 
(b) the parties or parties to the permanent residence in the territory of the People's Republic of China; 
or 
(c) the subject matter outside the territory of the People's Republic of China; or 
(d) The legal facts that produce, alter or destroy civil relations take place outside the territory of the 
People's Republic of China; 
(e) other circumstances that can be identified as foreign civil relations.  
For details, such as Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning 
Application of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Choice of Law for Foreign-Related Civil 
Relationships (I). 
636 SIPO, ‘Comparative Analysis on the Data of Patent Administrative Enforcement Cases in 2014 and 
2013 in the Intellectual Property System’ (7 January 2015) 
<www.sipo.gov.cn/zscqgz/2014/201501/t20150106_1056435.html> accessed 17 June 2015. 
637 SIPO, ‘Comparative Analysis on the Data of Patent Administrative Enforcement Cases in 2014 and 
2013 in the Intellectual Property System’ (7 January 2015) 
<www.sipo.gov.cn/zscqgz/2014/201501/t20150106_1056435.html> accessed 17 June 2015. 
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cases.638 Another more specific study has shown that there were 471 decisions made 
for patent infringement cases among all the closed IP suits between 2006 and 2011.639 
Most of the IT invention patent related cases were heard in Beijing, and there were 14 
cases between 2006 and 2011. 640  There were 9648 patent suits filed in 2014. 641 
However, the IT-issue-related national representative cases with big social impacts 
were copyright infringement or integrated circuit design patent infringement related 
cases.642 Moreover, these are cases happening among the big players, for example, 
according to the annual report of the SPC in 2015, the SPC re-trialed a case643 among 
Huawei, ZTE, and Alibaba regarding a method patent. 644  Moreover, the judicial 
enforcement ratio on innovation patent related infringement cases remains low after the 
establishment of the IP court. Taking the Beijing IP court as an example, the total 
amount of closed patent-related cases is 1813 since the establishment of the Beijing IP 
court in November 2014 till 30 June 2017. Among the 668 patent infringement cases, 
there were 142 closed with judgements (plaintiff won 116 cases), 4 closed with consent 
judgements based on mediation, and the remaining 522 cases were closed with rulings. 
According to the classification criteria of the International Patent Classification, among 
                                                
638 J Cao, ‘New Development of IP Judicial Protection’ [2004] 14 Intellectual Property 9. 
639 JB Love, C Helmers and M Eberhardt, ‘Patent Litigation in China: Protecting Rights or the Local 
Economy?’ [2016] 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 713. 
640 JB Love, C Helmers and M Eberhardt, ‘Patent Litigation in China: Protecting Rights or the Local 
Economy?’ [2016] 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 713. 
641 ƃˣAƱƿˆ, ‘%Ïƿˆǽɳ=Ə¸ƿ\řǝ}ǰǴ2 2014’ (SPC, ‘White Paper on IP 
Judicial Protection in China’ (2004)) <https://perma.cc/X4VR-GTWF> accessed 19 August 2015. 
642 “Ⱥ»ȱȫȇŘƅ˅k¸%Ïȉʤ]ˍÍǋƵƅ˅k¸ȘYĂɧȜƍʕIɒUƏȡȦ
ɴƠ”, “ʸƾgǫȇŘǌȼLƅ˅k¸ǌˌǫóˏIƅ˅k¸ȘYĂˍŎǫʑěÐ
ɰɧƅƏȡȦɴƠ” SPC, ‘%Ïƿˆǽɳ=Ə¸ƿ\řǝ}ǰǴ2 2014 (SPC, ‘White 
Paper on IP Judicial Protection in China’ (2004)) <https://perma.cc/X4VR-GTWF> accessed 19 August 
2015. 
643 ĀǋƵǸƕĔĚ%ȣAƱƿˆ2012ǋƕǽõȗ 419 ·Ʊ6|2014 ġ 4 Ƅ 17
ŵ;7ĀǋƵǸˣȣAƱƿˆ2014ǋǽȨõȗ 161·Ʊ6|2015ġ 2Ƅ 13ŵ;w
ĀƃˣAƱƿˆ2015ƱǪõȗ 2720 ·Ʊ6əþ2015 ġ 12 Ƅ 11 ŵ First instance
Zhejiang Hangzhou Intermediate Court (2012) No. 41, 17 April 2014; Second Instance: Zhejiang High 
People’s Court (2014) No. 161, 13 February 2014; Re-trial: SPC (2015) No. 2720, December 11, 2015.  
644 The Supreme People’s Court of China, ‘IP Cases Annual Report of The Supreme People’s Court of 
China 2015’ (2016) <www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2016/04/id/1845020.shtml> accessed 12 June 
2016. 
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the 142 cases with judgments, the cases are grouped to particular technologies, human 
necessities (43 cases), fixed constructions (17 cases), electricity (28 cases), performing 
operations and transporting (17 cases), chemistry and metallurgy (15 cases), physics 
(17 cases), mechanical engineering (4 cases), and paper (2 cases).645 
 
Above all, patent cases involving software and computer technology constitute just a 
small minority in both administrative and judicial enforcement. Even though filings on 
invention patents from the Chinese IT industry have exploded in the last decade, the 
enforcement ratio maintains low. One crucial reason is that the industry itself in China 
is still growing and maturing. The low judicial enforcement ratio significantly reflects 
that the software industry itself in China is still developing. Therefore, patents at this 
stage mainly function as jetton for business negotiations with international players, 
protections for own technologies, and R&D achievements. 
 
The relatively low intensive enforcement does not mean the Chinese IT industry fails 
to appreciate innovation or IP. In fact, it is the opposite. Following the main finding of 
Chapter 2 in this monograph, if we combine S&T policies and the IP system together 
with the IT industry, the IT industry’s development in China can be narrated by years 
as the following phases:646  
 
(1) From the 1950s to the late 1970s, software in China was mainly for military use and 
national defence, the ratio of commercialization and industrialization of these software 
was extremely low, matching its demand in the domestic market. The IP protection and 
enforcement was a blank. 
 
                                                
645 ɭǀ?ǽɳ=ƏƿˆĀäŬš2014.11.6-2017.6.30(Xu B, Big Data on the 
Beijing Intellectual Property Court Patent Trials(2014.11.6-2017.6.30)). 
646 Detailed statistic see Electronic Information Product Management Department Under the Ministry of 
Information Industry economic System Reform, The Economic Operation Department under the 
Ministry of Information Industry and China Software Industry Association, ‘China Software Industry 
Development Study’ (2006). 
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(2) Between the 1980s and the middle of the 1990s represents the groping period for 
the Chinese software industry. During this period, the industry slowly progressed to 
create the needed fundamental elements for a knowledge-based industry. The software 
industry of China conceded that it could not have exactly the same development model 
as the US, because the grand picture of the software industry was already formulated. 
Globally speaking, the competency of the Chinese software industry is low. 
Domestically speaking, the local software enterprises lacked the necessary capacities 
and sustainability. Meanwhile, the Chinese software industry also maintained a 
distance from some developing countries’ business model, such as the famous Indian 
labour intensive and software-outsourcing model647. This partly is due to the linguistic 
and cultural difference,648 and partly is because the Indian model is at the bottom of 
the value chain, which mainly provides coding services to large companies from 
developed countries.649  
 
During this period, Shi Zhenrong (also known as Stan Shih), the chairman of the board 
of Acer Inc.650, created the concept of the Smiling Curve which portrays the added 
value distribution of the personal computer industry, which was later also used to 
analyse the hardware industry. Shang-Ling Jui, the senior vice president of SAP,651 and 
later the managing director of the SAP Labs in China and the SAP R&D Center in 
Korea, expanded the Smiling Curve to the software industry at the beginning of the 21st 
Century.  
 
                                                
647  B Parthasarathi, The Indian Software Industry: Business Strategy and Dynamic Co-Ordination 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2004). 
648 S Jui, Innovation in China: The Chinese Software Industry (Routledge 2010). 
649 N Gregory, S Nollen and S Tenev, New Industries from New Places: The Emergence of the Software 
and Hardware Industries in China and India (The World Bank and Stanford University Press 2009). 
650 ‘Biography of Stan Shih’ 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20081115174657/http://global.acer.com/about/biographical.htm> 
accessed 8 June 2014. 
651 System, Application and Products, it is the largest global enterprise management and e-business 
solution provider. 
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652 
 
Chinese IP legislation was at its early stage during this period. Taking IT industry as an 
example, the indigenous players were developing their understanding of IP mainly 
through the global market and daily business. In contrast, international business players 
were requesting a proper establishment of IP protection in China. For both domestic 
and international IP holders, this period is the groping period for carrying out 
administrative and judicial enforcement on IP in China.  
 
(3) From the middle of the 1990s, and especially since the beginning of the 21st Century, 
the Chinese software industry has emphasized the prominence of IP.653 The Chinese 
government keenly acknowledges that more attention shall be paid to the distribution 
                                                
652 Source: S Jui, Innovation in China: The Chinese Software Industry (Routledge 2010) 22. 
653 In fact, the collapse of the DVD-player industry of China taught a hard and painful lesson to the 
Chinese in the late 1990s and early 21 century. The Chinese manufacturers produced two-third of the 
world’s DVD players. However, they employed cheap labors, had neither IP on the core parts nor key 
technology. The Chinese DVD enterprises paid tremendous royalty fees even after the global cliff down 
of the DVD players’ prices. The fade-off of the Chinese DVD player industry taught China that IP rather 
than low labor cost shall be the new competitive advantage for the new round economic development. 
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process of wealth and income, rather than the foreign trade volume.654 Learning from 
Taiwan industries’, the profits China can earn from its labour-intensive foreign trade 
model is very limited, more attention has been paid not only to tangible goods but also 
to the intangible ones, such as technology patents.  
 
Within the globally formulated and matured IP system, software piracy in China more 
greatly damages China’s own software industry as opposed to advanced international 
business entities.655 Globally speaking, the Chinese software industry at this stage is 
elevating its position on the Smiling Curve, such as developing innovative ideas, 
joining the standards making process, and global marketing strategies.  
 
Since the beginning of the 21st Century, the Chinese government polished the national 
IP legislations and put forward IP policies at the state strategic level. SIPO has matured 
the administrative enforcement on IP. The SPC has actively improved the judicial 
protection level on IP, established IP courts and IP tribunals. Although an intensive IP 
enforcement has not occurred, the Chinese domestic business players have considerably 
boosted their national and international filings on all types of IPRs. 
 
4. Conclusion  
4.1 The Gloss of Regional Protectionism 
 
Globally speaking, the opening-up of patentability of computer programs inflects the 
transformation and ‘keep-up’ of the patent system itself due to new technologies.656 
                                                
654 ‘Li Deshui: Huge Surplus Essentially Is Only a Passing by God of Wealth’ First Financial Daily (26 
January 2006) <http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20060126/07122307823.shtml> accessed 18 September 
2015.  
655 S Jui, Innovation in China: The Chinese Software Industry (Routledge 2010). 
656 LC Thurow, ‘Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights’ [1997] Harvard Business 
Review 94 
<http://business.kingston.ac.uk/sites/all/themes/kingston_business/retake/bs6701innovation1.pdf> 
accessed 29 July 2017. 
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The raising of the computer software industry and its continuous growth of importance 
to a country’s development has already gone far beyond an algorithm, or mathematical 
computing rules. The IP protection scale on computer software strongly depends on the 
role and size of the technology itself at different stages of social progress.657 
 
From the US experiences, people in the early stage (before 1981) of computer 
development focused on increasing computational speed and accuracy of computer 
hardware. Software functioned only as a completion of the hardware. When Japan and 
already developed countries entered the game, the strategic position of the software 
industry was acknowledged to be different from the US, and the relevant patent system 
of these countries reacted differently to the US as well. 
 
The case for China is different from the other developed countries. While the US 
already started adjusting the patent system for software, during the same period China 
hardly had a proper foundation for any type of economic development and just 
reopened its gate to the world.658 In contrast to the US and other developed countries, 
where the IT industry sustains their eminence, in China the IT industry has functioned 
as an approach for catching up. The business model of the Chinese IT industry is 
different from the US IT industry.659 Therefore, as long as China wants to sufficiently 
implement its IP system, the Chinese government inescapably has to consider a balance 
between its domestic conditions and the changing global environment.660  
 
It is obvious that the Chinese software industry has rapidly grown since the 21st Century. 
For example, China’s software and IT services business revenue was around 0.38 
                                                
657 P Zhang, ‘The Change of the Computer Software Patent Protection Concept On the E—Commerce 
Environment’ [2000] Intellectual Property 22. 
658 See Chapter 2 
659 S Jui, Innovation in China: The Chinese Software Industry (Routledge 2010). 
660 Âƴ!, ‘ǽɳ=ƏőǮÿŲǲÏ˃ǢÜ%ÏÓſ’ [2012] ƿú 3 (H Wu, ‘The International 
Environment and Domestic Context of the Implementation of Intellectual Property Strategy’ [2012] 
Legal Science 3). 
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trillion yuan in 2005, reaching 1.36 trillion yuan in 2010, employing more than 3 
million people and accounting for 18% of electronic-information industry output that 
year. 661  Until 2010, China had more than 2000 software enterprises with annual 
income more than 100 million yuan, among which, there were seven enterprises with 
business income more than 5 billion yuan, four enterprises with business income more 
than 10 billion yuan, and one enterprise with business income over 50 billion yuan. 
Software enterprises are mainly located in Guangdong, Beijing, Jiangsu, Shandong, 
Liaoning, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Sichuan provinces. These 9 provinces host 
87% of the software enterprises. The Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology pointed out that there was a lack of a global leader, the whole industry was 
in the low-end value chain. The industrial innovation system was imperfect and lacked 
core technologies. China needed to build leading enterprises together with small and 
medium enterprises to support the development of industry pattern, in order to complete 
the industrial chain for sufficient industrial synergistic effect.662 
 
The software and IT services business revenue reached 4.3 trillion yuan in 2015, 
accounted for 25% of electronic information industry output in 2015, employing 5.74 
million people.663 Until 2015, the number of software enterprises leapt to 38,000. The 
copyright registrations reached 292,400 pieces and was 3.8 times comparing to 2010. 
Moreover, until 2015, the total revenue of the top 100 enterprises of software business 
accounted for 14% of the total industry. The shortlisted threshold for top 100 enterprises 
increased from 0.396 billion yuan in 2010 to 1.33 billion yuan in 2015. R & D strength 
                                                
661 ĕÇ]ŅʮʕIÇ]ŅŘƌƆ7:®ďɟ (2012) (Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology, Software and Information Technology Services Industry the 12th Five-
year Development Plan(2012)). 
662 ĕÇ]ŅʮʕIÇ]ŅŘƌƆ7:®ďɟ (2012) (Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology, Software and Information Technology Services Industry the 12th Five-
year Development Plan(2012)). 
663 ĕÇ]ŅʮʕIÇ]ŅŘƌƆ®ďɟ 2016-2020ġ (2016) (Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology, Software and Information Technology Services Industry Development 
Plan for 2016-2020 (2017)). There’s a statistic difference: the business revenue of the software and IT 
services industry accounted for 18% of electronic information industry output in 2010 in the Software 
and Information Technology Services Industry the 12th Five-year Development Plan (2012). This 
proportion is 16% in the Software and Information Technology Services Industry Development Plan 
for 2016-2020 (2016). 
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(R & D expenses accounted for the proportion of the main business income) reached 
9.6% among these top 100 companies. The international influence of the industry has 
significantly improved. Among the top ten Internet companies in the world, Chinese 
enterprises account for four. Although the achievements have been obvious during 
2010-2015, for 2016-2020 the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of 
China suggested that the software industry needs to acknowledge severe problems, such 
as: (1) the weak innovative capacities on basic software and core industry related 
software; (2) commercialization of the software products is still low, and the industry 
lacks sufficient integrations with other industries; (3) international influence of the 
industry does not match its overall scale, the ability to expand the international market 
remains weak, and the pace of internationalization needs continuous acceleration; (4) 
mismatch between software market pricing and software value; and (5) intellectual 
property protection needs to be further strengthened.664 
 
Reflected by the Chinese software industry, IP system became a strong internal need 
for China’s social and economic transformation. Ten years after joining the WTO, 
China was transforming from a pure norm taker to a norm maker.665 Fifteen years after 
joining the WTO, we can no longer imagine how the world would look without 
China.666 Based on the experiences from practices, China is slowly yet continuously 
adding its own understanding of IP.667 Internationally, China is positively reacting with 
the global IP system. It has been the No.1 country for innovation patent filings for 4 
                                                
664 For a more detailed industrial analyses and development plan, seeĕÇ]ŅʮʕIÇ]Ņ
ŘƌƆ®ďɟ 2016-2020ġ (2016) (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 
Software and Information Technology Services Industry Development Plan for 2016-2020 (2016)). 
665 Âƴ!, ‘şőƍʦ%Ïi 10ġǲǽɳ=Ə6’ [2011] ǽɳ=Ə 13 (H Wu, ‘Challenges 
and Opportunities: the 10 Years IP Career After China Joined WTO’ [2011] Intellectual Property 13). 
666  Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘China’s 15th WTO Anniversary: Assessing the 
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Environment and Domestic Context of the Implementation of Intellectual Property Strategy’ [2012] 
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years and no.1 country for trademark filings for 14 years. 668  Internally, Chinese 
government and SIPO aims to enlarge its IP filings up to 1 million during its 13th Five-
Year Plan.669  
 
In the global context, the dominant economy is no longer raw materials or capital but 
core technologies. While other industries are transforming into knowledge-based 
industries, IP will always be in a central position for this era.670 It is difficult to say if 
this is due to the pre-existing IP system promoted by the growth of technology, or if 
technology raised the importance of IP.  
 
One thing is clear, globally speaking, IP has already developed into an inevitable 
institution for every latecomer for development. It is the precondition for any 
developing country to start its communication with the already developed countries; it 
is also the legal mechanism for developed countries to maintain their upfront economic 
positions.671 While the developed countries criticizing that the Chinese IP system is a 
format of regional protectionism, IP is a regionally protective mechanism for the 
developed countries; by which, the developed countries have generated and developed 
IP-related non-tariff barriers.672  
 
Taking the computer software industry as an example, infringing such a technology-
based right is much easier than before. The cost of conducting such infringement is 
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ƍʦ%Ïi 10ġǲǽɳ=Ə6’ [2011] ǽɳ=Ə 13 (H Wu, ‘Challenges 
and Opportunities: the 10 Years IP Career After China Joined WTO’ [2011] Intellectual Property 13). 
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significantly lower comparing to the previous raw material and capital focused 
economic model, and the damages to the right holders can be fatal. Pirated software is 
visible in both developed and developing countries. Some may claim that regional 
protectionism is evident in a more obvious way, such as the ratio of using pirated 
software is extremely high in developing countries. Indeed, if following the 
development model of the raw-material era, by tolerating piracy and meanwhile 
supporting its own relevant infant industry, the government of a developing country 
can theoretically formulate a new ladder-to-be or even claim that piracy is a form of 
regional protectionism. However, can it really be the case nowadays? The answer 
provided by this monograph is a NO. In fact, taking the software industry as an example, 
the Chinese software industry business model can follow neither the US nor Indian 
model.673 Damages of software piracy to the Chinese software enterprises are much 
more serious and harmful than it is to the multinational companies. In contrast to the 
raw-material business, software is a typical example of IP. Furthermore, the rise of the 
Chinese IT industry shows that on IP issues of the 21st Century, the question lies not 
only on substantive law; the role of IP enforcement becomes increasingly important. 
 
While evaluating regional protectionism under the context of both administrative and 
judicial enforcement in China, however, one might question whether it actually 
currently exists. Firstly, the small amount of invention patent-related infringement 
cases is insufficient to support the claim on China’s regional protectionism. Second, 
both domestic and foreign players experience the same problems and disadvantages 
caused by the insufficient IP enforcement during this transitional period of China. Even 
if there may have regional protectionism existing as theoretically claimed in IP 
enforcement, the Chinese IP enforcement system itself is not advanced enough at this 
stage to setup the claimed type of protection via its enforcement organs. China is still 
constructing its IP system. The insufficiency of the enforcement system benefits neither 
                                                
673 S Jui, Innovation in China: The Chinese Software Industry (Routledge 2010). 
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domestic nor international right holders. Thirdly, as shown by statistics,674 judicially 
speaking, the outcomes of Chinese patent litigations bear very little evidence of 
protectionism.  
 
4.2 Collecting Experiences on Know How to Implement Patents 
China is reaching a crossover point that it automatically seeks for a higher level of IP 
protection out of its own interests.675 Criticizing China’s ‘great-leap’ on the enormous 
amount of patent filings may be too naïve and perhaps horribly imprudent. It is a basic 
and logical question that: what are the players going to do after having thousands of 
patents? This is apparently not an image project. There is nothing complex but a 
common sense that the non-capital or property system works in such a way. Through 
the on-going judicial reform, China is putting efforts into improving the judicial 
capacities on handling IP cases and creating sufficient judicial protection for IPRs.676   
 
One noteworthy goal of Chinese patent law is to improve its ‘security system’ for 
implementation, which covers three parts: legislation, creation of a more sufficient 
administrative enforcement, and sufficient judicial enforcement. 677  Legislatively 
speaking, China has completed the phase of general legislation, and is stepping into the 
phase of ‘adjustments’ and ‘leak-fillings’. For enforcement, China will step further on 
                                                
674 See JB Love, C Helmers and M Eberhardt, ‘Patent Litigation in China: Protecting Rights or the Local 
Economy?’ [2016] 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 713. 
675 P Yu, ‘Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle’ in D Gervais (ed), 
Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: strategies to optimize economic development in a TRIPS 
Plus Era (Oxford University Press 2007). 
676 Âƴ!,ʺȅǎ%Ïǽɳ=Ə¸ƿ\řǲǥŀŨș[2013] ĴFƿú 42 (H Wu and F 
Suo, ‘Ideas and Policies on China IPR Judicial Protection’ [2013] Contemporary Legal Sciences 42.) 
677 Âƴ!, ‘ƿÿŲǲǶƜK\ˊRȞ’ [2015]ǽɳ=Ə	3 (H Wu, ‘The Objectives of 
Patent Law Implementation and Its Security System’ [2015] Intellectual Property 3.) 
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the reform of the ‘dual-track’ system, which will significantly enhance the level of 
protection of IPRs.678  
 
Via exploring how the IP system has been absorbed into the business, this chapter 
reveals that: if we separately evaluate the simultaneous constructions on the S&T 
system, IP system, and IT industry, each individual construction has its own remarkable 
achievements. However, an intent to experience collecting of know-how on 
implementing patents is visible for each. While putting the S&T, IP system, and 
industry together, the parallel construction reveals diverse understandings of ‘catching-
up’ in practice and a need for further integration when it comes to the IP issues. How 
the coagulation of the parallel construction will be carried out remains unclear. If the 
boost up of domestic and international patent filings of the Chinese industry since the 
21st Century mirrors the raising awareness of IP for the Chinese government as well as 
Chinese business players, the small amount of judicial and administrative enforcements 
perhaps reflect that: there is still a need for know-how and improvement for obtaining 
experiences in implementing patents for the Chinese government, the Chinese people’s 
courts, and the right holders.  
 
Moreover, by exploring the growth process of the Chinese software and IT services 
industry, it has shown that Chinese government is evaluating the level of industrial 
development of software and identifies the software industry with a strong focus on big 
players but not the small and medium enterprises or individual right holders. It is worth 
highlighting that constructing an IP system is not enough, the system must be 
sufficiently functional in order to favour the country’s development, and a sufficient 
nation-wide implementation of the IP system requires both the policy makers as well 
as the judicial organs to consider the balance between, (1) giant business players and 
small firms, and (2) undeveloped regions, developing regions, and well-developed 
                                                
678 ʹɐ,Ĭů,Ǡ[Ʈ, ‘ǽɳ=Ə¸ƿ\řɕŨŖƿɖŤșǮǾȋ’ [2009] ȇŘƿĹ 58(L 
Zhong, J Liu and J Wang, ‘The Strategic Cohesion on the IPR Judicial Protection and Administrative 
Enforcement’ [2009] Technology and Law 58.) 
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regions inside the country. For patent-related policies, ‘should the Chinese government 
set up S&T and IP policies to favour the Chinese giant companies, such as Huawei, or 
should it concern more the small business and R&D players’, the answer to such a 
question for policy makers goes beyond IP, but has transferred into a question on how 
the Chinese government would like to distribute its state resources. 
 
 
The current administrative system for patent registration and examination focuses 
mainly on the domestic industry yet references internal practices. There are a few 
remarks worth considering:  
 
(1) The specific technologies and the relevant industries of these policies are very clear 
and detailed. China as a developing country followed the developed countries’ 
technology trends, and its catch-up has aims at the global advanced technological 
standards. The selection of a particular technology is strongly connected with the 
global inclination, rather than the level of the country’s internal development. The 
route of the internal development has then been adjusted to catch-up to the 
international standards as fast as possible. For the precise leading technologies, 
China had no difficulty to introduce them to its society.  
 
(2) The pertinent policies are very sophisticated packages that include various 
institutions to develop the infant industries, such as capital, technology, human 
capital, tariffs, taxation, organization, market and IP policies. The introduction and 
establishment of these institutions in China follows the international 
recommendations. In contrast with the initiation of the technology, the level of 
implementing those institutions may differ from the international standards but is 
strongly linked with the level of the national conditions and developments. For 
some of the precise institutions, such as IP, the State Council placed extra efforts 
into establishing the awareness of the institutions in order for the institutions to be 
accepted and functional in Chinese society.  
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(3) The policies have very explicit timeframes, which noted the exact transition period 
for all the institutions and individual players to react in tandem. Although it is 
unclear how the State Council decides the length of the time frame, the institutional 
development is very fast and the upgrades are timely. This reflects that the level of 
state involvement in China is severe for every factor both vertically and 
horizontally.  
 
(4) These polices illustrate that China is still a norm follower. In contrast to the 
developed countries, such as Britain, the USA, or Japan, China follows the existing 
international IP community but not actively creating new IP agenda. However, in 
regard to the development of IP institutions, especially those in TRIPS, China has 
been trying to achieve as high a level as possible. After reaching the global 
standards, the investments made on improving the administrations, managements 
and system improvement in general are enormous. Predictably, the level of 
implementation on these institutions, including IP, will be continuously raised.  
 
(5) Combining these polices together with the leading companies’ steps, diverse levels 
of acknowledgement of the institutions among the Chinese players are detectable. 
Some players already run ahead of the policies, such as Huawei. Yet some still need 
to be encouraged in order to accept and implement the concept into daily business, 
such as the previously discussed leading pharmaceutical enterprise. This gap is 
massive and unique.  
 
Meanwhile, the know-how and experience collecting intention is more visible at the 
judicial level. There are currently two judicial interpretations regarding patent 
infringements. They are: Interpretation I (2009)679 and Interpretation II (2016) of the 
                                                
679 This interpretation is originally developed from the Several Provisions of the Supreme People's Court 
on Issues Concerning Applicable Laws to the Trial of Patent Controversies in 2001, and it was revised 
respectively in 2013 and 2015. 
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Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the 
Trial of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases, the interpretations apply to all cases on 
patent infringements and disputes, and there is no particular rule so far related to 
specific patent issues on computer programs. Although the amount of cases is small, 
computer-program-related IP enforcement still plays an important role in the current 
judicial reform inside China. This has been reflected in the newly established IP courts, 
where their exclusive jurisdiction on first instance covers civil and administrative cases 
of computer software,680 although copyright is the main protective mean for computer 
program. According to the empirically based ‘three-stage’ model discussed in the 
previous chapters, computer-software-related cases in China at the moment are 
facilitating the establishment of principles and collection of experiences. However, a 
strong IP protection could favour the developed regions such as Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou, but may not necessarily favour the developing or undeveloped regions. 
How the Chinese people’s courts will balance the level of IP protection with the 
developmental differences of different regions in the country remains unclear. 
 
"%#/! &$! 
 
This monograph has illustrated the IP development in China and especially focused on 
its modernization after the Reform and Opening-up Policy since 1979. The monograph 
has delineated the IP system as one of the many factors within a grand picture of 
China’s mechanism to catch-up and social transition. This monograph focuses 
particularly on the catch-up process and has reviewed IP in China during the general 
historical turbulences (Chapter 1), its increasing importance in the national strategy and 
social transition (Chapter 2), then the evolution of administrative and judicial 
enforcements on IP and their subsequent reforms (Chapter 3). This monograph has 
                                                
680 ƃˣAƱƿˆo8?ǌĤĔǽɳ=ƏƿˆƠIȝʗǲɟþ	ƿʱ201412
· (No 12 SPC Rules on the Jurisdiction of the IP Courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (27 
October 2014)) <http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2014/10/id/147980.shtml> accessed 6 June 2015. 
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inserted a technical factor by employing the IT industry and its relevant IP issues as an 
example (Chapter 4), studying how the IP system at the state level impacts Chinese 
business players. 
 
Transitional development in the country set requirements for balancing the need to stay 
up to speed with global development and the challenge to find the country’s own way 
for development in China. A ‘jacobinical’ way of assuming China has similar social 
conditions as developed countries, picturing China as a country of imitations, and 
evaluating the country’s IP and its implementation with already developed countries’ 
standards is debatable. Such assumption could be a continuous reflection of ‘general 
disdain of foreigners for a system with which they had little familiarity and for which 
they had even less respect’.681 In fact, the country’s very first national S&T policy in 
1957 already emphasized the need for China to avoid plagiarism and blind imitations.682 
Judging from the experiences of other countries, it takes decades for an institution to 
properly function after its establishment; the Chinese IP enforcement system needs 
future maturity.  
 
Drawing from the decades-long policies on IP modernization, it is not difficult to see 
that China is a country of creations and innovations. However, the social, economic, 
and technological conditions disabled China from sufficient IP enforcement even 
though the country strove for IP development for years since its opening-up. 
Nevertheless, China has positively and continuously made great efforts to be a country 
that respects IPRs. The efforts have been evolved in policies and legislation, as well as 
both in administrative and judicial enforcements. Those efforts have encompassed all 
levels of the governments. In addition, the Chinese government is in consultation with 
the industry representatives, constructing a proper IP enforcement system via 
sophisticated design of judicial reforms. 
                                                
681 WP Alford, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization 
(Standford University Press 1995). 
682 The Perspective Plan For Science And Technology Development From 1956-1967.  
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1. Limitations of the Current Research Findings  
 
As presented in Chapter 2, the importance of IP and the quality of its implementation 
are strongly associated with growth performance. This monograph focuses on the 
association between IP and S&T growth. Based on the general picture elucidated in 
Chapter 1, Chapter 2 highlights that evaluating single policy or institution can limit the 
understanding of the Chinese IP system. The interconnection between the strategic 
policies and the establishment of institutions is traceable. China hosts S&T policies that 
impact IP, including aspects such as policies, legislation, and enforcement. 
 
Comparing the IP notions during the historical period between 1949 to 1979, the 
country’s development progress exposes that IP polices can have retroaction on S&T 
policies. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, international pressures683 played a positive 
role in China’s adoption of the IP system and its modernization. Moreover, the Chinese 
experience presents insight for IP studies of developing countries, which is: a proper 
combination of good policies and institutions can allocate social resources from the 
macro level, attract FDIs, generate economic growth, and render social improvement. 
 
Under this new era, the idea of avoiding the influence of developed countries is 
contentious. According to Chapter 1 and 2, there is very little space for a latecomer, 
namely a developing country, to construct new norms of legal mechanism on 
technology management, especially after the establishment of a globally accepted IP 
norm. The Chinese fast growth during the last three decades demonstrates the benefits 
                                                
683 Detailed studies on international pressures on the Chinese IP system, see CKC Gordon, Intellectual 
Property Rights in China: Politics of Piracy, Trade and Protection (Routledge 2009); see also P 
Torremans, H Shan and J Erauw, Intellecutal Property and TRIPS Compliance in China, Chinese and 
European Perspective (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2007); and C Liu, Intellectual Property Law 
(5th edn, Renmin University Press 2014). 
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of implementing from the already developed countries. A proper degree of external 
pressure can be helpful. Healthy and mutual understandings and communications 
between the developed and developing countries are supportive for the growth of 
different countries.  
 
The current Chinese reforms discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 show that the 
reforms are based on an academic presumption that a further growth of the country 
requires substantial enhancement on the quality of the IP system, especially in the 
implementation step. However, the on-going enforcement reforms in China cannot 
sufficiently predict the timeframe needed for the successful improvement process. 
Moreover, whether the ‘good quality’ institutions can lead the presumed growth is 
unclear and requires further research. Globally speaking, the already developed 
countries are experiencing continuous growth slowdown, thus: (1) What is the 
definition and criterion of ‘good quality’ for institutions? As a matter of fact, an 
extensive level of diversity exists in both IP understanding and practices among 
developed countries. (2) Additionally, as reviewed in previous chapters, the on-going 
judicial reform of China has highlighted another global IP academic challenge: a lack 
of knowledgeable human resources to be advanced IP agents, IP lawyers, and judges. 
(3) The cost of creating a ‘good quality’ IP system can be massive. After all, apart from 
allocating resources, the IP system itself consumes a noteworthy amount of social 
resources. The previous chapters amplify and reveal these problems, but the questions 
per se are beyond the scope of this monograph. 
 
2. Final Observations 
 
Several findings may be drawn from the previous four chapters, and these will be 
described in this section.   
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2.1 A Sophisticatedly Designed Governance with Strong Administrative 
Intervention on IP Development 
 
The Chinese government has played a fundamental role for the country’s IP 
development since 1949. The People’s Republic of China has introduced two different 
types of IP systems since its establishment, and both of the systems are transplanted. 
The Soviet Union’s IP model was adopted before the Reform and Opening-up Policy, 
and a modern IP system started since the promulgation of the Patent Law in 1984.  
 
As a developing country, China had no option to say no to the creation of the modern 
IP system after the Reform and Opening-up Policy in 1979. IP is a pre-condition for 
every developing country nowadays to properly join the international business society. 
Observing the big events and academic records of China’s IP, it is clear that the 
modernization of IP in China did not naturally happen as a response to its market 
economy, but it was instigated by the internal needs for development and the external 
pressure for market access to China. Therefore, during China’s social transition at this 
stage, it is considerably late to call for the creation of IP awareness in the public. IP 
shall be accepted as an existing common sense.  
 
Although the Chinese IP system has been constructed by following the international IP 
norms created by the developed countries, it is arguable to completely isolate the 
Chinese IP law studies from its domestic implementations or its local industrial bases. 
China shall obey the international treaties. However, it is groundless to call for or 
picture Chinese IP with the same IP or implementation system as that of the US or EU.  
 
One of the main academic findings and claims of this monograph is that: it is not 
difficult to find external pressures when the Western IP norm was first introduced in 
China. Even though external pressures played an undeniable role during Chinese IP 
development, which can be reviewed to the 19th Century as illustrated in the First 
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Chapter, China since 1949 has been constantly advancing its IP system and its 
implementation mainly because of its internal and developmental needs (Chapter 2). 
 
Although China could not say no to the IP system, the current experience of China and 
the accumulative statistics in this monograph have shown that the transplanted modern 
IP system has helped China’s economic development. Besides, as illustrated in Chapter 
1, after developing the IP system for three decades, IP nowadays is playing a 
substantive role in economic transformation and is making extensive contributions to 
the country’s sustainable economic development. 
 
Internally speaking, IP has been premeditated as a part of the sophisticated, planned 
national strategy for catching up with the developed world. The attitude shifts toward 
the increase of IP protections and successive IP reforms as illustrated in Chapter 3 has 
shown a considerable level of continuous state governance together with administrative 
intervention. As explored in Chapter 2, an active state governance on IP strongly exists 
inside China, even after the policy and legislation making phase. The management of 
social resources and capacities are well designed to fulfil the purposes of the national 
catch-up process. Upgrades of the IP system are strictly designed state actions to 
achieve the developmental tasks. The role of the IP system has been designed and 
expanded more than attracting FDIs, but also serves the domestic transition of 
economic mode.  
 
As revealed in Chapter 2, the parallel creations of the NIS and IP system has exposed 
that, in contrast to current main-stream claims as discussed in Chapter 2, the frequency 
which has occurred in the timeline of the IP legislation amendments is not an 
epiphenomenon. China has adjusted the IP system hand in hand with the country’s 
indigenous innovation capabilities, such as technological development and generation 
of human resources and so on. During the same historical period, China actively joined 
all necessary international treaties, which indicates its openness and willingness to 
foreign technology transfer. This thesis has academically proved that: The S&T and IP 
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polices have shown a clear governance on innovations. The governance on innovation 
has been infiltrated in the political process inside China. The construction of the NIS 
and the IP system reflects that China as a state has intensively obtained physical 
technologies and constructed social institutions. Non-state players are involved in the 
NIS and IP systems via various administrative mechanisms. However, according to the 
current studies, the national-oriented NIS and IP development model seems to lack 
sufficient consideration for the role and function of the market. How the NIS and IP 
system functions in the market remains unclear.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Chinese IP policies are flexible, which leave sufficient room 
for fast upgrades and timely adjustments. Comparing with many already developed 
countries, the IP legislation has been frequently revised in China. The fast adjustments 
and frequently revised legislations aim to enable the country to quickly respond to both 
the internal and external changes and challenges; so that the policies and rules stay in 
time with the technological and industrial development. 
 
IP policies are relatively more focused and specific than legislations for the 
improvement of certain industries. Chinese IP policies have been implemented in 
various forms via different levels of the Chinese governments; the disposition to 
implement these IP policies is obvious. The emphasis of these policies is aimed at 
selected industries, rather than folks. Comparing to the IP policies, Chinese IP 
legislations are general rules which cannot address detailed problems of any particular 
industry. In contrast to the policies, IP legislations and their enforcements are designed 
to fit all industries, cover folks, and with a higher level of independence and much less 
inclination. Above all, this monograph highlights that China has adopted 
interventionist IP policies to encourage and guide its industries. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the evolution of judicial enforcement on IP. By studying the active 
involvement of all the levels of people’s courts in the national IP strategy and 
construction of the IP system, the thesis academically proves that: Via adjusting the 
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judicial enforcement and improve the protection level of IPRs, Chinese government is 
trying to motivate non-state players to be more involved into the IP system. Such 
adjustments on judicial organs reflect that the governance on innovations has also been 
infiltrated in the implementation process of the exercise of rights. However, the 
national wide construction of the IP system with unified standards at the state-level 
could confront severe challenges during implementation because of regional diversities. 
For example, the protection standards may be too weak to the developed regions but 
too strong to the undeveloped regions. The unified construction can confront a 
‘schizophrenic’ implementation.684  
 
Following these mentioned innovation plans, certain industries have been more 
preferential from the perspective of the state development strategies, and the IP policies 
have been actively used for the development of these industries, such as the IT industry 
as Chapter 4 has shown. The Chinese software industry is adopting neither the US nor 
Indian business model. The IP policies in other countries indeed have their referential 
significance, especially developed countries, such as the US. However, it is implausible 
to cite the EU or US standards as academic authorities to push the development of the 
Chinese IP system and its implementation out of its own Chinese contexts, especially 
if the industries’ development is considerably interacting on the IP system’s guidance 
as disclosed in Chapter 4. The Chinese government has introduced various 
administrative means to motivate and boost the registration of innovations. The strong 
administrative interventions are detectable inside the NIS as well as the IP system.  
 
2.2 The Incentive Overall Catch-Up of Chinese IP to the Global Standard Does 
Not Guarantee an Inevitable Success  
  
                                                
684 Challenges of regional diversities, see P Yu, ‘The Transplant and Transformation of Intellectual 
Property Laws in China’, Governance of Intellectual Property rights in China and Europe (Elgar 
Intellectual Property and Global Development 2016). 
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Different from many already developed countries, where IP was generated because of 
the development of a domestic market; the international norms are fundamentally 
encoded in the Chinese IP system as recorded in Chapter 2. Similar to many other 
developing countries, such as Brazil, Indian, or Russia, China as a norm taker currently 
utilizes very little effort to access the latest institutional development of national IP. 
The Chinese introduction and construction of an IP system has been performed with 
sophisticated design by the state. In addition, China is willing to follow up the advanced 
IP rules from the developed countries. This has indirectly guaranteed China a fast 
development in regard to its IP legislation. 
 
However, because the introduced rules were not originally generated from Chinese 
domestic practices, this directly generated a gap between the domestic enforcement and 
transplanted legislation. As showed in Chapter 3, squeezing domestic legal practices 
into international legal standards require modification on both sides, which raises costs 
and complexity to sufficiently run the system. The introduced international IP standards 
are results and summaries of already developed countries’ experiences, but not the 
cause of the current developmental status. Thus, a sufficient implementation of these 
international standards in any developing country will require development of many 
other factors in that country besides the matter of law, of which China is not an 
exception. China is actively observing its own solutions for the implementation 
problems, and one of the important judicial enforcement reforms is the nation-wide 
construction of a ‘three-in-one’ IP tribunal model together with a ‘two-in-one’ special 
IP court in the already well-developed regions.  
 
Moreover, because of the ‘international gene’, the national IP strategy of China is a 
strategy for international competition and correspondingly a domestic development 
strategy. Reflected by the Chinese catching-up experience, this monograph claims that 
on top of emphasizing IP’s territorial feature, China has demarcated IP with an 
international feature. The already developed country did not have a similar definition 
for IP at their creation stage of the system. The definition of IP that was developed 
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inside China has expanded out of the scope of a simple legal concept and can be 
reviewed as a political tactic. The current China example has reflected and confirmed 
the dual significance of IP in the contemporary new global IP development. China has 
been slowly constructing its IP system into a very dynamic model with continuous 
adjustments.  
 
Internally speaking, the implementation of the IP strategy has offered a systematic 
support for China’s economic transformation. The national IP strategy indicates that 
China is entering a new stage of development, namely, a knowledge-based economy. 
This is confirmed from the side of some of the latest S&T-related strategies, such as 
the issuing of the Notice of the State Council on Issuing the ‘Made in China (2025)’.685  
 
One of the academic findings of this monograph is that, the three decades of Chinese 
modern IP development and its enforcement mirrors the diverse levels of development 
within the Chinese IP system, which can be summarized as: an advanced legislation 
system that goes along with the international standards, an enforcement system with 
Chinese characteristics, and an administrative system for registration and examination 
focusing mainly on the domestic industries686 yet taking international practices as 
reference (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). 
 
The Chinese experiences confirm that, evaluating the level of IP development can 
reflect the development level of a country. Taking the Chinese software industry as an 
example, the transformation from a country of ‘importing IP’ to a country of 
‘independently creating IP’ and to a country of ‘exporting IP’, there has five interlocked 
                                                
685 Notice of the State Council on Issuing the ‘Made in China (2025)’ 2015. 
686 For example, the newly released Management Means on the Prioritized Patent Examination (SIPO 
Order No.76 [2017]) has introduced the ‘Prioritized Patent Examination Process’ to patent applications, 
which has come into force on 1 August 2017. For patent applications which fall within the scope of this 
administrative order (Art.2. Art.3 and Art. 4), SIPO agrees to give a prioritized examination within the 
following period (Art. 10): (1) for invention patent applications, SIPO shall issue the first notice of 
opinion within 45 days and close the case within one year; (2) patent applications for utility models and 
designs shall be closed within two months; (3) patent reexamination cases shall be closed within seven 
months;(4) cases of invalidation declaration on invention or utility model patents shall be closed within 
five months, the invalidation declaration on design patents shall closed within four months. 
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phases. The leading factor for economic development changes in each stage.687 The 
first stage is the exportation of low-tech products, and the driving factors are low labour 
cost, intensive labour resources, cheap raw materials, and relatively low needs on 
education. The second stage starts when the exportation contains certain technologies, 
which is a beneficial result caused by the vast experience from the first stage together 
with industrial imitations and R&D investments.688 The third stage, to a developing 
country such as China, will involve learning from the developed countries and trying 
to increase its own investments into acquiring, developing, and managing IP. The fourth 
stage is to reach the same status as developed countries in terms of IP. The last stage is 
the occupation of comparative advantages and ability to export IP.689 
 
Even though the improvement of the Chinese IP system is obvious and the system has 
already reached a similar level as the already developed countries have, such as the 
specific IP court discussed in Chapter 3, the general strength of IP still needs further 
enhancement.  
 
In short, one of this monograph’s findings is that: China’s adjustments of the IP policies 
are ultimately determined by the overall objectives for catching up and building an 
innovative country. China updates its IP system strictly in line with its level of national 
S&T development. Based on the internal and international conditions, it is a selected 
development model from China’s side to emphasize IP reform and modernization.  
 
                                                
687 S Jui, Innovation in China: The Chinese Software Industry (Routledge 2010); see also E Lim and M 
Spence, Medium and Long Term Development and Transformation of the Chinese Economy an 
International Perspective (Beijing Cairncross Economic Research Foundation 2011) 
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jcarpen0/Chinaluncheon/Synthesis%20Report%20Complete%20English.p
df> accessed 12 November 2013. 
688 X Fu, China’s Path to Innovation (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
689 S Jui, Innovation in China: The Chinese Software Industry (Routledge 2010). 
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However, it is worth mentioning that: fundamentally, this is no different from 
gambling.690 This monograph would like to address in its concluding chapter that, the 
embedment of IP into a country does not necessarily guarantee an inevitable success, 
just like the early introduction of IP in China back in the 19th Century as described at 
the very end of Chapter 1. After all, apart from the willingness of the state to introduce 
and implement the policies, the success of any policy is critically dependent on the 
detailed forms of the policies and the capacities of the state in general, which has been 
proved by many other countries’ experiences.691 
 
Therefore, even though it can be agreed for the moment that the IP system contributed 
to China’s development, it still requires a further clarification on the exact shape that 
IP system and its implementations can yield. The current diverse practices of IP in 
different countries, which include both developed and developing countries, have 
shown that: there is neither a ‘one-size-fits-all’ IP system, nor universal implementation 
for a country’s development. After fulfilling the requirements of the international 
standards on IP, China has been progressing a step-by-step basis of IP system-relevant 
issues according to its domestic level of development. Chinese IP enforcement shall 
warrant more academic attention. Following this monograph, the utmost relevance for 
further research can be: (1) internally speaking, how to systematically organize the 
Chinese IP development diversities in enforcement; and (2) internationally speaking, 
how globalization and the contemporary liberal trade regime can impact the ongoing 
Chinese IP reform and transition. 
 
2.3 An IP Enforcement System with Chinese Characteristics 
 
                                                
690 K Shao and X Feng, Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 
2014). 
691 H-J Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem 
Press 2002). 
 ==?
As elucidated in Chapter 3, IP administrative enforcement is caused by the earlier year’s 
limited judicial capacity, and it is closely related to the national conditions of the 
Chinese IP system. After decades of development, administrative enforcement has 
grown into an important tool for the protection of IPRs in China. 
 
Administrative enforcement authorities can independently carry out actions against IP 
infringements or resolve IP civil disputes. Comparing to the developed countries’ IP 
enforcement system, such as the UK and the US, the Chinese IP administrative 
enforcement system has a quasi-civil-judicial status, which covers the administrative 
punishment for the infringement of IPRs, adjudication for IP ownership disputes, and 
mediation. Administrative enforcement has a quasi-criminal-judicial status for which 
the extent of administrative enforcement contains: (1) border measures which prohibit 
pirated goods from being imported and exported; and (2) ‘misdemeanor system’ which 
authorizes all the IP administrative organs to provide administrative punishment for 
minor IP crimes according to the relevant administrative legislations. The ‘dual-track’ 
system has matched the practicalities of China and sustained the IP system even though 
it obviously differs from the international practice. Correspondingly, the involvement 
of administrative force in IP enforcement causes some problems. Although the 
establishment of a modernized IP system in legislations can be achieved in a short 
period, the implementation of the global IP standards regulated by the TRIPS in such a 
short period might be comprehended as a form of ‘great leap’. 
 
The gap between international standards and domestic conditions led to an obvious lack 
of unity in the enforcement system, for example, the definition of protective standards 
in administrative and judicial enforcement is miscellaneous at the moment. The ‘dual-
track’ system offers optional protections for IPRs, but the overlap of protective agencies 
can lead to the lack of efficiency. The ‘dual-track’ system adds a noteworthy level of 
complexity to IP civil cases. In the short-term, it can raise the possibility of 
controversial decisions among the judicial and administrative organs. The ‘dual-track’ 
system exemplifies the lack of convergence in the Chinese IP enforcement system. The 
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current system leads to competition between the administrative and judicial forces. In 
the long-term, after the maturation of the judicial enforcement, parallel enforcement 
might be a waste of public resources. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Chinese 
government is keenly cognizant of these potential problems. Thus, the intention to 
reduce competition waste among, for example, macro-state level judicial and 
administrative organs is sensible in the current judicial reform.  
 
The on-going judicial reform reflects on the dual track system as a parallel system and 
is now revising it into a collateral system. Judicial enforcement will obtain the dominant 
position in Chinese IP enforcement. Meanwhile, the trend shows that China is currently 
amending and slowly moving its IP enforcement system toward the one-track system, 
similar to developed countries. Nevertheless, whether to abolish the IP administrative 
enforcement in China, or not, is beyond the research scope of this monograph.  
 
However, indeed, as a developing country and a latecomer, China has no need to re-
invent the IP system. This does not mean that China shall unquestionably abolish its 
functional administrative enforcement mechanism, which has been established based 
its own domestic experiences. It took decades to establish a modern IP system. One 
might, of course, claim that after the establishment of the IP system and its judicial 
enforcement, it takes decades to improve the practice, close various leakages, and 
strengthen the general capacities of the enforcement. Does this claim exclude or 
terminate the administrative enforcement? The answer is ‘no’. In fact, the same logic 
that applies to improving judicial enforcement can be implemented to administrative 
enforcement. It is also a matter of time to polish the management of administrative 
agencies, close the loopholes, and strengthen the general capacities. 
 
This monograph is not claiming the on-going strategies as any sort of agenda or action 
plan to go further than the highlighted and globally accepted standards. However, the 
‘one-size-fit-all’ standards and the EU-US centred international standards for 
institutional development have generated new issues while solving diverse domestic 
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problems in China. In addition, these standards have limitations to guide newly 
developed industries as reflected in the previous chapters. Systematic differences at the 
enforcement level shall be accepted to certain extent as it is in the case of the Chinese 
dual-track system for its IP enforcement. Rather than completely replacing one with the 
other, the noteworthy challenge is to properly harmonize these two enforcement 
mechanisms and avoid pluralism.  
 
One can claim that the single-track IP judicial enforcement is commonly applied in the 
countries that China is modelling their system from, namely the already developed 
countries. This monograph has no intention to question the on-going IP reform, because 
the Chinese experience has shown that continuous institutional development can lead 
to fast growth. However, the single-track IP judicial enforcement implemented in the 
developed countries is not perfectly functioning in either one of the single developed 
countries. The enforcement among these countries is non-harmonized. Inefficiency has 
been a general IP enforcement challenge to many countries, China should address more 
attention and give patience to its indigenous enforcement system. 
 
Moreover, the ‘three-in-one’ model and the special IP court indicate a new trend is 
slowly emerging inside China, which is: the modernization of judicial system, together 
with the implementation of centralized management with specialized judiciary (Chapter 
3). The establishment of special IP courts in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou is the 
first step toward the modernization of the IP judicial system. As mentioned in Chapter 
3, IP court has been given exclusive jurisdiction, which means other people’s courts 
have no jurisdiction on the same matters692 in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou; the 
parties shall not change jurisdiction based on agreement, and the people’s court cannot 
change the jurisdiction based on the court rulings. The jurisdiction provides exclusivity 
and priority to the IP court’s jurisdiction. Moreover, it is a compulsory jurisdiction that 
excludes foreign court’s jurisdiction over the litigations. Meanwhile, in other provinces, 
                                                
692 See chapter 3, part 4.  
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the establishment of a ‘three-in-one’ model continues and is being furthered by the SPC. 
Every province is collecting IP judicial enforcement experience. Such an arrangement 
at the macro level aims at integrating the specialized judicial resources, improving the 
professional level of the judiciary, and harmonizing the judicial standards of IP 
protection.  
 
The on-going IP reform is a giant project considering the large size of the Chinese 
territory, its population, and the diverse development levels of different regions. Even 
though institutional improvements contribute to the economic growth, one fundamental 
point to be continuously mentioned is: the Chinese IP system is multifunctional, but 
dominantly it shall function as a legal mechanism to maintain the justice order of 
intellectual rights and enhance the knowledge-based transition progress. Internally 
speaking, a successful system shall cover the nation as a whole, but not only a few well-
developed regions, even though such an arrangement means a low level of profits. At 
the same time, internationally speaking, the designing of Chinese legal reform may 
need to consider the responsibilities and obligations in advance as China is becoming 
an economic super power. The Chinese experience of constructing and improving the 
IP system can be a supportive case study for the global IP system.  
 
2.4 A Need for Further Improvement on IP Practices in Business 
The sophisticated design of S&T and IP policies has created some unique 
characteristics in the Chinese invention patent portfolio. Chapter 4 takes the IT industry 
as an example, since IT is one of the privileged and representative industries. It shows 
that the capital, taxation bonus, R&D resources, and human capital are allocated in 
certain selected industries (Chapter 4). Huawei’s considerable number of patent filings 
and its relevant patent-related activities show that Chinese patents are being gradually 
industrialized and commercialized. However, the small number of judicial cases 
indirectly show that the patent filings are centralized in the hands of few leading players 
 ==C
instead of a commonly implemented intellectual management mechanism for business. 
The level of industrialization and commercialization of patents is still relatively low. 
The IP policies and their concepts are mainly used at the central government level, 
consequently, there is a demand for further policies’ localization and decentralization.  
 
As showed in Chapter 4, Huawei which was founded in 1985, established its IP 
management office in 1995, and started properly filing invention patents at the 
beginning of the 21st century. On one hand, Huawei’s case shows that the direction of 
economic activities and technological changes require time to be developed. On the 
other hand, the fact that China favoured particular industries during the transition period, 
such as the IT industry, has been encouraging the growth of certain firms. However, 
such implementation limits the birth of new firms and the innovative capabilities in 
other industries. The national wide IP system shall not only benefit certain industries 
or big players but also accelerate the development of small firms and other R&D entities. 
 
Chapter 4 also shows that, comparing to the patent portfolio that the developed 
countries have for their advance industries, such as the pharmaceutical or automotive 
industry, the IP structure is relatively simple in a new industry, such as IT. This leaves 
a huge space for improvement. Although policies and institution can be transplanted 
from the external society with global standards to China, each country must develop its 
own industrial model based on its own economic, social, internal, and international 
circumstances. Government can help firms to adopt and apply new ideas and 
technologies, but the important thing is that these industries should be able to sustain 
and renew themselves later on. Thus, government support can be crucial during the 
initial steps but the industry should develop self-sufficiency on innovation. This 
requires the involvement of market and competition. The role switch of Chinese 
government is necessary, that is the government should interfere less and encourage the 
industry to produce new ideas. 
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ABOVE ALL, during the current catching-up process, both the Chinese government 
and industries have learned and benefited considerably from the positive approaches 
and development experiences of already-developed countries. Nonetheless, the 
developed countries’ achievements did not come easily. During the process of catching-
up, it is necessary to draw attention to the negative factors and failures that the 
developed countries have experienced, to prevent the Chinese government and 
industries from confronting similar issues. 
 
Many similarities can be drawn from the divisional catch-up process of the Chinese 
S&T and IP system. This manuscript summarizes the state catch-up model of China in 
following phases:  
 
(1) the beginning stage of catching-up, which could be defined as the ‘preparation 
period’, is the phase of collecting capital, constructing similar or transplanting same 
institutions, cultivating relevant human resources and basic knowledges. The institution 
construction can cover many sectors, such as legislation, administration, education, and 
the funding system, as well as implementing organs. 
 
The Chinese catch-up model has a character in its way that the ‘preparation period’ is 
the most time-consuming period among all the three phases. The preparation can take 
decades and several generations. The central Chinese government is well-aware of the 
time-consuming preparation during the implementation of the Reform and Opening-up, 
as Deng Xiaoping pointed out in 1982, ‘utilizing the first ten years to prepare for the 
next ten years’.693 
 
(2) The second stage of catching-up, which this monograph defines as the ‘chasing 
period’, is the phase of testing established institutions, advancing human resources, 
                                                
693 ʩċĠʩċĠŭʣȗ¥AƱǛȄ 1993ȗ 16˕. X Deng, Selected Works of 
Deng Xiaoping, Vol 3 (Renmin Press, 1993), p16. 
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adjusting the allocation of resources, collecting relevant and domestic experiences, and 
improving mechanisms for implementations at the central and local levels; and 
 
(3) The final stage of catching-up, which can be defined as ‘sprinting to the end-point’, 
is the phase of systemization of different institutions and maturing the capacities for 
sustainable implementation at various levels of capital-allocation, technology-handling, 
and human resources upgrading. 
 
The ‘preparation period’ is well reflected by the Chinese S&T policies, both during the 
Soviet-Union period and the early years after the Reform and Opening-up Policy. For 
example, the intensive attraction of FDIs and technologies, the massive training for 
relevant human resources, and the establishment of different funding systems for R&D. 
The current on-going construction of the NIS indicates that the Chinese S&T is at the 
end of chasing period and is entering the last phase. For the IP system, China completed 
the preparation period for IP legislation in a relatively very short period, and is at the 
end of the ‘chasing-period’. The new amendments of different Chinese IP legislations, 
such as the on-going discussions on the fourth amendment of Chinese Patent Law, are 
worth looking forward to. The actions carried out by the IP enforcement sector all 
indicate that China is quickly completing the ‘preparation period’ for IP enforcement. 
These actions include the newly established IP court in Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou; the IP tribunals in Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuhan, and Chengdu; and the nation-
wide introduction of a ‘three-in-one’ model. The mechanisms that have been carried 
out for formulating the team of IP judges, the adjustment in the ‘dual-track’ system, 
and the enhanced construction of IP system, all mapped out the Chinese ambition to 
enter and complete the ‘chasing period’ of rapid IP enforcement. 
 
The Chinese construction of the IP system itself is a giant social and governmental 
project to access and promote knowledge and innovation. In contrast to the developed 
countries, the Chinese IP system is endowed with the mission of promoting innovation 
and developing the country into an innovation-driven society. The acknowledgement 
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of IP norms and their importance have improved together with the country’s growth. 
Therefore, considering the new Chinese economic phase, the continuous improvements 
of IPRs are very promising in the future.  
 
The on-going judicial reform reflects the confidence and commitment for the 
institutional development of IP in China. The process of harmonization of the 
administrative and judicial enforcement shows that China is willing to adjust its 
enforcement system to integrate with global practices. Whether China should reduce 
the importance of the administrative enforcement requires more specific studies.  
 
The enormous growth of patent filings will continue or even go higher, because the 
relevant policies have been actively released to encourage R&D and technical 
improvement. The ratio of innovation patents has risen dramatically since the beginning 
of the 21st century. However, linking the patents and enforcement system requires 
proficient understanding of the technologies, practical experiences, and professional 
practitioners. In other words, it took decades to construct a modern IP system and its 
sufficient implementation. At this point, China has already fulfilled the global standards 
set up by the international treaties, such as Berne Convention, Pairs Convention and 
TRIPS. Nevertheless, similar to developed countries, a sufficient enforcement of the IP 
system needs more time for implementation. Both China and the rest of the world shall 
give patience to China to properly develop its IP enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Reviewing the IP development of China since 1898, riding with the Chinese elites’ ups 
and downs and their mechanism on national development, has emphasized that China 
is very unique in a way that IP law has gone far more than a law discipline itself. It is, 
indeed, as many have said: how one was yesterday has decided how one is today, how 
one is today will decide how one’s future looks like. Then the following logical 
question is: what will be the next after the ‘catch-up’ and ‘social transition’? Due to the 
length and research period limitation, this monograph has not touched the part of ‘keep-
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ahead’. Hopefully there can be another volume later to answer this question or this 
monograph can inspire whoever interested in this topic to carry it further. 
 
  
 =>>

Ahn B, ‘The Making of the Cultural Revolution’ in B Ahn, Chinese Politics and the 
Cultural Revolution (University of Washington Press 1976) 
Alford WP, To Steal Aa Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in 
Chinese Civilization (Stanford University Press 1995) 
Allison JR and Lin L, ‘The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes Toward Property Rights in 
Invention and Discovery’ (Social Science Research Network 2000) SSRN 
Scholarly Paper ID 222539 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=222539> 
Beat W, ‘Technology Transfer in China’, Patent Law In Greater China (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2014) 
Bently L and Sherman B, Intellectual Property Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 
2009) 
Beijing High People’s Court, ‘BHPC: Attention needed on Legal Problems in the 
current intellectual property trials’, (9 May 2016) ?ˣˆ, ‘?ˣˆ:Ĵǽ
ɳ=ƏĀˑɛǁŊǲƿĹˀ˚’, 2016ġ 5Ƅ 9ŵ 
‘Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei will explore centralize the jurisdiction of intellectual 
property cases’ China Intellectual Property (12 June 2015)) 
<http://ip.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0612/c136655-28427113.html> ‘?ǅtĉţ
ȟʐǽɳ=ƏƠIˍ%ȝʗ’ %Ïǽɳ=ƏŚ2015ġ 6Ƅ 12ŵ 
‘Biography of Stan Shih’ 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20081115174657/http://global.acer.com/about/bio
graphical.htm> 
B Xu, Big Data on the Beijing Intellectual Property Court Patent Trials (2014.11.6-
2017.6.30) ɭǀ?ǽɳ=ƏƿˆĀäŬš2014.11.6-2017.6.30 
Bosworth D and Yang D, ‘Intellectual Property Law, Technology Flow and Licensing 
Opportunities in the People’s Republic of China’ [2002] International Business 
Review 98 
Bosworth D and Yang D, ‘Intellectual Property Law, Technology Flow and Licensing 
Opportunities in the People’s Republic of China’ (31 May 2016) 
<http://secure.com.sg/courses/ICI/Grab/Student_Presentations/A01_G17.pdf> 
Broggi CB, Trade and Technology Networks in the Chinese Textile Industry - Opening 
Up Before the Reform (Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 
Bruun N and Zhang L, ‘Legal Transplant of Intellectual Property Rights in China: Norm 
Taker or Norm Maker’, in N Lee, N Bruun and M Li (eds), Governance of 
Intellectual Property rights in China and Europe (Elgar Intellectual Property and 
Global Development 2016) 
 =>?
Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘China’s 15th WTO Anniversary: 
Assessing the Record and Charting the Path Forward’ (2012) 
<www.csis.org/events/chinas-15th-wto-anniversary-assessing-record-and-
charting-path-forward/?block3> 
Cao J, ‘Dual Enforcement System’ in S Luginbuehl and Peter Ganea (eds), Patent Law 
in Greater China (Edward Elgar 2014) 
Cao J, ‘New Development of IP Judicial Protection’ [2004] 14 Intellectual Property 9 
Cao T, The Chinese Model of Modern Development (Routledge 2005) 
Capron H and Meeusen W, The National Innovation System of Belgium (Springer-
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000) 
Chang H-J and Rowthorn B, The Role of the State in Economic Change (Oxford 
University Press 1995) 
Chang H-J, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective 
(Anthem Press 2002) 
Chen C, Chang L and Zhang YM, ‘The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in China’s 
Post 1978 Economic Development’ [1995] World Development 691 
Chen C, Foreign Direct Investment in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011) 
Chen J, Studies on the Construction of National Innovation System a nd Its 
Implementation - The Enlightenment from Finland (Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University Press 2010) ˄ǃ, ÏăůRȞƛƗʛɕƍǾȋ——Ɋm
ǲÁȂ_ʶ (ǌ<ʤäúǛȄ 2010) 
Chen X, ‘156 Projects and the Modernization of China’s China’s Industries’ [1999] 
Literature of Communist Party of China 
Cheung GCK, Intellectual Property Rights in China: Policy of Piracy, Trade and 
Protection (Routledge 2009) 
China Development Research Foundation, China’s New Urbanization Strategy 
(Routledge 2013) 
China Science and Technology Statistics, ‘Patent Statistical Analysis of 2014’ 
<www.sts.org.cn/tjbg/cgylw/documents/2016/2014ġŏÏȬɧƘ.pdf> 
Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Establishing the Leading Group 
for the Work concerning Formulating the Strategy for National Intellectual 
Property Right 2005 
Cornish W, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights 
(Sweet and Maxwell 1999) 
Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major 
Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform (2013) 
 =>@
Decision of the State Council on Accelerating the Fostering and Development of 
Strategic Emerging Industries (2010) Ïˆo8ĿÚȽÇ®ďőǮŃůp
=ǲ|þ 
Deng S and Cui Y, ‘Human Capital and Relying on Science and Education to 
Rejuvenate the Country’ [2000] Science, Technology and Dialectics 64 
Deng X, Implement the Policy of Readjustment, Ensure Stability and Unit (25 
December 1980) 
Deng X, Respect Knowledge, Respect Talents, Selected Papers of Deng Xiaoping 
(1975-1982) (Renmin Press 1983) ʩċĠ‘ĊʳǽɳĊʳAŕ’ʩċĠŭ
ʣ1975-1982AƱǛȄ 1983 
Deng X, Our State’s Historic Experience on Economic Constructions (6 May 1982) 
Deng X, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol 3 (Renmin Press, 1993) ʩċĠʩ
ċĠŭʣȗ¥AƱǛȄ 1993 
Deng JZ and Shan XG, ‘The Conception of IP Administrative Protection in China’ 
[2007] Intellectual Property Law 62 ʩĬľ, ¢Žg‘ŏÏǽɳ=ƏɕŨ\
řǲǏ,’[2017] 1 ǽɳ=Əƿ 62 
Dobbs R and others, ‘Farewell to Cheap Capital? The Implications of Long-Term Shifts 
in Global Investment and Saving’ (Mckinsey Global Institute 2010) 
<www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principal-investors/our-
insights/farewell-cheap-capital> 
Donald CC, China’s Legal System: New Developments, New Challenges (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 
Drahos P, The Global Governance of Knowledge: Patent Offices and Their Clients 
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 
Duncan JM, Sherwood MA and Shen Y, ‘A Comparison between the Judicial and 
Administrative Routes to Enforce Intellectual Property Rights in China’ [2008] 7 
The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 529 
Esherick JW, Pickowicz PG and Walder AG, The Chinese Cultural Revolution as 
History (Stanford University Press 2005) 
EU-China IP2, ‘Third Revision of China’s Patent Law, Legal Texts and Documents on 
the Drafting Process 2006-2008’ (2010) <www.ipkey.org/zh/resources/ip-
information-centre/22-patent/2079-third-revision-of-china-s-patent-law-legal-
texts-and-documents-on-the-drafting-process-2006-2008_2079> 
Fen X and Wu Z, ‘Research on the Relationships between Intellectual Property Court 
and General Court in China’ [2014] Shangdi Forum of Intellectual Property {
Ž˒, ƫľ÷, ‘ŏÏǽɳ=ƏƿˆžʤƿˆoȞǾȋ’ 
Feng X, ‘Challenges to China’s Self-Driven Innovation’ in K Shao and X Feng (eds), 
Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 
2014) 
 =>A
Francks P, ‘Leaning from Japan: Plant Imports and Technology Transfer in the Chinese 
Iron and Steel Industry’ [1988] Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies 42 
Fu W, ‘Internet and Patent System’ [2000] Science and Law 59 ȖƇ, ‘9ȹȱ
Ĩ’ [2000] ȇŘƿĹ 59 
Fu X, China’s Path to Innovation (University of Oxford, Cambridge University Press 
2015) 
Gallini N and Scotchmer S, ‘Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive 
System?’ [2001] UC Berkeley Department of Economics Working Paper 
Gordon CKC, Intellectual Property Rights in China: Politics of Piracy, Trade and 
Protection (Routledge 2009) 
Governance in China - OECD (2016) <www.oecd.org/gov/governanceinchina.htm> 
Gregory K. L and Lauren J. S, Economic Approaches to Intellectual Property: Policy, 
Litigation and Management (Thomson/West 2006) 
Gregory N, Nollen S and Tenev S, New Industries from New Places: The Emergence 
of the Software and Hardware Industries in China and India (The World Bank 
and Stanford University Press 2009) 
Griffiths J, ‘Book Review on W. Twining, Law in Context: Enlarging a Discipline’ 
(1998) 4 European Journal of Crime, Criminal law and Criminal Justice 145 
Gu C, Chinese Legal System, vol 1 (China & Hongkong Law Studies Ltd 1988) 
Guo X, ‘A Positive Analysis on Patent Protection for Computer Software’ [2008] 
Intellectual Property 38 ʯˎy, ‘ɧȜƍʕIǲ\ř$ÿɱǲƘ’ 
[2008] ǽɳ=Ə 38 
Gu S and Lundvall B-Å, ‘Policy Leaning as a Key Process in the Transformation of the 
Chinese Innovation System’, Asia’s Innovation System in Transition (Edward 
Elgar 2006) 
Guidelines for Patent Examination 
Guo H, ‘Patents’, in Z Jiang and R Kariyawasam (eds), Chinese Intellectual Property 
and Technology Laws (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011) 
Guo W, Jin C and Wang J, Network Legal Problems and the Countermeasures (Law 
Press 2001) 
He H and Zhang P, ‘Impact of the Intellectual Property System on Economic Growth 
Country Report China’ (WIPO-JPO-UNU Joint Research Project 2007) 
<www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-
ip/en/studies/pdf/wipo_unu_07_china.pdf> 
Henderson JV, ‘Urbanization in China: Policy Issues and Options’ (2009) 
<www.s4.brown.edu/china2012/Papers/Final%20Report%20format1109summa
ry.pdf> 
Hsü CY, The Rise of Modern China (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2000) 
 =>B
Hsü CY, The Rise of Modern China (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2000) 
Huang J, Liu J and Di Y, ‘Discover the US Courts Views on the Patentability of 
Computer Software and Analysis the Relevant Cases’ (National Forum of 
Intellectual Property 1999) ˦[ɍ ƵĸɏȚ‘ţɨȲÏƿˆćǫɀʕ
IŃ-ɝɢǷoW-Ƙ’ (1999jÏƀŋʆ=ƏǾɨO) 
Hu D, ‘After the elected judiciary, how to elect judges’ Guangming Daily (4 September 
2014) <http://www.njfy.gov.cn/www/njfy/xwzx_mb_a3914090559424.htm> 
Ⱦʧŕ, ‘Ä˛½ƿýɹîSʣK’gŸŵŚ, 2014ġ 9Ƅ 4ŵ 
Hu M and Ran Y,‘Huawei, and Its Piercing through Road for Core Technologies’, 
People’s Daily (2003) Ⱦɾ,vƳĠ, ‘¡'ƝļŘƌǲȎǿ-ʑ’, AƱŵŚ 
[2003] 
Hu J, ‘Generally Complete the Construction of the National Innovation System with 
Chinese Characteristics by 2020’ China Daily (7 September 2012) 
Hu J, ‘Study on the New Relations between FDI Attraction and Technology 
Introduction’ (Tsinghua University 2004) 
Huldt B and others, China Rising - Reaction, Assessments, and Strategic Consequences 
(National Defense University 2007) 
Hu S, ‘Discussions On the Establishment of IP Court’ [2010] 4 Intellectual Property 37 
ȾǐǤ, ‘ɮǽɳ=Əƿ ˆƿĩǲĬȒ——ćŏʚǽɳ=ƏĀRŧ˔
ǲǥŃłȵ’ [2010] 4ǽɳ=Ə 37 
Intellectual Property Court in Beijing, ‘Information of IP judges in the Intellectual 
Property Court in Beijing’ 
<www.bjcourt.gov.cn/fgxx/detail.htm?court=30&channel=100606002>  ?
ǽɳ=Əƿˆ?ǽɳ=Əƿˆƿý]Ņ	Ā]Ņȱ 
Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning 
Application of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Choice of Law for 
Foreign-Related Civil Relationships (I) 
IP House Judicial Data Analyses Center, ‘Report on Judicial Protection Data of Beijing 
Intellectual Property Court’ (2016) N=)G97OS2, ‘	Nɳ=Ə
GbGř97@Ś!’ 
Jiang Z and Kariyawasam R, Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology Laws 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011) 
Jui S, Innovation in China: The Chinese Software Industry (Routledge 2010) 
Jun W, ‘The Solid Steps of Huawei in 2003’ [2004] Communication World 46, also 
available at Huawei Media Center <http://pr.huawei.com/cn/news/media-
coverage/hw-092065-news.htm> yŭ ‘¡' 2003 ǲÕÿɁƪ’ [2004] ʤ
]ǭ 46 
 =>C
Kong X and Du W, ‘Efforts and Tendencies in China’s Judicial Practice of Intellectual 
Property’ in K Shao and X Feng (eds), Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014) 
Kong X, ‘Basic Issues of the Application of Intellectual Property Law: Judicial 
Philosophy, Judicial Policy and the Method of Adjudication’ [2013] Beijing: Law 
Press 1 
Kristina S and Alan C, ‘Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China:  Trends in 
Litigation and Economic Damages’ (NERA Economic Consulting 2014) 
<www.zlcip.cn/hold/books/other/matts/other3.pdf> 
Kynge J, China Shakes the World: A Titan’s Rise and Troubled Future- and The 
Challenges Forfor America (A Mariner Book Hougton Mifflin Company 2007) 
La CS and Konan DE, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in China: The Changing Political 
Economy of Chinese-American Interests’ [2002] 39 East-West Center Working 
Papers 
Lan X and Zhang L, ‘Relationship between IPR and Technology Catch-up Some 
Evidence from China’ in H Odagiri, A Goto, A Sunami and RR Nelson (eds), 
Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-up An International 
Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Landes W and Posner R, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 
(Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2003) 
Landes WM and Posner RA, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law (The 
American Enterprise Institute 2004) 
Lee N, ‘Intellectual Property Law in China-From Legal Transplant to Governance’ in 
N Lee, N Bruun and M Li (eds), Governance of Intellectual Property rights in 
China and Europe (Elgar Intellectual Property and Global Development 2016) 
Lee N, Bruun N, and Li M, Governance of Intellectual Property Rights in China and 
Europe (Edward Elgar 2016) 
Legislative Work Plan of The Standing Committee of The National People's Congress 
in 2017 jÏAäĞñO 2017ġȒƿĕUɧ 
Li C and Xu L, ‘Literature Review on Computer Software Patent Protection in China’ 
[2010] Journal of Chongqing University of Post and Telecommunications 20) Ɛ
ʽb, ĺ)Ē, ‘ŏÏɧȜƍʕI\řŭǞȮʡ’, [2010] ʳĥʫǫäú
úŚ:ȄOȇúǛ 20 
Liegsalz J, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights in China: Patent, Trade and 
Foreign Direct Investment (Springer Fachmedien 2010) 
‘Li Deshui: Huge Surplus Essentially Is Only a Passing by God Of Wealth’ First 
Financial Daily (26 January 2006) 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20060126/07122307823.shtml> 
 =>D
Li H, Liu Chuntian: The Problems of Protection Model on Intellectual Property Rights 
Lack a ”Truth and Standard“ Type of Discussion”’ [2016] 
<http://news.hexun.com/2016-06-23/184551233.html> ƐÀ, ‘źǨǽɳ=
Ə\řƣĮˀ˚ƤȰÓ“ǺǥƜ”Įǲäɨɮ, ƿƽÅƊ 
Li G and Lou C, ‘Characteristics of Technological Introduction in China in 1950s and 
Comments’ [2004] Journal of Northwestern University 8 
Li M, Intellectual Property Court and Innovation-Driven Development, People’s Court 
News <http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/images/2014-
09/03/05/2014090305_pdf.pdf> ƐŸĻ,‘ǽɳ=Əƿˆů˟®ď’,A
ƱƿˆŚ, 2014ġ 9Ƅ 3ŵ 
Li M, Intellectual Property Law (2nd edn, Social Sciences Academic Press 2014) 
Li M, US Intellectual Property Law (Law Press, 2014) 
Lim E and Spence M, Medium and Long Term Development and Transformation of the 
Chinese Economy an International Perspective (Zhongxin Publishing 2011) 
<http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jcarpen0/Chinaluncheon/Synthesis%20Report%20C
omplete%20English.pdf> 
Liu C, Intellectual Property Right as First Property Right is A Discovery of Civil Law 
Studies) [2015] Intellectual Property 3 źǨ, ‘ǽɳ=ƏU'ȗʆ=Ə
ŻƱƿúǲ$®ǣ’[2015] ǽɳ=Ə 3  
Liu C, ‘Intellectual Property Court’s Mandate and Mission’ [2014] People’s Court 
News źǨ, ‘ǽɳ=ƏƿˆǲȸʇVÆ’, AƱƿˆŚ, 20 
Liu C, ‘Copyright Protection under the Network Environment’ in R Kariyawasam (ed), 
Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology Laws (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited 2011) 
Liu C, Intellectual Property Law (5th edn, Renmin University Press 2014) 
Liu F, ‘The Justice Analysis On the ‘Dual Enforcement System’ of Patent Infringement 
Remedies in China’ [2008] 2 Intellectual Property L aw 50 ĒŏÏǽɳ
=ƏYƏŪǊ‘¬ʓ’ǲƨĴŃ	ǽɳ=Əƿ	2008ġȗ 2ƈ 
Li L, ‘Studies On the Elected Judiciary System’ Liaoning Shenyang Municipal 
Intermediate People’s Court 
<http://syzy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=6424> ), ‘ƿýÄ˛Ĩ
Ǿȋ’, ʙûǸƹˁĚ%ȣAƱƿˆ 
Li M, ‘Special Intellectual Property Court in China’ in N Lee, N Bruun and M Li (eds), 
Governance of Intellectual Property rights in China and Europe (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2016) 
Liu W, ‘Intellectual Property Protection Related to Technology in China’ [2005] 72 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 339 
 =?;
Li X, ‘The Aims of the Establishment of the Chinese Intellectual Property Court’, 
Shangdi Forum of Intellectual Property (2014) Ɛċƫ%Ïǽɳ=Əƿˆ
ǲɰȒǶǲ	2014ġǽɳ=ƏÒɮÖ 
Long G, ‘China’s Policies on FDI: Review and Evaluation’ in TH Moran, EM Graham 
and M Blomstrom (eds), Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development? 
(Washington DC Institute for international Economics 2005) 
Love JB, Helmers C and Eberhardt M, ‘Patent Litigation in China: Protecting Rights 
or the Local Economy?’ [2016] 18 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & 
Technology Law 713 
Lü X, Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution - the Impance on Chinese Thought, 
Culture and Communication (University of South Carolina Press 2004) 
Lubman S, ‘Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law’ in S Lubman (ed), China’s Legal 
Reforms (Oxford University Press 1996) 
Lubman S, China’s Legal Reforms (Oxford University Press 1996) 
Luginbuehl S and Ganea P, Patent Law in Greater China (Elgar Intellectual Property 
Law and Practice 2014) 
Luginbuehl S, ‘China’s Patent Policy’ in S Luginbuehl and P Ganea (eds), Patent Law 
in Greater China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014) 
Lundvall B-Å, Patarapong I and Jan V, Asia’s Innovation Systems in Transition 
(Edward Elgar 2006) 
Maitland F, The Forms of Action at Common Law (1909) 
<http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/maitland-formsofaction.asp> 
Mao J and Chen W, ‘Discussion on the Intellectual Property Policies on the Strategic 
Emerging Industries’ [2011] Intellectual Property Law 63) ưʵǦ, Ȋŭò, ‘ő
ǮŃůp=ǽɳ=ƏŨșţ 2011 ǽɳ=Əƿ 63 
Mattei U, ‘Comparative Law and Economics’ in B Bouckaert and G De Geest (eds), 
Elgar Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 2000) 
Mazzucato M and Penna C, The Brazilian Innovation System: A Mission- Oriented 
Policy Proposal (CGEE 2016) 
Mertha A, The Politics of Piracy: Intellectual Property in Contemporary China 
(Cornell University Press 2005) 
‘Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection 
of Intellectual Property’ 
<http://tcc.export.gov/trade_agreements/all_trade_agreements/exp_005362.asp> 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Software and Information 
Technology Services Industry the 12th Five-year Development Plan(2012) ĕ
Ç]ŅʮʕIÇ]ŅŘƌƆ7:®ďɟ (2012) 
 =?<
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Software and Information 
Technology Services Industry Development Plan for 2016-2020 (2016) ĕÇ
]ŅʮʕIÇ]ŅŘƌƆ®ďɟ 2016-2020ġ (2016)  
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, Evaluation 
of the Finnish National Innovation System - Full Report (Helsinki University 
Press 2009) 
Ministry of Science and Technology, ‘Science and Technology Development Plans in 
the History’ <www.most.gov.cn/kjgh/lskjgh/> 
Monton NV, ‘Trademark Anticounterfiting in Asia and the Pacific Rim’ [2001] 
International Trademark Association 21 
Motohashi K, ‘Growing R&D Collaboration of Japanese Firms and Policy Implications 
for Reforming National Innovation System’ [2006] 24 Studies in Science of 
Science 482 <www.mo.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp/theme/nihonkigyouR&D.pdf>  
Murray A, Information Technology Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 
Nakayama N, translated by J Guo, Legal Protections on Computer Software (Dalian 
University of Technologies Press 1988) %đ]İ(ɒ), ʯĬů(ɶ), ʕIǲƿ
Ĺ\ř,äʠǥĕäúǛȄ, 1988 
National Patent Development Strategy 2011-2020 (2010) jÏ6®ďőǮ
2011-2020 
Nelson R, National Innovation Systems - A Comparative Analysis (Oxford University 
Press 1993) 
No 12 SPC Rules on the Jurisdiction of the IP Courts in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou (27 October 2014) 
<www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2014/10/id/147980.shtml> ƃˣAƱƿˆo
8?ǌĤĔǽɳ=ƏƿˆƠIȝʗǲɟþ 2014 (ƿʱ201412
·) 
Notice of the State Council on Issuing Several Policies on Further Encouraging the 
Development of the Software and Integrated Circuit Industries 2011 
Notice of the State Council on Issuing the ‘Made in China (2025)’ 2015 
Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Outline of the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 2008 
Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Forwarding Several Opinions of 
the State Intellectual Property Office and Other Departments on Strengthening 
the Work of Intellectual Property Rights in Strategic Emerging Industries (2012) 
Ïˆk¦ʔ®ǽɳ=ƏčȘʮʿo8ĳőǮŃůp=ǽɳ=Əĕ
UɌğŊɝǲʤǽ 
Odagiri H and others, Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-Up, an 
International Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2010) 
 =?=
OECD, ‘Chapter 14. Intellectual Property Rights in China: Governance Challenges and 
Prospects’, in Governance in China (OCED 2005) 
OECD, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in China: Governance Challenges and 
Perspectives’, in Governance in China (OCED 2005) 
OECD, ‘OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy CHINA Synthesis Report’ (2007) 
<www.oecd.org/sti/inno/39177453.pdf> 
OECD, OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy- China (2008) 
Oyelanren-Oyeyinka B and McCormick D, Industrial Clusters and Innovation Systems 
in Africa: Institutions, Markets and Policy (United Nations University Press 2007) 
Parthasarathi B, The Indian Software Industry: Business Strategy and Dynamic Co-
Ordination (Palgrave Macmillan 2004) 
Planning on Adjusting and Revitalizing the Electronic Information Industry 2008 
People’s Congress, The Second Session of the Twelfth National People 's Congress 
Resolution on the Implementation of the National Economic and Social 
Development Plan in 2014 and the National Economic and Social Development 
Plan 2015 (2015) jÏAƱFɗäOȗ7ĎjÏAƱFɗäOȗƥO
ɪo8 2014 ġÏƱȪǊÇȄO®ďɧŖɕņ} 2015 ġÏƱȪǊÇȄ
O®ďɧǲ|ɪ 2015 
People’s Supreme Court, ‘Introduction of the IP division of the SPC’ (12 April 2010) 
<www.court.gov.cn/zscq/zscqt/201004/t20100412_3940.html> ƃˣAƱƿˆ
ƃˣƿˆǽɳ=ƏĩDȩ	 
Polices for the Promotion of Software and Integrated Circuit Industries 2000 
PRC Agrees to Push for Copyright Law That Will Protect Computer Software (World 
Intellectual Property Report 1989) 
‘Project 211 and 985 - China Education Center’ (7 July 2016) 
<http://www.chinaeducenter.com/en/cedu/ceduproject211.php> 
Provision of the Supreme People’s Court on the Judicial Interpretation Work (2007) 
Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, Important Speeches of the 
General Secretary Xi Jinping (Renmin Press 2014) %n%ç%āʮ, 1ʜĠ
ń2ɫʳɛɬɷɽƋ (AƱǛȄ 2014) 
Quality Brand Protection Committee of China Association of Enterprise with Foreign 
Investment, ‘Annual Review of Counterfeiting Development 2000’ (2004) 
Regulation on Invention Reward 1963 
Rein S, The End of Copycat China: The Rise of Creativity, Innovation, and 
Individualism in Asia (John Wiley & Sons, Inc 2014) 
S.J Kamath SJ, ‘Property Rights and the Evolution of Foreign Direct Investment in a 
Centrally Planned Developing Economy: Reply to Pomfret’ [1994] Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 
<www.jstor.org/stable/1154451?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents> 
 =?>
Schiappacasse M, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in China: Technology Transfers and 
Economic Development’ [2004] Buffalo Intellectual Property Law Journal 166 
Sell SK, ‘Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World Crisis, 
Coercion, and Choice’ [1995] 49 International Organization 315 
Shao K and Feng X, Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2014) 
Shao K, ‘Patent Law, National Strategies and Policy Incentives: China Road to a 
Leading Innovator’ [2011] 14 the International Trade and Business Law Review 
85 
Shao K, History Is a Key Decoder: Why China Aims at Re-Emerging as a Global 
Leader of Innovation, vol 1 (Law in Context 2013) 
Shao K, ‘To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense? – How to Anatomize the History of 
Chinese Copyright and the Traditional Opinions about Innovations’ [2011] 
Intellectual Property Rights Annual Journal 39 ʬȇ, ‘ȏ2Ȝc——îS
Ƙ%ÏǛƏµ«QȬůɞ’, ǽɳ=Əġ, 39–56. ?äúǛȄ, 
2011 
Shao W, Patent Litigation Practices in Mainland China (Taiwan Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Intellectual Property Office 2011) 
Shen D, Understandings and Implementations on the SPC Judiciary Interpretations on 
The Chinese Civil Procedure Law (People’s Court Press, 2015) ƹĻÈ, ƃˣ
AƱƿˆƱ6ɴɯƿ¸ƿɢʱǥɢʢǧ, AƱƿˆǛȄ 2015 
Shi W, Intellectual Property in the Global Trading System: EU-China Perspective 
(Springer Science & Business Media 2008) 
Shu G, ‘Methodological Development of Legal Theory’ [2010] Legal Philosophy: 
Stand and Method 41 ɇÏǕ, ‘EŰƿɮǹśʂƿúǥɮǲ®ď’, ƿÊú
ȒÓŰƿ, 41–64. ?äúǛȄ, 2010 
Shu G, Legal Philosophy: Stand and Method (Peking University Press 2010) ɇÏǕ, 
ƿÊúȒÓŰƿ, ?äúǛȄ, 2010 
Sigurdson J, Technological Superpower China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2005) 
SIPO, ‘Comparative Analysis on the Data of Patent Administrative Enforcement Cases 
in 2014 and 2013 in the Intellectual Property System’ (7 January 2015) 
<www.sipo.gov.cn/zscqgz/2014/201501/t20150106_1056435.html>  
SIPO, ‘WIPO Chinese Agency Opened in Beijing’ (16 July 2014) 
<http://english.sipo.gov.cn/news/official/201407/t20140716_980595.html> 
SIPO, ‘The 13th Five Years Plan on Personnel on Intellectual Property’ [2017] No 12 
ǽɳ=ƏAŕ:ɟ (Ïǽ®Aõ[2017]12·)  
Song Z, ‘From Marching Toward Science to Rejuvenating China by Relying on Science 
and Education: Comments on the Party’s Policy of Science and Technology since 
the Founding of New China’ 14 Journal of Hulun Buir College 78 
 =??
SPC: 2013 China IPR Judicial Protection in Court, People’s Court News (25 April 2014) 
<www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/04/id/1283299.shtml> ƃˣAƱƿˆ
2013ġ%Ïƿˆǽɳ=Ə¸ƿ\řǝ}	AƱƿˆŚ	2014ġ 4
Ƅ 25ŵ 
SPC, ‘White Paper on IP Judicial Protection in China’ (2014) <https://perma.cc/X4VR-
GTWF> ƃˣAƱƿˆ, ‘%Ïƿˆǽɳ=Ə¸ƿ\řǝ}ǰǴ2 2014’ 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Decision on the Establishment 
of Intellectual Property Court in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou (31 August 2014)
jÏAƱFɗäOĞñÄOo8Ñ?ǌĤĔɰȒǽɳ=Əƿ
ˆǲ|þ	2014 
State Council of People’s Republic of China, ‘National Intellectual Property Strategy 
Outline’ (2008) <www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_1018942.htm> 
State Intellectual Property Office of the PRC, The Guangzhou Intellectual Property 
Court Is Established (17 December 2014) 
<www.sipo.gov.cn/mtjj/2014/201412/t20141217_1047660.html> %¡AƱn
ÇÏǽɳ=Əč:ĤĔǽɳ=ƏƿˆŝǜŎȒ	2014ġ 12Ƅ 17 ŵ 
State Intellectual Property Office Of the P.R.C, ‘The Shanghai Intellectual Property 
Court Is Established’ (31 December 2014) 
<www.sipo.gov.cn/mtjj/2014/201412/t20141231_1054112.html>%¡AƱn
ÇÏǽɳ=Əč:ǌǽɳ=ƏƿˆŝǜŎȒ	2014ġ 12Ƅ 31ŵ 
Sun L, ‘Analysis on the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
Decision on the Establishment of Intellectual Property Court in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou’ [2014] 5 China Copyright 5. Published also at the Shangdi Forum of 
Intellectual Property 2014öː<o8Ñ?, ǌ, ĤĔɰȒǽɳ=Əƿ
ˆǲ|þ>ţƘ	%ÏǛƏ	2014 ġȗ 5ƈ±ªɝ 2014ġǽɳ=Ə
ÒɮÖ 
Sun Y, ‘Intellectual Property Protections on Computer software and Business Methods 
– The Introduction And Analyses Of The Recent Cases In US’ [1999] Journal of 
Law 44 öʞʷ, ‘ǫɀʕIŰƿǲƀŋʆ=\řȲÏƃʜƿWį
DɲƘ’ [1999] ƿú  44 
Supreme People’s Court Decision on Promoting Intellectual Property Civil, 
Administrative and Criminal Cases ‘Three-in-one’ Trail in all National Courts 
[2016] No 17 ƿ®201617·ƃˣAƱƿˆo8ÑjÏƿˆťʝǽɳ
=ƏƱ6ɕŨÇ6ƠIĀ“»”ĕUǲŊɝ 
‘The Approval On Establishing Specific Tribunal in Intermediate Court of Nanjing, 
Suzhou, Wuhan and Chengdu and Cross-regional Jurisdiction on Intellectual 
Property Cases’ [2017] 2 ƃˣƿo8¼Ŋ£?ĚɋĔĚƫƴĚŎʰĚ
 =?@
%ȣƿˆuɰʿĀƍƗĢʐØȝʗʮǽɳ=ƏƠIǲŗà 2017 
(ƿ 20172·) 
The CPC Central Committee, Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China on Deepening the Reform of Several Major Issues (2013) %n
%ç,%n%ço8j˓Ǒŧ˔Ɍğʳäˀ˚ǲ|, 2013 
The Outlines on National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020) 2006 
The Perspective Plan for Science and Technology Development from 1956-1967 
The Supreme People’s Court, Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several 
Issues Regarding the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy, No 16 [2009] 
The Supreme People’s Court of China, ‘IP Cases Annual Report of The Supreme 
People’s Court of China 2015’ (2016) 
<www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2016/04/id/1845020.shtml> 
The Supreme People’s Court of China, ‘AƱƿˆțD’ (‘Introduction of the People’s 
Courts’ (2 May 2014)) <www.court.gov.cn/jgsz/rmfyjj/> 
The Thirteenth National Congress, Walk Along the Road of Socialism with the Chinese 
Characteristics (1987) 
Thirteenth Five-year National Science and Technology Innovation and Social 
Development Planning (Ministry of Science and Technology 2016 No.404) ‘
:’ÏăȄO®ďȇŘůɟ 2016 (Ïȇ®Ȅ
2016404·) 
Thirteenth Five-year National Science and Technology Innovation Plan (State Council 
2016 No 43) ‘:’ÏăȇŘůɟ 2016 (Ï®
201643·) 
‘Through Huawei to See the Cost and Value of Patents’ China Intellectual Property 
(CNIPR) (2016) 
<www.cnipr.com/yysw/zscqjyytrz/201605/t20160504_196682.htm> %Ïǽɳ
=ƏȱE¡'ǹǲŎƋJ` (2016) 
Thurow LC, ‘Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights’ [1997] Harvard 
Business Review 
<http://business.kingston.ac.uk/sites/all/themes/kingston_business/retake/bs670
1innovation1.pdf> 
Torremans P, Shan H and Erauw J, Intellectual Property and TRIPS Compliance in 
China, Chinese and European Perspective (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 
2007) 
Treaty Between the United States and China for the Extension of the Commercial 
Relations Between Them (1903), available at 
<www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/209>  
Twining W, Law in Context: Enlarging a Discipline (Clarendon Press 1997) 
 =?A
United States Information Service, ‘U.S Trade Deficit Hits Record as Imports Rise, 
Exports Drop’ News Release (22 June 1995) 
US Department of State, ‘Intellectual Property: Memorandum of Understanding 
between the United States of America And the People’s Republic of China’ [1992] 
12036 Treaties and Other International Acts Series 6 
US Department of State, ‘Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and 
Business Affairs, E. Anthony Wayne Before the Senate Judiciary Committee’ 
(2004) 
US Department of State, ‘Trade Official Urges China to Punish IPR Violators 
Forcefully’ (2005) 
van Someren TCR and van Someren-Wang S, Innovative China: Innovation Race 
Between East and West (Springer Berlin 2013) 
Varum CA, Huang C and Gouveia JJBG, China: Building an Innovative Economy 
(Chandos Publishing Limited 2007) 
W.Pontius AW, Protection Extended to Patents, Designs, Framed-Marks and 
Copyrights in China, Japan and Korea (Government Printing Office 1909) 
Wang L, ‘Intellectual Property Protection in China’ [2004] 36 The International 
Information & Library Review 253 
Wang Y, ‘China’s National Innovation System and Innovation Policy’ (2012) 
<http://apctt.org/nis/sites/all/themes/nis/pdf/CSNWorkshop_Report_P2S2_Wan
g.pdf> 
Warren M, ‘US- China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual Property, and the Rule of 
Law in a Global Economy’’ in MA Cohen, E Bang and S Mitchell (eds), Chinese 
Intellectual Property Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International 1999) 
Watson A, Comparative Law: Law, Reality and Society (3rd Edition) (3rd edn, 
Vandeplas Publishing 2010) 
Wechsler A, ‘Intellectual Property Law in the People’s Republic of China: A Powerful 
Tool for Innovation and Development’ [2011] China-EU Law Journal, Online 
Version 
Wei S, ‘Intellectual Property, Innovation and the Ladder of Development: Experience 
of Developed Countries for China’, Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014) 
Wei-Ning Y and Anderw Y Y, ‘The Dragon Gets New IP Claws: The Latest 
Amendments to the Chinese Patent Law’ [2009] Intellectual Property & 
Technology Law Journal, < http://www.ipo.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/DragonGetsNewIPClaws.pdf> 
Wen T, ‘The Relationship between China’s Strategic Changes and Its Industrialization 
and Capitalization’ in TY Cao (ed), The Chinese Model of Modern Development 
(Routledge 2005) 
 =?B
Wen X, Intellectual Property Lawyer Based Legal Practices (Renmin University Press 
2014) ǒŶǽɳ=ƏĹĜÛȀÿAƱäúǛȄ 2014 
Wen X, ‘Planning Development Department of the State Intellectual Property Office: 
Improving Intellectual Property Protection, Establishing Innovative Countries’ 
[2007] Patent Statistics Bulletin 
Wessner WC and Shivakumar JS, India’s Changing Innovation System: Achievements, 
Challenges and Opportunity for Cooperation (The National Academies Press 
2007) 
Whyte MK, ‘Sub-Optimal Institutions but Superior Growth: The Puzzle of China’s 
Economic Boom’ in J Lin and L Wang (eds), China’s Economic Dynamics: A 
Beijing Consensus in the Making? (Routledge 2014) 
WIPO, ‘Annual Report – Innovation Breakthrough and Economic Growth’ (2015) 
WIPO, ‘ǭǽɳ=ƏŚÃ——ȎǿůȪǊÝʽ’ 
WIPO, ‘US and China Drive International Patent Filing Growth in Record-Setting Year’ 
(2015) <www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2014/article_0002.html> 
Woo MYK and Gallagher ME, Chinese Justice - Civil Dispute Resolution in 
Contemporary China (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
WTO, ‘Overview: The TRIPS Agreement’ 
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2b_e.htm#enforcement>  
Wu H, ‘Challenges and Opportunities: the 10 Years IP Career After China Joined WTO’ 
[2011] Intellectual Property 13 Âƴ!, ‘şőƍʦ%Ïi 10ġǲǽɳ
=Ə6’ [2011] ǽɳ=Ə 13 
Wu H, ‘The International Environment and Domestic Context of the Implementation 
of Intellectual Property Strategy’ [2012] Legal Science 3 Âƴ!, ‘ǽɳ=Əő
ǮÿŲǲÏ˃ǢÜ%ÏÓſ’ [2012] ƿú 3 
Wu H, Intellectual Property System Under The Trend of International Changes and the 
Overall Development of China [2009] Law Studies 3-17 Âƴ!, ‘Ï˃¯˔ä
%Ï®ďäč%ǲǽɳ=ƏĨ’ [2009] ƿúǾȋ 3-17 
Wu H, The Characters and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Intellectual Property Court)’ 
2014 People’s Court News, <http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/images/2014-
09/03/05/2014090305_pdf.pdf> Âƴ!, ‘ǽɳ=ƏƿˆǲʿƿˆĐŃ
Đȝʗȸȿ’, AƱƿˆŚ 
Wu H, ‘Intellectual Property Law In the New Era of Knowledge Innovation’ [2010] 
Northern Legal Science 157 Âƴ!, ‘ǽɳůŷFǲǽɳ=Əƿ’ [2010] 
Űƿú 157 
Wu H, ‘Innovation-Driven And Development Of Intellectual Property Under The New 
Economic Norm’ [2016] Legal Science Âƴ!, ‘ȪǊůĞŁǽɳ=Əǲ
ů˟®ď’ [2016] ƿú 
 =?C
Wu H, Studies on Intangible Property System ( Law Press 2005) Âƴ!, ųĶʆ=
ĨǾȋ (ƿĹǛȄ 2005) 
Wu H, Intellectual Property Law (6th edition, Peking University Press 2014) Âƴ!
ǽɳ=ƏƿȗlǛ?äúǛȄ 2014 
Wu H and Suo F, ‘Ideas and Policies on China IPR Judicial Protection’ [2013] 
Contemporary Legal Sciences 
Wu H, ‘The Objectives of Patent Law Implementation and Its Security System’ [2015] 
Intellectual Property 
Wu H, ‘To Rethink the Identity, Subject and Object of Intellectual Property by 
Comparatively Studying Property Ownership’ [2000] Legal Review 
Wu Y, ‘China’s Development Road’ (2006), First China-US Strategic Economic 
Dialogue  
Wu Y, ‘Promoting IPR Policy and Enforcement in China - Summary of OECD-China 
Dialogues on Intellectual Property Rights Policy and Enforcement’ (Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and development 2005) 
Xi J, ‘Transition to Innovation-Driven Growth’ (Address to the 17th General Assembly 
of the members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the 12th General 
Assembly of the Members of the Chinese Academy of Engineering 9 June 2014) 
in J Xi, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages Press 2014)  
Xi J, The Encyclopedia of Scientific Development (Shanghai Lexicographic Publishing 
House 2007) êǃA, ȇú®ďɞǱȇɵsǌʘ2ǛȄ2007 
Xi J, ‘Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road’ (14 May 2017) 
<https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/home/rolling/13299.htm>  
Xi J, Explanatory Notes to the ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing 
the Reform’ in J Xi, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages Press 2014) 
(9 November 2013) 
Xi J, The Governance of China (Foreign Languages Press 2014) 
Xu B, ‘The Current Patent Protection Situation of Computer Software in China and 
Suggestions’ [2012] Science and Technology Innovations and Intellectual 
Properties 68 ĺ¤, ‘ŏÏɧȜƍʕIǲ\řǣǝ«ćșĬɪ’ [2012] 
ȇŘůǽɳ=Ə	 68 
Xue H and Zheng C, Software Protection in China: A Complete Guide (Sweet & 
Maxwell Asian 1999) 
Xue L, ‘A Historical Perspective of China’s Innovation System Reform: A Case Study’ 
[1997] Journal of Engineering Technology Management 14 
Yang D, Sonmez M and Bosworth D, ‘Intellectual Property Abuses: How Should 
Multinationals Respond?’ [2004] 37 Long Range Planning 459 
 =?D
Yang DL, ‘Economic Transformation and State Rebuilding in China’ in BJ Naughton 
(ed), Holding China Together, Diversity and National Integration in the Post-
Deng Era (Cambridge University Press 2004) 
Yang G, Monograph on the Legal Issues of China Joining WTO, Law Press 1999ƔÏ
¡, %ÏiWTOƿĹˀ˚ɮ (ƿĹǛȄ 1999) 
Yang H and Cheng Y, ‘The Empirical Analysis of Evaluating the Implement Effect of 
Introduction Overseas High-Level Talents Policy’ [2013] 16 Science & 
Technology Progress Policy 
Yang J, Li Y and Meng X, Strategic Thoughts on the Chinese Software Industry’ China 
Information Almanac (2002) Ɣb,Ɛ˙ů,øƧ, ‘o8ŏÏʕI=ǲőǮł
ȵ’, [2002] %Ï]Ņġʶ 
Yang L, ‘Implementation of China’s Rejuvenation through Knowledge’ in K Shao and 
X Feng (eds), Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited 2012) 
Y Liu and others, ‘International Comparison on Patents of Seven Strategic Emerging 
Industries’ [2014] Chinese Science Forum 68 ɉơ, TƵ, Ĳʍ, ‘äőǮ
Ńůp=ŘƌůŁǲÏ˃Ưʖ’[2014] %ÏȇŘɮÖ 68 
Ying M and Sun Y, Intellectual Property Protections on Computer Software 
(Intellectual Property Publishing House 2009) ħŸ,öķ, ɧȜƍʕIǲǽɳ
=Ə\ř, ǽɳ=ƏǛȄǛ (2009) 
You J and Chang H-J, ‘The Myth of Free Labor Market in Korea’ [1993] 12 
Contributions to Political Economy 
Yu J and Chen K, ‘Current Situation and Challenge of Technological Innovations in 
Chinese Strategic Emerging Industries’ [2012] Studies in Science of ScienceT
Ƶ, ˄¡‘%ÏőǮŃůp=ǲŘƌůǣǝşő——Û8ŭ
ǞɧʴǲɡĨ’ 2012 ȇúúǾȋ 30 
Yu P, ‘Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle’ in D 
Gervais (ed), Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: strategies to 
optimize economic development in a TRIPS Plus Era (Oxford University Press 
2007)  
Yu P, ‘The International Enclosure of China’s Innovation Space’, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in China (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014) 
Yu P, ‘The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in China’ [2002] 11 
Occasional Papers in Intellectual Property from BN Cardozo School of Law, 
Yeshiva University 
Yu P, ‘The Transplant and Transformation of Intellectual Property Laws in China’ in 
N Lee, N Bruun and M Li (eds), Governance of Intellectual Property rights in 
China and Europe (Elgar Intellectual Property and Global Development 2016) 
 =@;
Yuan D, ‘Establishing the Intellectual Property Court Aims to Standardize the Market 
Competition’ Legal Daily (9 June 2014) ɘþǀ,’ɰȒǽɳ=ƏƿˆŊÑɟɎ
ĚÓȓ5’ƿŵŚ2014ġ 6Ƅ 9ŵ 
Zeng M and Williamson P, Dragons at Your Door: How Chinese Cost Innovation Is 
Disrupting Global Competition (Harvard Business School Press 2007) 
Zhang N, Analyses on Selected US Patent-Related Cases (China University of Politic 
and Law Press 1995) Ĳ*ƞ, ȲÏƿWʣƘ, %ÏŨƿäúǛȄ, 
1995 
Zhang P, Intellectual Property Law Analyses, Beijing University Press 1994 ĲĠǽ
ɳ=Əƿɺɮ?äúǛȄ1994 
Zhang P and Ma X, Sharing of Knowledge: Analysis on Intellectual Property Issues 
Related to Open Source Software (Peking University Press 2005)ĲĠ,˞ˠ, n
>ƀŋĭǔʕIǽɳ=Əˀ˚ɢƘ, ?äúǛȄ(2005) 
Zhang J, The Development of High-Tech Enterprises in China’s Universities 
(Huazhong Science and Technology University Press 2003) 
Zhang K, ‘Rise of Chinese Multinational Firms’ [2009] 42 The Chinese Economy 81 
Zhang P and Lu H, ‘From Refusing Protection to Providing FacilitiesA Chronological 
Study of Desirability of Computer Software Patent’ [2001] Intellectual Property 
222 
Zhang P and Meng Z, ‘Computer Software, Information Technology and E-commerce 
(1)’ in R Kariyawasam (ed), Chinese Intellectual Property and Technology Laws 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011) 
Zhang P, ‘The Change of the Computer Software Patent Protection Concept On the E—
Commerce Environment’ [2000] Intellectual Property 22 
Zhang Z, ‘Roadmaps of China’s National Intellectual Property Strategy Outline’ in K 
Shao and X Feng (eds), Innovation and Intellectual Property in China (Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited 2014) 
Zhao R, ‘Long-term Development Plan: Drawing on the Experience of International 
Experience - Interpretation of China's Medium and Long-term Economic 
Development and Transformation: Reflections and Suggestions from an 
International Perspective’[2011] Dynamics of Economics 4 ʋAP, ‘%ʽƈ®
ďɟ_ʶÏ˃Ȫˡǲˀ˚ ——ɢɽ%ÏȪǊ%ʽƈ®ďÇʔ×Ï˃
ɠɡǲłȵĬɪ	’ [2011] ȪǊúŁ 4 
Zhao Y and Bruun N, ‘Chinese Developments Regarding Judicial Enforcement 
Mechanisms in Intellectual Property Law’, Governance of Intellectual Property 
rights in China and Europe (Edward Edgar 2016) 
Zhao Y, The Gestation and Birth of China’s Patent Law (Intellectual Property 
Publishing House 2003) 
 =@<
Zhao YG, The Preparation and Emergence of Chinese Patent Law (Intellectual 
Property Press 2003) ʋeƚ, %ÏƿǲôȽɸǦ (ǽɳ=ƏǛȄ 
2003) 
Zheng B, China’s Peaceful Raise- Speeches of Zheng Bijian (1997-2005) (Brookings 
Institution Press 2005) 
Zheng BJ, ‘The Peaceful Rise of China and the Future of Asia, Lecture BFA in 
2003’[2004] Theoretical Reference ʭĽÕ ‘%ÏÇĠēʌůʧʑÇ;Ǉǲ
ƉƓ——Ñ 2003ġ¤˥;ǇɮÖǲɬǖ’ [2004] ǥɮªȵ 
Zheng C, ‘Review the Intellectual Property Research in the 20th Century’ [1999] 
Intellectual Property 3 
Zheng C, ‘The International System of Intellectual Property and the Law of Intellectual 
Property of China’ [1984] China Legal Science 166 
Zheng C, Chengsi’s Enlightenments (Intellectual Property Press, 2012) ʭŎł, Ŏł
Ĭɣĵ (ǽɳ=ƏǛȄ 2012)  
Zheng C, Intellectual Property Law- Some Research Focuses for the Beginning of the 
New Century (Law Press 2004) ʭŎł, Nɳ=ƏG——:ȤMX.O
SaI (G0JQ 2004)  
Zheng S and others, Peking University Encyclopedia of Jurisprudence (Peking 
University Press 2001) 
Zheng YX, ‘The Idea Establishing the quota system for judges’, People’s Judiciary 25
ʭƳż‘ĬȒƿýÄ˛Ĩ-Ɨŉ’ [2003] 7AƱ¸ƿ 25 
Zhong L, Liu J and Wang J, ‘The Strategic Cohesion on the IPR Judicial Protection and 
Administrative Enforcement’ [2009] Technology and Law 
Zhou Q, ‘Report on the Work of the Supreme People’s Court (2013-2014)’ (Supreme 
People’s Court 2014) SPC official report delivered for the Second Session of the 
Twelfth National People’s Congress) <www.china.org.cn/china/2014-
05/08/content_32331522.htm> 
Zhou Z and Dai Q, ‘Analysis on the Establishment of China Exclusive Intellectual 
Property Courts’ [2014] Shangdi Forum of Intellectual Property ÅľP, ŒÁ
ǆ, ‘ŏÏǽɳ=ƏƿˆɰȒŰƠţɨ’ 2014ġǽɳ=ƏÒɮÖ 

